SCG D BIGIP

Summary

The BIG-IP family of products offers the application intelligence network managers need to ensure applications are fast, secure and available. All BIG-IP products share a common underlying architecture, F5's Traffic Management Operating System (TMOS), which provides unified intelligence, flexibility and programmability. Together, BIG-IP's powerful platforms, advanced modules, and centralized management system make up the most comprehensive set of application delivery tools in the industry.

BIG-IP devices work on a modular system, which enables to add new functions as necessary to quickly adapt to changing application and business needs. The following modules are currently available for the BIG-IP system:

• Application Acceleration Manager (AAM)
• Advanced Firewall Manager (AFM)
• Access Policy Manager (APM)
• Application Security Manger (ASM)
• Global Traffic Manager (GTM)
• Link Controller (LC)
• Local Traffic Manager (LTM)
• Protocol Security Module (PSM)

Common Misconfigurations

BIG-IP persistence cookie information leakage

Description

An attacker can decode BIG-IP persistence cookie and receive sensitive information about internal network.

// Detailed description of the impact. Is it enabled by default? Vulnerable versions.

To implement persistence sessions BIG-IP system inserts a cookie into the HTTP response, which well-behaved clients include in subsequent HTTP requests for the host name until the cookie expires. The cookie, by default, is named BIGipServer<pool_name>. The cookie is set to expire based on the time-out configured in the persistence profile. The cookie value contains the encoded IP address and port of the destination server [1] in the following format: BIGipServer<pool name> = <coded server IP>.<coded server port>.0000

After decoding [2] this value an attacker receives an internal IP address and port number of backend servers. In some cases an attacker can also retreive sensitive informaion via <pool_name> value in the cookie name. For example, if an administrator give meaningful name to server pool (e.g. Sharepoint, 10.1.1.0, AD_prod) an attacker will get some additional information about network.

How to test

1. Find a cookie with name beginning with BIGipServer. 2. If the cookie value has the format described above then decode <coded server IP> and <coded server port> parts. 3. Analyze suffix of BIGipServer cookie name.

EXAMPLE 1

This example shows a GET request to BIG-IP with LTM module and response containing BIGipServer cookie.

GET https://x.x.x.x/ HTTP/1.1
Host: x.x.x.x

Result Expected:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Set-Cookie: BIGipServerOldOWA=110536896.20480.0000; path=/

Here we can see that pool has the meaningful name OldOWA and get the following destination server address:

• IP Address = 192.168.150.6
• Port = 80.

// Proof-of-concept here. Please include the screenshots and widely known tools/scanners!

Remediation

Initial/common value of parameter "listUsers" from config.xml is set to "true".

To assess the vulnerability it is enough to change the value to false:

<security>
	<listUsers>false</listUsers>
</security>

Misconfiguration 2

...

References

• F5 Networks Official Site
• BIG-IP Modules Datasheet - https://www.f5.com/pdf/products/big-ip-modules-ds.pdf

// please also include links to already existing OWASP pages!