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Difference between revisions of "HttpOnly"
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− | response.setHeader("Set-Cookie", "originalcookiename=originalvalue; HTTPOnly="); | + | response.setHeader("Set-Cookie", |
+ | "originalcookiename=originalvalue; | ||
+ | HTTPOnly="); | ||
'''Note''': This works OK for custom cookies, but the JSESSIONID is created and handled by the Java EE container, so you really cannot override the framework to add HTTPOnly to JSESSIONID | '''Note''': This works OK for custom cookies, but the JSESSIONID is created and handled by the Java EE container, so you really cannot override the framework to add HTTPOnly to JSESSIONID |
Revision as of 18:20, 27 July 2007
Overview
The goal of this section is to introduce, discuss, and discuss language specific mitigation techniques for HTTPOnly.
Who developed HTTPOnly? When?
According to Jordan Wiens' daily blog article, “No cookie for you!,” in 2002, HTTPOnly cookies were first implemented in Internet Explorer 6 SP1 by Microsoft Internet Explorer developers. Wiens, [1]
What is HTTPOnly?
According to the Microsoft Developer Network, an HTTPOnly cookie is an additional flag set on the client using a HTTP response header. Using the HTTPOnly flag helps mitigate the risk of client side script accessing the session cookie.
- The figure below shows the syntax used within the HTTP response header:
Set-Cookie: <name>=<value>[; <name>=<value>] [; expires=<date>][; domain=<domain_name>] [; path=<some_path>][; secure][; HttpOnly]
If the HTTPOnly flag (optional) is included in the HTTP response header, the cookie cannot be accessed through client side script or the web site that originally set the cookie. As a result, even if a cross-site scripting (XSS) flaw exists, and a user accidentally accesses a link that exploits this flaw, Internet Explorer will not reveal the cookie to a third party.
If a browser does not support HTTPOnly and a website attempts to set an HTTPOnly cookie, the cookie will be either ignored or demoted to a traditional, scriptable cookie. Unfortunately, this makes your session cookie vulnerable. Mitigating, [2]
Mitigating XSS using HTTPOnly
According to Michael Howard, Senior Security Program Manager in the Secure Windows Initiative group at Microsoft, the majority of XSS attacks succeed because a session cookie has been leaked. A server could help mitigate this issue by setting a flag within a HTTP response header, indicating a session cookie should never be accessed by the client.
If Internet Explorer detects a cookie containing the HttpOnly flag, and client side script code attempts to read the cookie, Internet Explorer returns an empty string. As a result, the attack fails by preventing the malicious XSS code from sending the data to an attacker's website. Howard, [3]
Java: Setting HTTPOnly
- Problem
- Most environments (e.g., Java EE) do not provide mechanism to set the HTTPOnly flag
- Solution
response.setHeader("Set-Cookie", "originalcookiename=originalvalue; HTTPOnly=");
Note: This works OK for custom cookies, but the JSESSIONID is created and handled by the Java EE container, so you really cannot override the framework to add HTTPOnly to JSESSIONID
C#.NET: Setting HTTPOnly
- By default, .NET 2.0 sets the HTTPOnly attribute for
- Session ID
- Forms Authentication cookie
In .NET 2.0, HTTPOnly can also be set via the HttpCookie object for all custom application cookies
- Via web.config in the system.web/httpCookies element
<httpCookies httpOnlyCookies="true" …>
- Or programmatically
HttpCookie myCookie = new HttpCookie("myCookie"); myCookie.HttpOnly = true; Response.AppendCookie(myCookie);
- However, in .NET 1.1, you would have to do this manually, e.g.,
Response.Cookies[cookie].Path += ";HTTPOnly";
VB.NET: Setting HTTPOnly
- By default, .NET 2.0 sets the HTTPOnly attribute for
- Session ID
- Forms Authentication cookie
In .NET 2.0, HTTPOnly can also be set via the HttpCookie object for all custom application cookies
- Via web.config in the system.web/httpCookies element
<httpCookies httpOnlyCookies="true" …>
- Or programmatically
Dim myCookie As HttpCookie = new HttpCookie("myCookie") myCookie.HttpOnly = True Response.AppendCookie(myCookie)
- However, in .NET 1.1, you would have to do this manually, e.g.,
Response.Cookies(cookie).Path &= ";HTTPOnly"
Browsers Supporting HTTPOnly
Using WebGoat's HTTPOnly lesson, the following web browsers have been tested for HTTPOnly capabilities. The results are listed below in table 1.
Browser | Version | Supports HTTPOnly? |
---|---|---|
Microsoft Internet Explorer | 6 (SP1) - 7 | Partially* |
Mozilla Firefox | 2.0.0.5 | Partially* |
Netscape Navigator | 9.0b2 | No |
Opera | 9.22 | No |
* An attacker could still access the session identifier cookie using a XmlHttpRequest.
Using WebGoat to Test for HTTPOnly Support
The goal of this section is to provide a step-by-step example of testing your browser for HTTPOnly support.
Getting Started
Assuming you have already installed and launched WebGoat, begin by navigating to the ‘HTTPOnly Test’ lesson located within the Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) category. After selecting the ‘HTTPOnly Test’ link, as shown in figure 1, you are now able to begin testing web browsers that support HTTPOnly.
Lesson Goal
If the HTTPOnly flag is set, then your browser should not allow client-side script to access the cookie. Unfortunately, since the attribute is relatively new, several browsers neglect to handle the new attribute properly.
The purpose of this lesson is to test whether your browser supports the HTTPOnly cookie flag. Note the value of the unique2u cookie. If your browser supports HTTPOnly and you enable it for a cookie, client side code should NOT be able to read OR write to that cookie, but the browser can still send its value to the server. However, some browsers only prevent client side read access, but do not prevent write access.
Testing Web Browsers for HTTPOnly Support
The following test was performed on two browsers, Internet Explorer 7 and Opera 9.22, to demonstrate the results when the HTTPOnly flag is enforced properly. As you will see, IE7 properly enforces the HTTPOnly flag, whereas Opera does not properly enforce the HTTPOnly flag.
Disabling HTTPOnly
1) Select the option to turn HTTPOnly off as shown below in figure 2.
2) After turning HTTPOnly off, select the “Read Cookie” button.
- An alert dialog box will display on the screen notifying you that since HTTPOnly was not enabled, the ‘unique2u’ cookie was successfully read as shown below in figure 3.
3) With HTTPOnly remaining disabled, select the “Write Cookie” button.
- An alert dialog box will display on the screen notifying you that since HTTPOnly was not enabled, the ‘unique2u’ cookie was successfully modified on the client side as shown below in figure 4.
- As you have seen thus far, browsing without HTTPOnly on is a potential threat. Next, we will enable HTTPOnly to demonstrate how this flag protects the cookie.
Enabling HTTPOnly
4) Select the radio button to enable HTTPOnly as shown below in figure 5.
5) After enabling HTTPOnly, select the "Read Cookie" button.
- If the browser enforces the HTTPOnly flag properly, an alert dialog box will display only the session ID rather than the contents of the ‘unique2u’ cookie as shown below in figure 6.
- However, if the browser does not enforce the HTTPOnly flag properly, an alert dialog box will display both the ‘unique2u’ cookie and session ID as shown below in figure 7.
- Finally, we will test if the browser allows write access to the cookie with HTTPOnly enabled.
6) Select the "Write Cookie" button.
- If the browser enforces the HTTPOnly flag properly, client side modification will be unsuccessful in writing to the ‘unique2u’ cookie and an alert dialog box will display only containing the session ID as shown below in figure 8.
- However, if the browser does not enforce the write protection property of HTTPOnly flag for the ‘unique2u’ cookie, the cookie will be successfully modified to HACKED on the client side as shown below in figure 9.
References
[1] Wiens, Jordan. No cookie for you!"
[2] Mitigating Cross-site Scripting with HTTP-Only Cookies
[3] Howard, Michael. Some Bad News and Some Good News