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Difference between revisions of "OWASP Good Component Practices Project"
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Revision as of 15:07, 1 May 2013
GCP Project Overview
This project documents a set of best practices for managing open source component vulnerability within enterprise applications. Fundamentally, we are concerned with usage throughout the entire component life cycle, from the time a component is selected for inclusion within the application through its deployment and maintenance within the production environment.
The underlying premise of this project is that the application itself should be part of the assurance process. Application self assurance needs to ensure that the "things" being placed into the system are not introducing new risks. Automated vulnerability discovery must be part of any continuous delivery process. If self-assurance and automated monitoring are not integrated into the entire life cycle of the component/application relationship, it is virtually impossible to assure the security of the system.
The notion of component life cycle management (CLM) has to be part of the delivery mechanism. Manual inspection after the fact as to whether a component puts the application or system at risk is no longer adequate, if it ever was. CLM has to be part of the software development process. Detection and monitoring have to be integrated into software delivery, itself.
When managing applications at enterprise scale, manual processes documented on a piece of paper or spreadsheet are not adequate. A system with 25,000 open source components must have self-assurance built into the tooling and development process. The tool itself says "I'm going to deploy this version. This version has been checked and I want to deploy it." The tool should be able to assert that all of the components that are part of that delivery mechanism have the characteristics necessary to meet the (enterprise) policy for that deployment to that type of infrastructure.
If self-assurance is not included in the tooling, the process is very easy to subvert. If the delivery tools themselves don't allow the subversion of the policies, and you can actually inspect the process, then it can be asked, "Was this tool chain used?" If the answer is "Yes, the tool chain was used", it can then be asserted that the only way for this component to get deployed is through the policies built within the tool." It is no longer left up to the discretion of individual developers to manage component vulnerabilities.
In this project, we will examine three gateways of component vulnerability and establish a series of best practices for managing component security. The output of the project will be a set of best practices for managing and monitoring open source components as part of the complete component life cycle.
Mark Miller 14:59, 26 April 2013 (UTC)
Gateways of Component Vulnerability
There are three gateways at which a vulnerable component may be included within an application: Selection/Consumption, Integration, Deployment. Each of these gateways must be policed and monitored to block, eliminate or manage vulnerable components. In this section, we describe the three gateways.
Consumption: Selection of the components and where they came from (provenance)
The first gateway of entrance to monitor for risk management is provenance - where does the componenent come from from. There are three levels of risk to examine at first gateway:
-- Licensing -- Security -- Quality
There must be a way to verify that the component downloaded is actually the component selected.
Once the component has crossed through the first gate, it becomes part of the development environment with other risk types
Integration: Component management within the development environment
Is the component I'm using actually what I have downloaded. How do I know that what I originally said was "ok" is actually what is being used? A simplified scenario for a downloaded file is:
I download a file and virus scan it on my machine.
The virus scan says it is clean so I put it in my local file directory.
How do I know the name wasn't changed, or the contents of the file haven't been altered?
At some later point in time, I use the file that I downloaded.
How do I insure that the thing that I downloaded is still what I thought it was?
The same is true for components. What kind of assurance can be made that the component has not been altered once it enters into the development environment.
Deployment: Component maintenance within the production environment
When the component moves into production, how do I ensure that what is actually running is the same thing that the developer that it was. How do I ensure that all along the path from selection through deployment, that the component is actually what I think it is. How do I verify that nothing has changed.
The gateways where risk can get introduced are the main points for automated monitoring and enforcement of policies and procedures. If I do all that great work up front, (this is validate, confirm integration with my current environment, etc,) then I need to ensure that that the component that was approved doesn't get invalidated by misconfiguration or manual change of version numbers to work around company policies.
Validation must be done through ever step in the supply chain to confirm that the component in use is what it says it is and hasn't been changed during the process.
Mark Miller 22:04, 24 April 2013 (UTC)
Outline for Good Component Practices
Component Selection
- Set standards and policy for component usage
- Identify components needed
Integration into Development Environment
- Verify company compliance policies
Integration and Maintenance within Production Environment
- Automated inventory of existing components, libraries and frameworks
- Monitor usage of deployed components
- Update risky components
- Move beyond penetration testing to find vulnerable components
Detailed Framework for Good Component Practices
Component Selection
(Rough outline: need details with downloadable check sheet)
- Set standards and policy for component usage
- Components must be actively maintained
- Component projects must have a security contact and security announcement list
- Component projects must use security tools and make the results public
- Component projects must have a history of responding to security vulnerability reports in a timely manner
- Component binaries must be generated directly from project source code using trusted tools
- Components with known vulnerabilities must be removed or updated within 1 month of vulnerability announcement
Integration into Development Environment
Integration and Maintenance within Production Environment
Project About
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