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Difference between revisions of "Testing for Session Fixation (OTG-SESS-003)"
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− | {{Template:OWASP Testing Guide | + | {{Template:OWASP Testing Guide v4}} |
== Brief Summary == | == Brief Summary == | ||
− | When an application does not renew | + | When an application does not renew its session cookie(s) after a successful user authentication, it could be possible to find a session fixation vulnerability and force a user to utilize a cookie known by the attacker. In that case, an attacker could steal the user session (session hijacking). |
+ | |||
− | |||
Session fixation vulnerabilities occur when:<br> | Session fixation vulnerabilities occur when:<br> | ||
* A web application authenticates a user without first invalidating the existing session ID, thereby continuing to use the session ID already associated with the user. | * A web application authenticates a user without first invalidating the existing session ID, thereby continuing to use the session ID already associated with the user. | ||
* An attacker is able to force a known session ID on a user so that, once the user authenticates, the attacker has access to the authenticated session. | * An attacker is able to force a known session ID on a user so that, once the user authenticates, the attacker has access to the authenticated session. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
In the generic exploit of session fixation vulnerabilities, an attacker creates a new session on a web application and records the associated session identifier. The attacker then causes the victim to authenticate against the server using the same session identifier, giving the attacker access to the user's account through the active session. | In the generic exploit of session fixation vulnerabilities, an attacker creates a new session on a web application and records the associated session identifier. The attacker then causes the victim to authenticate against the server using the same session identifier, giving the attacker access to the user's account through the active session. | ||
− | |||
− | == Black Box | + | Furthermore, the issue described above is problematic for sites that issue a session identifier over HTTP and then redirect the user to a HTTPS log in form. If the session identifier is not reissued upon authentication, the attacker can eavesdrop and steal the identifier and then use it to hijack the session. |
+ | |||
+ | ==How to Test== | ||
+ | === Black Box Testing === | ||
'''Testing for Session Fixation vulnerabilities:''' <br> | '''Testing for Session Fixation vulnerabilities:''' <br> | ||
− | The first step is to make a request to the site to be tested (example www.example.com). If | + | The first step is to make a request to the site to be tested (example www.example.com). If the tester requests the following: |
GET www.example.com | GET www.example.com | ||
− | + | They will obtain the following answer: | |
<pre> | <pre> | ||
HTTP/1.1 200 OK | HTTP/1.1 200 OK | ||
Line 29: | Line 33: | ||
Content-Language: en-US | Content-Language: en-US | ||
</pre> | </pre> | ||
− | + | ||
− | Next, if | + | |
+ | The application sets a new session identifier JSESSIONID=0000d8eyYq3L0z2fgq10m4v-rt4:-1 for the client. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | Next, if the tester successfully authenticates to the application with the following POST HTTPS: | ||
<pre> | <pre> | ||
POST https://www.example.com/authentication.php HTTP/1.1 | POST https://www.example.com/authentication.php HTTP/1.1 | ||
Line 48: | Line 56: | ||
Name=Meucci&wpPassword=secret!&wpLoginattempt=Log+in | Name=Meucci&wpPassword=secret!&wpLoginattempt=Log+in | ||
</pre> | </pre> | ||
− | + | ||
+ | |||
+ | The tester observes the following response from the server: | ||
<pre> | <pre> | ||
HTTP/1.1 200 OK | HTTP/1.1 200 OK | ||
Line 64: | Line 74: | ||
... | ... | ||
</pre> | </pre> | ||
− | |||
− | |||
− | |||
− | |||
− | == Gray Box | + | |
− | Talk with developers and understand if they have implemented a session token renew after a user successful authentication. | + | As no new cookie has been issued upon a successful authentication the tester knows that it is possible to perform session hijacking. |
− | '''Result Expected:''' | + | |
− | The application should always first invalidate the existing session ID before authenticating a user and if the authentication is successful, provide another sessionID. | + | |
− | + | ||
+ | '''Result Expected:''' | ||
+ | The tester can send a valid session identifier to a user (possibly using a social engineering trick), wait for them to authenticate, and subsequently verify that privileges have been assigned to this cookie. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | === Gray Box Testing === | ||
+ | Talk with developers and understand if they have implemented a session token renew after a user successful authentication. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | '''Result Expected:''' | ||
+ | The application should always first invalidate the existing session ID before authenticating a user, and if the authentication is successful, provide another sessionID. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | ==Tools== | ||
+ | * JHijack - a numeric session hijacking tool - http://yehg.net/lab/pr0js/files.php/jhijackv0.2beta.zip | ||
+ | * OWASP WebScarab: [[OWASP_WebScarab_Project]] | ||
+ | |||
== References == | == References == | ||
'''Whitepapers'''<br> | '''Whitepapers'''<br> | ||
* [[Session Fixation]] | * [[Session Fixation]] | ||
+ | * ACROS Security: http://www.acrossecurity.com/papers/session_fixation.pdf | ||
* Chris Shiflett: http://shiflett.org/articles/session-fixation | * Chris Shiflett: http://shiflett.org/articles/session-fixation | ||
<br> | <br> | ||
− | |||
− |
Latest revision as of 14:15, 31 July 2014
This article is part of the new OWASP Testing Guide v4.
Back to the OWASP Testing Guide v4 ToC: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Testing_Guide_v4_Table_of_Contents Back to the OWASP Testing Guide Project: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Testing_Project
Brief Summary
When an application does not renew its session cookie(s) after a successful user authentication, it could be possible to find a session fixation vulnerability and force a user to utilize a cookie known by the attacker. In that case, an attacker could steal the user session (session hijacking).
Session fixation vulnerabilities occur when:
- A web application authenticates a user without first invalidating the existing session ID, thereby continuing to use the session ID already associated with the user.
- An attacker is able to force a known session ID on a user so that, once the user authenticates, the attacker has access to the authenticated session.
In the generic exploit of session fixation vulnerabilities, an attacker creates a new session on a web application and records the associated session identifier. The attacker then causes the victim to authenticate against the server using the same session identifier, giving the attacker access to the user's account through the active session.
Furthermore, the issue described above is problematic for sites that issue a session identifier over HTTP and then redirect the user to a HTTPS log in form. If the session identifier is not reissued upon authentication, the attacker can eavesdrop and steal the identifier and then use it to hijack the session.
How to Test
Black Box Testing
Testing for Session Fixation vulnerabilities:
The first step is to make a request to the site to be tested (example www.example.com). If the tester requests the following:
GET www.example.com
They will obtain the following answer:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2008 08:45:11 GMT Server: IBM_HTTP_Server Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=0000d8eyYq3L0z2fgq10m4v-rt4:-1; Path=/; secure Cache-Control: no-cache="set-cookie,set-cookie2" Expires: Thu, 01 Dec 1994 16:00:00 GMT Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100 Connection: Keep-Alive Content-Type: text/html;charset=Cp1254 Content-Language: en-US
The application sets a new session identifier JSESSIONID=0000d8eyYq3L0z2fgq10m4v-rt4:-1 for the client.
Next, if the tester successfully authenticates to the application with the following POST HTTPS:
POST https://www.example.com/authentication.php HTTP/1.1 Host: www.example.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; it; rv:1.8.1.16) Gecko/20080702 Firefox/2.0.0.16 Accept: text/xml,application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 Accept-Language: it-it,it;q=0.8,en-us;q=0.5,en;q=0.3 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 Keep-Alive: 300 Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.example.com Cookie: JSESSIONID=0000d8eyYq3L0z2fgq10m4v-rt4:-1 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-length: 57 Name=Meucci&wpPassword=secret!&wpLoginattempt=Log+in
The tester observes the following response from the server:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2008 14:52:58 GMT Server: Apache/2.2.2 (Fedora) X-Powered-By: PHP/5.1.6 Content-language: en Cache-Control: private, must-revalidate, max-age=0 X-Content-Encoding: gzip Content-length: 4090 Connection: close Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 ... HTML data ...
As no new cookie has been issued upon a successful authentication the tester knows that it is possible to perform session hijacking.
Result Expected: The tester can send a valid session identifier to a user (possibly using a social engineering trick), wait for them to authenticate, and subsequently verify that privileges have been assigned to this cookie.
Gray Box Testing
Talk with developers and understand if they have implemented a session token renew after a user successful authentication.
Result Expected:
The application should always first invalidate the existing session ID before authenticating a user, and if the authentication is successful, provide another sessionID.
Tools
- JHijack - a numeric session hijacking tool - http://yehg.net/lab/pr0js/files.php/jhijackv0.2beta.zip
- OWASP WebScarab: OWASP_WebScarab_Project
References
Whitepapers
- Session Fixation
- ACROS Security: http://www.acrossecurity.com/papers/session_fixation.pdf
- Chris Shiflett: http://shiflett.org/articles/session-fixation