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| − | = Talk Abstracts and Presentations = | + | = Training = |
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| − | ===Abusing, Exploiting and Pwning with Firefox Add-ons===
| + | No training plan. |
| − | '''Ajin Abraham''' [https://docs.google.com/a/owasp.org/file/d/0B5Z9zE0hx0LNZWI0UC1MbjZCSEE/edit (Download the Presentation)]
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| − | | |
| − | The talk is about abusing and exploiting Firefox add-on Security model and explains how JavaScript functions, XPCOM and XPConnect interfaces, technologies like CORS and WebSocket, Session storing and full privilege execution can be abused by a hacker for malicious purposes. The widely popular browser add-ons can be targeted by hackers to implement new malicious attack vectors resulting in confidential data theft and full system compromise. This paper is supported by proof of concept add-ons which abuse and exploits the add-on coding in Firefox 17, the release which Mozilla boasts to have a more secure architecture against malicious plugins and add-ons. The proof of concept includes the implementation of a Local keylogger, a Remote keylogger, stealing Linux password files, spawning a Reverse Shell, stealing the authenticated Firefox session data, and Remote DDoS attack. All of these attack vectors are fully undetectable against anti-virus solutions and can bypass protection mechanisms.
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| − | ===A Call for Drastic Action: A Survey of Web Application Firewalls===
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| − | '''Jaeson Yoo''' [https://owasp.org/images/2/2b/APAC13_Jaeson_Yoo.pdf (Download the Presentation)]
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| − | Web application firewalls (WAFs) have become an unquestioned necessity in the modern world.
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| − | According to Gartner, 75% of all IT threats target the web application layer. The Ponemon Institute announced earlier this year that 93% of organizations hacked in the past two years were breached via insecure web applications. These are astounding figures, illustrating the vulnerability of web servers, through which we conduct so much of our daily business, as well as the significance of WAFs in addressing this vulnerability.
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| − | So why have so many businesses been reluctant to install WAFs? After all, they were designed specifically to deal with web application attacks. WAFs have been proven to block web attacks, and in some cases, provide effective countermeasures against them.
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| − | By taking a closer look at first- and second-generation web application firewalls, it seems to me that we can begin to find answers to this question. Until now, WAFs have been undermined by modified attacks, false positives, and an inordinate amount of burden to those who are entrusted to manage them.
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| − | | |
| − | First generation WAFs were based on a pattern-matching scheme, and brought about the advent of the Black List. The IT security administration would add a known attack pattern, and compile similar patterns to form the Black List. In so doing, the first-generation WAF could compare web traffic to its updated patterns, analyzing them at the application level. This list was static, meaning that there was no detection system put into place for new or modified attacks against the web application layer.
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| − | | |
| − | The first generation WAFs were not particular successful in the IT security market. Perhaps most companies wanted to stick with their Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems, ignoring the fact that these components did painfully little for the OSI Layer 7, or the web application layer. Perhaps companies wanted to actualize a return-on-investment on their legacy purchases.
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| − | | |
| − | But this does not mean that the first generation WAFs themselves didn’t have something to do with their disappointing sales. First, the heavy workload was a drawback. Administrators constantly had to update known attack patterns on the black list. This meant many hours for the WAF administration team, assuming that the end-user even had such a team. More often, it meant having to hire more people, an especially unattractive prospect for smaller, cash-strapped organizations. In other words, not only did you have to invest in WAFs, you also had to invest in an expensive, highly-trained IT staff to run them.
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| − | | |
| − | If first-generation WAFs provided top-notch security, perhaps the additional investments could have been digested. But WAFs did not protect against new or modified attacks. They also produced a significant number of false positives. Most significantly, all this work for marginal security also resulted in poor performance. If you put more than 3,000 signature-based rules, system performance begins to slow. More than 5,000 signatures means that you may have to delete some old rules, just to make rooms for new ones.
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| − | | |
| − | In light of these limitations, WAF providers came up with a second-generation solution to address some of these problems. Second-generation WAFs came with a white list, or a list that includes all permissible traffic. By using the white list along with the black list, these updated WAFs were supposed to make things easier for the WAF administrator, since the white list would essentially serve as an automated security policy.
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| − | | |
| − | Unfortunately, second-generation WAFs did little to alleviate manpower requirements. In fact, these updated WAFs resulted in a heavier workload for the administrator. The white list would take up to two weeks to implement. Also, in spite of the fact that these automated security policies were supposed to make things easier for the administrator, second-generation WAFs still needed manual configuration. All of this meant more work, not less.
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| − | | |
| − | Again, if all this meant greater web security, perhaps all of these problems could have been overlooked. But this wasn’t the case. It was still a pattern-matching solution, meaning that it was vulnerable to unknown or modified attacks. It still produced false positives at a significant rate. And with the white list, it now worsened the system performance problem.
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| − | WAFs were and are definitely necessary. But these first- and second-generation solutions were coming up significantly short. More importantly, hackers were becoming increasingly sophisticated with every new day. So what was needed?
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| − | A whole new breed of WAF, an intelligent WAF, based on an entirely new concept, is needed. This new breed should be capable of analyzing web traffic, and detect attacks by analyzing and classifying their modus operandi. After detecting attacks, WAFs needed to apply appropriate countermeasures to block the threat. And finally, for practically purposes (especially for smaller companies that can’t hire a whole brigade of security administrators), WAFs needed to do all this without continual administrative involvement. In other words, a new solution was needed to provide much better security, while lessening the administrative burden for customers.
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| − | | |
| − | ===Design Secure Web Applications===
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| − | '''Ashish Rao''' [https://www.owasp.org/images/f/f4/APAC13_Ashish_Rao.pdf (Download the Presentation)]
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| − | [https://www.owasp.org/images/f/f7/Checklist_For_Design.pdf Checklist for securing web application design]
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| − | | |
| − | We are all aware of “secure coding” and practice it to great extent while developing applications. But do we give equal attention to – “Secure Design”? Most of us would probably say, NO. Design level flaws are lesser known concepts but their presence is a very big risk to the applications. Such flaws are hard to find in static or dynamic application scans and instead require deep understanding of application architecture and layout to uncover them manually. With increasing business needs the complexities in application design and architecture are also increasing. There is a rise in the use of custom design techniques and diverse technologies in the applications today. But in the midst of all this, have we ever thought about design level security?
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| − | Will only secure coding practices help to keep a multi-tiered custom designed application safe?
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| − | | |
| − | If that question gets you thinking this presentation will help fetch you an answer for it.
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| − | This presentation focuses on highlighting some important secure design principles that developers and architects must adapt to build a secure application design. With the help of some design flaws we will see the areas of design that are exposed to security risks and what measures can be taken to avoid them in our design.
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| − | | |
| − | | |
| − | ===Dissecting Smart Meters===
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| − | '''Justin Searle''' [https://owasp.org/images/2/2a/APAC13_Justin_Searle_-_Dissecting_Smart_Meters_v4.pdf (Download the Presentation)]
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| − | | |
| − | The Smart Grid brings greater benefits for electric utilities and customer alike, however these benefits come at a cost from a security perspective. This presentation will explore the architecture of most Smart Meters, the protocols they use, a breakdown of their embedded components, and the functionality their headend servers contain. We'll explain the methodologies we've developed to perform penetration testing these AMI systems, enumerate the types of vulnerabilities we commonly find, and discuss the solutions we recommend to Smart Meter vendors. We will even demonstrate at least one of the attacks we commonly perform in our penetration tests. This will be done without the FUD and over-hyped framing that we usually find in the media and other Smart Grid presentations.
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| − | | |
| − | ===The Droid Exploitation Saga===
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| − | '''Aditya Gupta & Subho Halder''' [https://drive.google.com/a/owasp.org/?tab=mo#folders/0B5Z9zE0hx0LNZmgtazBya0dFMnc (Download the Presentation)]
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| − | | |
| − | In this talk, we will be discussing about the recent trends in Android Security Exploitation, as well as we will be carrying out all the possible attacks using a framework which we've designed called as Android Framework for Exploitation.
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| − | We will show how easy it could get to break into any Android Device, either using any exploit, or creating a malware using AFE. Also, in case the malware gets detected by any of the anti malwares, you 'll have the option to make it Fully Undetectable again and again, using the framework.
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| − | | |
| − | The things you would be able to steal with the help of AFE-created malwares, aren't limited to Contacts, Call Logs or Text messages, but you could also steal the application specific information (contained within the database files or saved using Content Providers).
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| − | | |
| − | We will be covering each topic with live demonstrations and will also discuss the case studies of vulnerabilities in some of the most popular android applications.
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| − | | |
| − | ===Growing sophistication of DDoS attacks===
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| − | '''John Ellis''' [https://owasp.org/images/6/68/APAC13_John_Ellis.pdf (Download the Presentation)]
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| − | | |
| − | 2012 saw the unprecedented growth in DDoS attacks, not only in volume but also in sophistication.
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| − | | |
| − | Gone are the days where DDoS attacks were the simple cheap and nasty, simplistic syn floods. Now they have evolved into a powerful cyber weapon, a weapon of choice for:
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| − | cyber extortion, aiding cyber criminals in their fraud activities, and hacktivists in pushing their cause.
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| − | | |
| − | Join John Ellis as he takes a deep dive into the growing sophistication of DDoS attack and examines:latest tools like 'itsoknoproblembro'the migration from the botnet to the Virtual Private Systems (VPS) as the attack platform of choice evolving C2 architecture the use of multi-vector attacks and the increasing attacks against and over SSL
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| − | common approaches to defending against these attacks, whats worked and what hasn't what organisations should be thinking about next; and ideas on how to build a protect and perform strategy along with the message to senior management to secure funding.
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| − | | |
| − | ===Hacking Authentication Checks in Web Applications===
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| − | '''Siddharth Anbalahan''' [https://www.owasp.org/images/c/c2/APAC13_Siddharth_Anabalahan.pdf (Download the Presentation)]
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| − | | |
| − | Authentication is one of the most coveted and targeted features for security attacks. Despite its importance and sensitivity we still fail to see robust implementations of this control in our applications. Developers just don’t seem to get it right and security researchers just cannot stop identifying flaws in them. In this talk we will look at 4 insecure authentication control implementation in web applications that will leave you astounded and make you understand why most of the applications will be prone to these flaws.
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| − | | |
| − | ===HTML 5 ===
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| − | '''Han-Ik Joo''' [https://www.owasp.org/images/6/6c/APAC13_JooHanik.pdf (Download the Presentation)]
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| − | | |
| − | HTML5 unlike the predecessors HTML that was impossible to implement features is the next generation standard language. However, vulnerability also is extended, and the fact that it is now possible to bypass existing countermeasures for Web-based security threats. In this talk, We will handle Demonstrations and the presentation of the security threats that can occur in the browser with the newly added features in HTML5. This talk include the following information as below:
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| − | | |
| − | *CSRF Using XHR Level2
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| − | *XSS using Newly added tag in HTML5
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| − | *Web Storage using information extraction
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| − | *WebSQL Information extraction using JavaScript
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| − | *Web Worker Injection
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| − | | |
| − | ===Invisibility Purge – Unmasking the Dormant Events of Invisible Web Controls – Advanced Hacking Methods for Asp.Net, Mono and RIA===
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| − | '''Shay Chen''' [https://owasp.org/images/6/6d/APAC13_ShayChen.pdf (Download the Presentation)]
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| − | | |
| − | Web Controls have become common in many popular platforms, enhancing the software lifecycle by speeding up development, and enabling developers to reuse custom content.
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| − | | |
| − | In platforms such as ASP.Net and Mono, the implementations of Web controls are packed with features that can enhance the security of applications, usually with minimum effort.
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| − | There are many ways to restrict the access to web controls, including privilege validation, deletion from pages that were duplicated for low privileged users, disabling controls, or even by making them invisible to anyone but users with pre-defined roles.
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| − | | |
| − | However, the event activation mechanism can also be a double-edged sword.
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| − | | |
| − | Invisibility, by definition, is in the eyes of the observer.
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| − | | |
| − | An object might be invisible to some eyes, while still being visible to instruments that were designed to locate it.
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| − | | |
| − | A new research reveals several methods that attackers can harness to unmask, enumerate and activate events of hidden web controls, even in popular platforms such as ASP.Net and Mono.
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| − | The slightest mistake or the right conditions can make this development model a fertile ground for attacks, enabling the attacker to completely ignore the security features of controls, and gain access to restricted and dormant server side events.
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| − | | |
| − | Locating invisible controls, Unmasking hidden events and activating them in-spite of various default and custom security measures – once only in theory, and now a step by step methodology that could be performed manually, or using designated tools.
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| − | | |
| − | This presentation will demonstrate several methods that can be used to locate invisible web controls, unmask secret events and activate dormant code. It will also discuss designated modules which are embedded into the upcoming release of the Diviner extension, an extension of the OWASP ZAP proxy project.
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| − | ===Missile of Cyber-terrorism, the reality of APT and Countermeasures===
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| − | '''Security Expert, Growing''' [https://owasp.org/images/9/9f/APAC13_Ihn-Hyuk._Song.pdf (Download the Presentation)]
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| − | APT’s attack is represented intelligented and sophisticated Hacking. As a result APT can be used to disturb the tackets. Here, this paper proposed to understand the reality of APT. In other words, APT’s definitions, properties, and Life-Cycle. Depending on derived properties, Security defense strategy is suggested differently.
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| − | | |
| − | === Open Source Metasploit - The Elixir of Network Security===
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| − | '''Harish Chowdhary and Shubham Mittal'''
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| − | | |
| − | <span style="color:red"> Talk Cancelled </span>
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| − | Today every organization intensely relies on the communication. Every part of an organization ought to operate closely & ought to be interconnected for the benefit of the organization. The term interconnected & communication signifies one of the most vital a part of an organization primarily of an IT organization is the Computer NETWORK.
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| − | Network is the backbone of an IT organizations Network security is a crucial concern for enterprises, government agencies, and organizations of all sizes. Today’s advanced threats demand an organized approach to network security. Information within a network has same importance like blood in our veins. But the increasing incidence of the network breaches leading to the critical information loss, finally loss of business & credibility, clearly indicates that computers networks are not secured as they seem. Therefore they must be tested for their security. The aim of this paper is to present the most effective open-source Framework for network security testing-METASPLOIT. This paper will provide the focused views on.
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| − | | |
| − | What is Metaspliot, how to use Metasploit for Penetration testing & its various advantages, how to customize you pen test. It will additionally also put lights on, how to find the intrusion in the network & mitigation techniques to keep away from the cyber assaults. Whole, the objective of this paper is to provide a detailed understanding of what is Metasploit and how to utilize it as a security professional.
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| − | ===Pentesting Web Apps with Python===
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| − | '''Justin Searle''' [https://owasp.org/images/5/58/APAC13_Justin_Searle_Python_Basics_for_Web_App_Pentesters.pdf (Download the Presentation)]
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| − | Interested in expanding your scripting skills to further customize your penetration testing approach? The goal of this talk is to teach you basic python skills you can use every day. Join one of the SamuraiWTF project leads and learn how to interact with websites using
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| − | python scripts and python shells. Understand the differences between the major HTTP libraries like httplib and urllib2. Walk through sample code that performs username harvesting and dictionary attacks. Learn how to use Python's multithreaded features to speed up your scripts. And most importantly, discover PyCIT, a new opensource
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| − | project that provides simple, documented, and functional python templates to accelerate your python scripting efforts.
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| − | ===Putting Security within the SDLC via Application Threat Modeling===
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| − | '''Tony UV''' [https://owasp.org/images/0/0b/APAC13_TonyUV.pdf (Download the Presentation)]
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| − | As delusions of effective risk management for application environments continue to spread, companies continue to bleed large amounts of security spending without truly knowing if the amount is warranted, effective, or even elevating security at all. In parallel, hybrid, thought provoking security strategies are moving beyond conceptual ideas to practical applications within ripe environments. Application Threat Modeling is one of those areas where, beyond the hype, provides practical and sensible security strategy that leverages already existing security efforts for an improved threat model of what is lurking in the shadows.
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| − | This presentation seeks to walk though practical applications and exercises associated with application threat modeling. Integration to multi-security focused disciplines will be included, such as dynamic analysis, static analysis, incident monitoring, vulnerability management, social engineering, penetration testing, and more.
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| − | The objective of the presentation is to illustrate the efficiency and effectiveness of application threat modeling in properly integrating and leveraging security information in order to evolve beyond a broken risk analysis model for application security today. The PASTA (Process for Attack Simulation & Threat Analysis) methodology will be introduced as part of this talk.
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| − | The target audience will encompass motley of both IS and IT professional, ideally providing a cross section of developers, project managers, system administrators, quality assurance engineers, security analysts, pen testers, network engineers, security risk analysts, and even compliance professionals. Due to the level of depth to be covered in the presentation which will go over Data Flow Diagramming, Application Decomposition exercises, correlation to existing frameworks such as Building Security-In Maturity Modeling, Software Assurance Maturity Modeling, and more.
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| − | ===Securing data with a Data Encryption Infrastructure===
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| − | '''Arshad Noor''' [https://owasp.org/images/0/04/APAC13_Arshad_Noor.pdf (Download the Presentation)]
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| − | | |
| − | As companies are challenged to keep up with an increasing number of data-security regulations worldwide, encryption of sensitive data has become the universal ""safe-harbor"", the last bastion of defense against unauthorized disclosure of data, mandated or highly recommended in every regulation.
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| − | While the protection of structured data-elements such as Credit Card Numbers, Bank Account numbers, etc., is addressed by applications on a case-by-case basis, we are entering an era where unstructured sensitive data are becoming equally attractive targets. Military documents, medical data, blueprints of new products, financial and legal documents, etc. are just as valuable as credit card numbers to attackers depending on their motiviation and backers.
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| − | While it is feasible for companies to address the protection of such documents on a case-by-case basis, it is far more effective to deploy a ubiquitous network service that addresses all of the following requirements:
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| − | *Provide a single point/protocol for commuication to the service (much like DNS or DHCP);
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| − | *Is accessible to any platform or programming environment;
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| − | *Provides automated scheduling of cryptographic operations (synchronous and asynchronous);
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| − | *Provides automated key-management (generation, escrow, recovery, etc.);
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| − | *Auto-scales cryptographic capability to address peaks/valleys of processing loads;
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| − | *Integrates with existing Identity and Access Management (IAM) infrastructure;
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| − | *Integrates with existing public/private Cloud services;
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| − | *Provides load-balancing and is highly-available; and
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| − | *Meets regulatory requirements of any data-security regulation anywhere.
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| − | While sounding more like a pipe-dream, this paper presents a case-study of a real-world implementation of such a network service to protect structured and unstructured content worth hundreds of millions of dollars, for one of the largest e-commerce companies in the world.
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| − | The Regulatory Compliant Cloud Computing (RC3) - a web-application architecture for secure cloud-computing - was presented at OWASP AppSec APAC 2012 in Sydney by this author, where it was fairly well received (to the best of my knowledge). RC3 is gaining attention worldwide, with IBM having translated the paper into Chinese, Portuguese and Russian for the BRIC markets on its developerWorks web-site (http://ibm.co/rc3dw), and the paper presented at various other conferences around the world (after AppSec APAC 2012).
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| − | This paper continues the discussion to present, for the first time, a real-world RC3 implementation, and discusses how the experience can be leveraged by others to address data-protection requirements. It will include details of the architecture, technology components (FOSS), and performance data to support the tenets described in the original RC3 paper from 2012.
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| − | ===Security Challenges of Hybrid Mobile Applications===
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| − | '''Mikko Saario''' [https://owasp.org/images/2/29/APAC13_Mikko_Saario.pdf (Download the Presentation)]
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| − | Mobile application development leveraging a hybrid technology stack is an accelerated way to bring new apps to market reusing existing competencies. Hybrid technology essentially refers to using several different coding languages instead of just the ""native"" one - whatever it may be in each case. Often existing code and services are reused to avoid expensive development for each distinctive platform. This way the ‘desktop web’ and the ‘mobile web’ are converging quickly - code can be shared and reused more and more. The focus technologies in this presentation are Windows Phone 8 and the Qt framework. Mikko will take a look into what kind of fundamental security mechanisms or threats do or do not exist in the two platforms to protect the user and the application from attacks when mixing several technology stacks. The expanding availability of development technologies opens up new attack surface, often with old attacks, to mobile applications: For instance, Windows Phone 8 introduced the possibility to implement applications in C++ in addition to the existing C#/Silverlight + web technologies. Are buffer overflows back? Qt is built on top of C++ and implements for instance the WebKit and QtQuick (QML with inline JavaScript) technologies for quickly developing cross-platform applications. The combination of these multiple stacks provide ample attack surface against mobile applications.
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| − | The presentation will cover security pitfalls when mixing native code and JavaScript in the Qt/QML stack, Qt-specific XSS and other injection issues, deploying code in webviews in both platforms - and the lack of common user security indicators in them, how malicious code can identify native methods exposed to a hybrid environment, how the same origin policy and code sandboxing differ from the typical desktop browser, how to leak your geolocation in Windows Phone, surprising differences in using a headless browser vs. IE Mobile in the older Windows Phone 7.5 and much more. Using a live demo application I will walk through several hybrid platform issues and threats in Windows Phone 8.
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| − | During the testing vulnerabilities were discovered in both the WP8 and Qt platforms and these will be demoed in cases where the vendor has either fixed the issue or the information is otherwise already public.
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| − | ===Using the Wisdom of the Crowd to Enhance Application Security===
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| − | '''Moshe Lerner''' [https://owasp.org/images/6/69/APAC13_Moshe_Lerner.pdf (Download the Presentation)]
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| − | Security-oriented source code analysis tools detect vulnerabilities only for well-defined hacks and tend to return many results which are hard to remediate. Two problems result: One, how can we overcome the lack of coverage? And two, how can we improve the ability to fix?
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| − | These problems are all the more pressing considering today’s short development cycles through Agile methodologies, the ever-increasing requirement for continuous deployment and large applications containing vast amounts of source code. In these environments, automation and accuracy are absolute necessities in order to achieve high rates of vulnerability detection and furthermore, taking the right preventive actions.
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| − | To address these challenges our research turned to the field of Big Data analysis to integrate their advanced technologies into our research. In this talk we present our research methodology and findings. In particular, we show how to:
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| − | # Adopt new technologies from the Big Data realm - used to locate required data and enable proper call for action – and apply them into source code analysis
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| − | # Identify security vulnerabilities through code irregularities using the Wisdom of the Crowds (large scale apps reference)
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| − | # Optimize vulnerability remediation of large result sets using smart graph methods that pinpoint vulnerability junctions and best-fix locations
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| − | ===Web Security - New Browser Security Technologies===
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| − | '''Tobias Gondrom''' [https://owasp.org/images/b/b8/APAC13_TobiasGondrom.pdf (Download the Presentation)]
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| − | | |
| − | This is cutting edge and will talk about new browser security technologies that have recently been developed and/or will be coming up in the coming months to counter risks that became apparent from the current trust model used in browsers. This will be improving channel protection and enabling better protection against XSS, Clickjacking and XSRF.
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| − | | |
| − | In the recent months global standard developing bodies and the browser vendors have in a joined effort developed and implemented many new major security capabilities in the browsers allowing web application developers to counter common security problems with comprehensive new mechanisms.
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| − | This talk will be talking about:
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| − | *Channel protection: Securing SSL against Man-in-the-middle-attacks: New technologies - HTTP Strict Transport Security and and Pinning of Certs
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| − | *Protection against XSS and clickjacking: the future of X-Frame-Options and the Content Security Policy
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| − | | |
| − | The presented technologies are cutting edge and although some parts of the specifications are not final yet, they will be rolled-out in about 6 months time.
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| − | ===What your CISO has not told you - Outbound security of cloud and enterprise web services===
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| − | '''Wong Onn Chee''' [https://owasp.org/images/4/4b/APAC13_Wong_Onn_Chee.pdf (Download the Presentation)]
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| − | | |
| − | This presentation will cover an important topic which no CISO ever mentions. Cloud and enterprise e-services are accessible 24x7 by anyone across the world, especially via mobile devices. Yet, efforts for past decades have sorely neglected the outbound risks of enterprise e-services and, in recent years, cloud and mobile services. Without outbound protection, incidents such as leaking private data, infecting visitors with malware and displaying defaced web pages are often reported by the press, damaging reputation and customer confidence. With tighter data privacy laws, many organisations are risking hefty legal penalties if they continue to neglect this risk area.
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| − | This talk will highlight the growing trend of web sites being used to leak information, transmit malware and display defaced content. The speaker will walk through a number of case studies and share with the audience on the lessons learnt from each case study. The speaker will also explain how the lack of outbound security protection contributed to the realized risk in each case study.
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| | = Open Source Projects = | | = Open Source Projects = |
