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Difference between revisions of "Chicago"

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6:30 Welcome message - Joe Bernik & Jason Witty, Lasalle Bank, ABN AMRO North America<BR>
 
6:30 Welcome message - Joe Bernik & Jason Witty, Lasalle Bank, ABN AMRO North America<BR>
 
6:40 "Webapps in Name Only" - Thomas Ptacek, Matasano Security<BR>
 
6:40 "Webapps in Name Only" - Thomas Ptacek, Matasano Security<BR>
7:20 <A HREF="http://wittys.com/owasp/cscott-Stronger%20Web%20Authentication-v1.0.ppt">"Token-less strong auth for web apps: A Security Review"</a> -  Cory Scott, ABN AMRO<BR>
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7:20 [http://wittys.com/owasp/cscott-Stronger%20Web%20Authentication-v1.0.ppt]"Token-less strong auth for web apps: A Security Review" -  Cory Scott, ABN AMRO<BR>
 
7:35 Q&A and Networking<BR>
 
7:35 Q&A and Networking<BR>
  
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- Web App Crypto Tricks
 
- Web App Crypto Tricks
  
'''<a href="http://wittys.com/owasp/cscott-Stronger%20Web%20Authentication-v1.0.ppt">Token-less strong authentication for web applications: A Security Review</a>'''
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'''[http://wittys.com/owasp/cscott-Stronger%20Web%20Authentication-v1.0.ppt]Token-less strong authentication for web applications: A Security Review'''
 
Cory Scott, ABN AMRO
 
Cory Scott, ABN AMRO
  
 
A short presentation on the threat models and attack vectors for token-less schemes used to reduce the risk of password-only authentication, but yet do not implement "true" two-factor technologies for logistical costs or user acceptance reasons. We'll go over how device fingerprinting and IP geo-location work and discuss the pros and cons of the solutions.  
 
A short presentation on the threat models and attack vectors for token-less schemes used to reduce the risk of password-only authentication, but yet do not implement "true" two-factor technologies for logistical costs or user acceptance reasons. We'll go over how device fingerprinting and IP geo-location work and discuss the pros and cons of the solutions.  
 
[[Category:OWASP Chapter]]
 
[[Category:OWASP Chapter]]

Revision as of 20:57, 16 December 2006

Welcome to the OWASP Chicago Local Chapter

Anyone in our area interested in information security is welcome to attend. Our meetings are informal and encourage open discussion of all aspects of application security. We invite attendees to give short presentations about specific topics.

If you have any questions about the Chicago chapter, please send an email to our chapter leaders, Joe Bernik or Jason Witty.

The Chicago chapter is sponsored by LaSalle Bank[1]

Next Meeting

The next Quarterly Chicago OWASP Chapter meeting will be held on December 13th, 2006 at 6PM CST. We have a very exciting agenda with two excellent presenters.

We hope to see you at the ABN AMRO Plaza at 540 W. Madison, Downtown Chicago, 23rd floor. Please RSVP to jason{AT}wittys.com by Monday 12/11/2006 if you plan to attend. Your name will need to be entered into the building's security system in order to gain access to the meeting.

Agenda:

6:00 Refreshments and Networking
6:30 Welcome message - Joe Bernik & Jason Witty, Lasalle Bank, ABN AMRO North America
6:40 "Webapps in Name Only" - Thomas Ptacek, Matasano Security
7:20 [2]"Token-less strong auth for web apps: A Security Review" - Cory Scott, ABN AMRO
7:35 Q&A and Networking

Webapps In Name Only Thomas Ptacek, Matasano Security

Where modern network architecture meets legacy application design, we get "The Port 80 Problem": vendors wrapping every conceivable network protocol in a series of POSTs and calling them "safe". These "Webapps In Name Only" are a nightmare for application security specialists.

In this talk, we'll discuss, with case studies, how tools from protocol reverse engineering can be brought to bear on web application security, covering the following areas:

- Locating and Decompiling Java and .NET Code - Structure and Interpretation of Binary Protocols in HTTP - Protocol Debugging Tools - Web App Crypto Tricks

[3]Token-less strong authentication for web applications: A Security Review Cory Scott, ABN AMRO

A short presentation on the threat models and attack vectors for token-less schemes used to reduce the risk of password-only authentication, but yet do not implement "true" two-factor technologies for logistical costs or user acceptance reasons. We'll go over how device fingerprinting and IP geo-location work and discuss the pros and cons of the solutions.