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Difference between revisions of "Belgium"
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The agenda: | The agenda: | ||
*18h00 - 18h45: '''Welcome & sandwiches'''<br> | *18h00 - 18h45: '''Welcome & sandwiches'''<br> | ||
− | *18h45 - 19h00: '''OWASP Update''' (by Sebastien Deleersnyder, OWASP Belgium Board)<br> | + | *18h45 - 19h00: '''[https://www.owasp.org/images/4/41/Owasp_Belgium_update_2013-12-17_v1.pptx OWASP Update]''' (by Sebastien Deleersnyder, OWASP Belgium Board)<br> |
− | *19h00 - 20h00: '''Smart metering privacy''' (by George Danezis)<br> | + | *19h00 - 20h00: '''[https://www.owasp.org/images/f/f8/Danezis-owasp14.pptx Smart metering privacy]''' (by George Danezis)<br> |
:''Abstract:'' In the past few years tremendous cryptographic progress has been made in relation to primitives for privacy friendly-computations. These include celebrated results around fully homomorphic encryption, faster somehow homomorphic encryption, and ways to leverage them to support more efficient secret-sharing based secure multi-party computations. Similar break-through in verifiable computation, and succinct arguments of knowledge, make it practical to verify complex computations, as part of privacy-preserving client side program execution. Besides computations themselves, notions like differential privacy attempt to capture the essence of what it means for computations to leak little personal information, and have been mapped to existing data query languages. | :''Abstract:'' In the past few years tremendous cryptographic progress has been made in relation to primitives for privacy friendly-computations. These include celebrated results around fully homomorphic encryption, faster somehow homomorphic encryption, and ways to leverage them to support more efficient secret-sharing based secure multi-party computations. Similar break-through in verifiable computation, and succinct arguments of knowledge, make it practical to verify complex computations, as part of privacy-preserving client side program execution. Besides computations themselves, notions like differential privacy attempt to capture the essence of what it means for computations to leak little personal information, and have been mapped to existing data query languages. | ||
:So, is the problem of computation on private data solved, or just about to be solved? In this talk, I argue that the models of generic computation supported by cryptographic primitives are complete, but rather removed from what a typical engineer or data analyst expects. Furthermore, the use of these cryptographic technologies impose constrains that require fundamental changes in the engineering of computing systems. While those challenges are not obviously cryptographic in nature, they are nevertheless hard to overcome, have serious performance implications, and errors open avenues for attack. | :So, is the problem of computation on private data solved, or just about to be solved? In this talk, I argue that the models of generic computation supported by cryptographic primitives are complete, but rather removed from what a typical engineer or data analyst expects. Furthermore, the use of these cryptographic technologies impose constrains that require fundamental changes in the engineering of computing systems. While those challenges are not obviously cryptographic in nature, they are nevertheless hard to overcome, have serious performance implications, and errors open avenues for attack. | ||
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:''Bio:'' George Danezis is a Reader in Security and Privacy Engineering at the Department of Computer Science of University College London. He has been working on anonymous communications, privacy enhancing technologies (PET), and traffic analysis since 2000. He has previously been a researcher for Microsoft Research, Cambridge; a visiting fellow at K.U.Leuven (Belgium); and a research associate at the University of Cambridge (UK), where he also completed his doctoral dissertation under the supervision of Prof. R.J. Anderson. | :''Bio:'' George Danezis is a Reader in Security and Privacy Engineering at the Department of Computer Science of University College London. He has been working on anonymous communications, privacy enhancing technologies (PET), and traffic analysis since 2000. He has previously been a researcher for Microsoft Research, Cambridge; a visiting fellow at K.U.Leuven (Belgium); and a research associate at the University of Cambridge (UK), where he also completed his doctoral dissertation under the supervision of Prof. R.J. Anderson. | ||
*20h00 - 20h15: '''Break'''<br> | *20h00 - 20h15: '''Break'''<br> | ||
− | *20h15 - 21h15: '''Securing Complex Forms''' (by Jim Manico)<br> | + | *20h15 - 21h15: '''[https://www.owasp.org/images/d/db/HTML_Forms_and_Workflows_v3.pdf Securing Complex Forms]''' (by Jim Manico)<br> |
:''Abstract:'' The heart of how users interact with a web application is the HTML form submission. A great deal of very sensitive data flows over HTML forms. Securing web form submissions is critical for the construction of a secure web application. Multi-form workflows make securing form submissions even more complicated! This presentation will take you on a journey as untrusted data flows from a form submission into the many layers of a secure web application. | :''Abstract:'' The heart of how users interact with a web application is the HTML form submission. A great deal of very sensitive data flows over HTML forms. Securing web form submissions is critical for the construction of a secure web application. Multi-form workflows make securing form submissions even more complicated! This presentation will take you on a journey as untrusted data flows from a form submission into the many layers of a secure web application. | ||
:* Review some of the basic threats against web forms | :* Review some of the basic threats against web forms |
Revision as of 15:37, 23 February 2014
OWASP Belgium
Welcome to the Belgium chapter homepage. The chapter leader is Sebastien Deleersnyder
Participation
OWASP Foundation (Overview Slides) is a professional association of global members and is open to anyone interested in learning more about software security. Local chapters are run independently and guided by the Chapter_Leader_Handbook. As a 501(c)(3) non-profit professional association your support and sponsorship of any meeting venue and/or refreshments is tax-deductible. Financial contributions should only be made online using the authorized online chapter donation button. To be a SPEAKER at ANY OWASP Chapter in the world simply review the speaker agreement and then contact the local chapter leader with details of what OWASP PROJECT, independent research or related software security topic you would like to present on.
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