This site is the archived OWASP Foundation Wiki and is no longer accepting Account Requests.
To view the new OWASP Foundation website, please visit https://owasp.org
Difference between revisions of "Projects/OWASP Framework Security Project/Secure LDAP API Standard"
(→Supports LDAPS) |
|||
Line 40: | Line 40: | ||
== Supports LDAPS == | == Supports LDAPS == | ||
− | While not technically a standard, it is common to use LDAP over SSL/TLS on TCP port 636 (a.k.a. "LDAPS"). Often "<code>ldaps://...</code>" URLs are used to specify this and providing support for it is recommended give developers additional deployment options. | + | While not technically a standard, it is common to use LDAP over SSL/TLS on TCP port 636 (a.k.a. "LDAPS"). Often "<code>ldaps://...</code>" URLs are used to specify this and providing support for it is recommended to give developers additional deployment options. |
== Enables SSL/TLS Certificate Validation by Default == | == Enables SSL/TLS Certificate Validation by Default == |
Revision as of 15:50, 19 January 2016
This standard is designed to describe the specific properties secure LDAP APIs have. APIs with these properties help developers, regardless of their skill or experience with LDAP, avoid the most common and serious vulnerabilities associated with developing LDAP client software.
Version: 0.1
- 1 Properties of Safe LDAP APIs
- 1.1 Documents the Security Risks of LDAP Filter Injection
- 1.2 Documents the LDAP Bind Without Filter Queries
- 1.3 Provides an LDAP Filter Escape Function
- 1.4 Provides LDAP Filter Syntax Templates
- 1.5 Provides an Abstract API for LDAP Filter Queries
- 1.6 Supports LDAP with StartTLS
- 1.7 Supports LDAPS
- 1.8 Enables SSL/TLS Certificate Validation by Default
- 1.9 Documents the Customization of Trusted Certificate Authorities
- 1.10 Documents the Risk of Disabling Certificate Validation
- 2 Grading Scale
- 3 TODO
Properties of Safe LDAP APIs
Documents the Security Risks of LDAP Filter Injection
The API documentation should include a warning about the risks of LDAP filter injection. The warning should occur on pages associated with LDAP filters functionality so that it is hard for any programmer to miss. The warning maybe short (as little as one sentence), but should reference documentation that describes the risk of injections. Consider using LDAP injection or LDAP Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet as a reference.
Documents the LDAP Bind Without Filter Queries
TODO
Provides an LDAP Filter Escape Function
Escaping special characters in LDAP filter expressions is well described in section 3 of RFC 4515. The API should provide a function which accepts a string (potentially containing LDAP filter special characters) and returns a string with the same string with any special characters appropriately escaped. For example, the string "Asterisk (*) is more beautiful than backslash (\).
" would be converted to "Asterisk \28\2a\29 is more beautiful than backslash \28\5c\29.
".
Provides LDAP Filter Syntax Templates
A "syntax template" is one way to offer an API to a developer which automatically encodes LDAP filter special characters in a safe-by-default way. Consider the pseudocode:
result = LDAPFilterQuery("(&(objectClass=user)(firstName=*?*)(lastName=*?*))", [first_name, last_name])
In this hypothetical API, the developer provides a LDAP filter query template in the first argument and a list of values as the second argument. Each "?
" that appears in the template is bound in order to the value in the list. The LDAPFilterQuery
function is responsible for automatically encoding the values stored in first_name
and last_name
. Note how this is very similar to parameterized prepared statements in the realm of SQL.
An LDAP API should provide either a system for filter syntax templates, or an abstract API (see next item), or both.
Provides an Abstract API for LDAP Filter Queries
An abstract LDAP filter API allows developers to construct a data structure or model within the caller's language which is then automatically translated by the API into a safe LDAP filter expression. Consider the pseudocode:
result = LDAPFilterQuery(LDAPAnd({"objectClass":"user", "account":username}))
In this hypothetical API, if the username had a value "AcmeCorp\Bob
", then the LDAP filter expression generated by the API might look like: (&(objectClass=user)(account=AcmeCorp\5cBob))
Note how this is somewhat similar to object-relational mappings (ORMs) in the realm of SQL.
An LDAP API should provide either an abstract API, or a filter syntax template API (see previous item), or both.
Supports LDAP with StartTLS
Provide support for LDAP with the StartTLS extension, as defined in RFC 4513. In order to be effective (and avoid downgrade attacks), the API must provide callers with a way to require TLS be used on StartTLS connections. That is, if a developer opts for StartTLS as a communications security mechanism, then any remote server claiming that it does not support StartTLS will cause the client to close the connection without attempting a bind, search query, or any other transaction.
Supports LDAPS
While not technically a standard, it is common to use LDAP over SSL/TLS on TCP port 636 (a.k.a. "LDAPS"). Often "ldaps://...
" URLs are used to specify this and providing support for it is recommended to give developers additional deployment options.
Enables SSL/TLS Certificate Validation by Default
Whether the LDAP client library is using StartTLS or LDAPS, the client library should properly validate server certificates by default. Server certificate validation should include, at a minimum, the following two steps:
- Validation that the server certificate is signed by a trusted certificate authority
- Validation that the server certificate's host name matches the host name that the developer provided
Developers may be given the option of disabling one or both of these validation steps, but once again, they should be enabled by default.
Documents the Customization of Trusted Certificate Authorities
TODO
Documents the Risk of Disabling Certificate Validation
TODO
Grading Scale
TODO
TODO
- What other forms of encryption should we encourage? SASL and/or proprietary mechanisms?
- The LDAP injection page could use work. Some statements are a bit off base, and there should be a clearer statement of the risk.