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REST Security Cheat Sheet
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Last revision (mm/dd/yy): 07/23/2017 DRAFT MODE - WORK IN PROGRESSIntroductionREST (or REpresentational State Transfer) is an architectural style first described in Roy Fielding's Ph.D. dissertation on Architectural Styles and the Design of Network-based Software Architectures. Resources in a system are represented by URL path elements. REST allows interaction with a web-based system via simplified URLs rather than complex request body or POST parameters to request specific items from the system. This document serves as a guide (although not exhaustive) of best practices to help REST-based services. Protocols for Authentication and Authorization
The OAuth 2.0 authorization framework enables a application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either by resource owners granting an application access to the HTTP service on their behalf, or by allowing an application to obtain access on its own behalf. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749
The OpenID Connect standard is based on OAuth 2.0 and is widely used in authentication. It allows Clients to verify the identity of the End-User based on the authentication performed by an Authorization Server, as well as to obtain basic profile information in JSON Web Token format. REST services are statelessREST APIs are stateless. Stateful APIs do not adhere to the REST architectural style. State in the REST acronym refers to the state of the resource which the API accesses, not the state of a session within which the API is called. While there may be good reasons for building a stateful API, it is important to realize that managing sessions is complex and difficult to do securely. Stateful services are out of scope of this Cheat Sheet. Passing state from client to backend, while making the service technically stateless, is an anti-pattern that should also be avoided as it is prone to replay and impersonation attacks. In order to implement flows with REST APIs, resources are typically created, read, updated and deleted. For example, an ecommerce site may offer methods to create an empty shopping cart, to add items to the cart and to check out the cart. Each of these REST calls is stateless and the endpoint should check whether the caller is authorized to perform the requested operation. Access ControlAnti-farmingMany RESTful web services are put up, and then farmed, such as a price matching website or aggregation service. There's no technical method of preventing this use, so strongly consider means to encourage it as a business model by making high velocity farming is possible for a fee, or contractually limiting service using terms and conditions. CAPTCHAs and similar methods can help reduce simpler adversaries, but not well funded or technically competent adversaries. Using mutually assured client side TLS certificates may be a method of limiting access to trusted organizations, but this is by no means certain, particularly if certificates are posted deliberately or by accident to the Internet. API Key can be used for every API request. If there is any suspecius behaviors in the API requests, it will be able to be idenfied by the API Key and revoke the specific API Key for further requets. Furthrmore, API rate limites control can also enforce on the API key as source of identifier of every API request. Protect HTTP methodsRESTful API often use GET (read), POST (create), PUT (replace/update) and DELETE (to delete a record). Not all of these are valid choices for every single resource collection, user, or action. Make sure the incoming HTTP method is valid for the session token/API key and associated resource collection, action, and record. For example, if you have an RESTful API for a library, it's not okay to allow anonymous users to DELETE book catalog entries, but it's fine for them to GET a book catalog entry. On the other hand, for the librarian, both of these are valid uses. Whitelist allowable methodsIt is common with RESTful services to allow multiple methods for a given URL for different operations on that entity. For example, a GET request might read the entity while PUT would update an existing entity, POST would create a new entity, and DELETE would delete an existing entity. It is important for the service to properly restrict the allowable verbs such that only the allowed verbs would work, while all others would return a proper response code (for example, a 403 Forbidden). In Java EE in particular, this can be difficult to implement properly. See Bypassing Web Authentication and Authorization with HTTP Verb Tampering for an explanation of this common misconfiguration. Protect privileged actions and sensitive resource collectionsNot every user has a right to every web service. This is vital, as you don't want administrative web services to be misused: The session token or API key should be sent along as a cookie or body parameter to ensure that privileged collections or actions are properly protected from unauthorized use. Protect against cross-site request forgeryFor resources exposed by RESTful web services, it's important to make sure any PUT, POST, and DELETE request is protected from Cross Site Request Forgery. Typically one would use a token-based approach. See Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) Prevention Cheat Sheet for more information on how to implement CSRF-protection. CSRF is easily achieved even using random tokens if any XSS exists within your application, so please make sure you understand how to prevent XSS. Insecure direct object referencesIt may seem obvious, but if you had a bank account REST web service, you'd have to make sure there is adequate checking of primary and foreign keys: In this case, it would be possible to transfer money from any account to any other account, which is clearly absurd. Not even a random token makes this safe. In this case, it would be possible to get a copy of all invoices. This is essentially a data-contextual access control enforcement need. A URL or even a POSTed form should NEVER contain an access control "key" or similar that provides automatic verification. A data contextual check needs to be done, server side, with each request. API Rate limitsThe objective of the API Rate limits is to reduce massive API requests that cause denial of services, and also to mitigate potential brute-force attack, or misuses of the services. The API rate limits can be controlled at API gateway or WAF. The following API rate limits mechanism can be considered.
The results of exceeding API rate limits can be temporarily blacklisted the application/API access or notification alert to relevant users/admin. The service should return HTTP return code. "429 Too Many Requests" - The error is used when there may be DOS attack detected or the request is rejected due to rate limiting. Input validationInput validation 101Everything you know about input validation applies to RESTful web services, but add 10% because automated tools can easily fuzz your interfaces for hours on end at high velocity. So:
Assisting the user makes the most sense, as the most common scenario is "problem exists between keyboard and chair" (PEBKAC). Help the user input high quality data into your web services, such as ensuring a Zip code makes sense for the supplied address, or the date makes sense. If not, reject that input. If they continue on, or it's a text field or some other difficult to validate field, input sanitization is a losing proposition but still better than XSS or SQL injection. If you're already reduced to sanitization or no input validation, make sure output encoding is very strong for your application. Log input validation failures, particularly if you assume that client-side code you wrote is going to call your web services. The reality is that anyone can call your web services, so assume that someone who is performing hundreds of failed input validations per second is up to no good. Also consider rate limiting the API to a certain number of requests per hour or day to prevent abuse. Secure parsingUse a secure parser for parsing the incoming messages. If you are using XML, make sure to use a parser that is not vulnerable to XXE and similar attacks. Strong typingIt's difficult to perform most attacks if the only allowed values are true or false, or a number, or one of a small number of acceptable values. Strongly type incoming data as quickly as possible. Validate incoming content-typesWhen POSTing or PUTting new data, the client will specify the Content-Type (e.g. application/xml or application/json) of the incoming data. The server should never assume the Content-Type; it should always check that the Content-Type header and the content are the same type. A lack of Content-Type header or an unexpected Content-Type header should result in the server rejecting the content with a 406 Not Acceptable response. Validate response typesIt is common for REST services to allow multiple response types (e.g. application/xml or application/json, and the client specifies the preferred order of response types by the Accept header in the request. Do NOT simply copy the Accept header to the Content-type header of the response. Reject the request (ideally with a 406 Not Acceptable response) if the Accept header does not specifically contain one of the allowable types. Because there are many MIME types for the typical response types, it's important to document for clients specifically which MIME types should be used. XML input validationXML-based services must ensure that they are protected against common XML based attacks by using secure XML-parsing. This typically means protecting against XML External Entity attacks, XML-signature wrapping etc. See http://ws-attacks.org for examples of such attacks. Framework-Provided ValidationMany frameworks, such as Jersey, allow for validation constraints to be enforced automatically by the framework at request or response time. (See Bean Validation Support for more information). While this does not validate the structure of JSON or XML data before being unmarshaled, it does provide automatic validation after unmarshaling, but before the data is presented to the application. Output encodingSend security headersTo make sure the content of a given resources is interpreted correctly by the browser, the server should always send the Content-Type header with the correct Content-Type, and preferably the Content-Type header should include a charset. The server should also send an X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff to make sure the browser does not try to detect a different Content-Type than what is actually sent (can lead to XSS). Additionally the client should send an X-Frame-Options: deny to protect against drag'n drop clickjacking attacks in older browsers. JSON encodingA key concern with JSON encoders is preventing arbitrary JavaScript remote code execution within the browser... or, if you're using node.js, on the server. It's vital that you use a proper JSON serializer to encode user-supplied data properly to prevent the execution of user-supplied input on the browser. When inserting values into the browser DOM, strongly consider using .value/.innerText/.textContent rather than .innerHTML updates, as this protects against simple DOM XSS attacks. XML encodingXML should never be built by string concatenation. It should always be constructed using an XML serializer. This ensures that the XML content sent to the browser is parseable and does not contain XML injection. For more information, please see the Web Service Security Cheat Sheet. CryptographyData in transitUnless the public information is completely read-only, the use of TLS should be mandated, particularly where credentials, updates, deletions, and any value transactions are performed. The overhead of TLS is negligible on modern hardware, with a minor latency increase that is more than compensated by safety for the end user. Consider the use of mutually authenticated client-side certificates to provide additional protection for highly privileged web services. Data in storageLeading practices are recommended as per any web application when it comes to correctly handling stored sensitive or regulated data. For more information, please see OWASP Top 10 2010 - A7 Insecure Cryptographic Storage. Message IntegrityIn addition to HTTPS/TLS, JSON Web Token (JWT) is an open standard (RFC 7519) that defines a compact and self-contained way for securely transmitting information between parties as a JSON object. JWT can not only be used to ensure the message integrity but also authentication of both message sender/receiver. The JWT includes the digital signature hash value of the message body to ensure the message integrity during the transmition. ConfidentialityRESTful web services should be careful to prevent leaking credentials. Passwords, security tokens, and API keys should not appear in the URL, as this can be captured in web server logs, which makes them intrinsically valuable. OK: NOT OK:
HTTP Return CodeHTTP defines status code [1]. When designing REST API, don't just use 200 for success or 404 for error. Here are some guideline to consider for each REST API status return code. Proper error handle may help to validate the incoming requests and better identify the potential security risks.
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Authors and primary editorsErlend Oftedal - [email protected] Other cheatsheets |
