Difference between revisions of "Reviewing Code for Cross-site scripting"

Latest revision as of 23:37, 10 April 2014

Overview

Cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks occur when an attacker uses a web application to send malicious code, generally in the form of a browser side script, to a different end user. Flaws that allow these attacks to succeed are quite widespread and occur anywhere a web application reflects user input without validation or encoding.

Related Security Activities

Description of Cross-site Scripting Vulnerabilities

See the OWASP article on Cross-site Scripting (XSS) Vulnerabilities.

How to Avoid Cross-site scripting Vulnerabilities

See the OWASP Development Guide article on Phishing.

See the OWASP Development Guide article on Data Validation.

How to Test for Cross-site scripting Vulnerabilities

See the OWASP Testing Guide article on how to Test for Cross site scripting Vulnerabilities.

Vulnerable Code example

If the text inputted by the user is reflected back without proper encoding, the browser will interpret the inputted script as part of the mark up, and execute the code accordingly.

To mitigate this type of vulnerability we need to perform a number of security tasks in our code:

1. Validate data
2. Encode unsafe output

import org.apache.struts.action.*; 
import org.apache.commons.beanutils.BeanUtils; 
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest; 
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse; 

public final class InsertEmployeeAction extends Action { 

public ActionForward execute(ActionMapping mapping, ActionForm form,
    HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) throws Exception{ 

// Setting up objects and vairables.

Obj1 service = new Obj1(); 
ObjForm objForm = (ObjForm) form; 
InfoADT adt = new InfoADT (); 
BeanUtils.copyProperties(adt, objForm); 

	String searchQuery = objForm.getqueryString();
	String payload = objForm.getPayLoad();
try { 
service.doWork(adt);  / /do something with the data
ActionMessages messages = new ActionMessages(); 
ActionMessage message = new ActionMessage("success", adt.getName() ); 
messages.add( ActionMessages.GLOBAL_MESSAGE, message ); 
saveMessages( request, messages ); 
request.setAttribute("Record", adt); 
return (mapping.findForward("success"));
}
catch( DatabaseException de ) 
{
ActionErrors errors = new ActionErrors(); 
ActionError error = new ActionError("error.employee.databaseException" + “Payload: “+payload);
errors.add( ActionErrors.GLOBAL_ERROR, error ); 
saveErrors( request, errors ); 
return (mapping.findForward("error: "+ searchQuery)); 
} 
} 
}

The text above shows some common mistakes in the development of this struts action class. First, the data passed in the HttpServletRequest is placed into a parameter without being validated.

Focusing on XSS we can see that this action class returns a message, ActionMessage, if the function is successful. If an error the code in the Try/Catch block is executed, the data contained in the HttpServletRequest is returned to the user, unvalidated and exactly in the format in which the user inputted it.

import java.io.*; 
import javax.servlet.http.*; 
import javax.servlet.*; 

public class HelloServlet extends HttpServlet 
{ 
public void doGet (HttpServletRequest req, HttpServletResponse res) throws ServletException, IOException 
{ 

String input = req.getHeader(“USERINPUT”);

PrintWriter out = res.getWriter(); 
out.println(input);  // echo User input.
out.close(); 	
} 
} 

Following is a second example of an XSS vulnerable function. Echoing un-validated user input back to the browser provides a large vulnerability footprint.

.NET Example (ASP.NET version 1.1 ASP.NET version 2.0)

The server side code for a VB.NET application may have similar functionality.

' SearchResult.aspx.vb 
Imports System 
Imports System.Web 
Imports System.Web.UI 
Imports System.Web.UI.WebControls 

Public Class SearchPage Inherits System.Web.UI.Page 

Protected txtInput As TextBox 
Protected cmdSearch As Button 
Protected lblResult As Label Protected 

Sub cmdSearch _Click(Source As Object, _ e As EventArgs) 
	
// Do Search…..
	// …………

lblResult.Text="You Searched for: " & txtInput.Text 

// Display Search Results…..
// …………

End Sub 
End Class

This is a VB.NET example of a vulnerable piece of search functionality which echoes back the data inputted by the user. To mitigate against this, we need proper data validation and in the case of stored XSS attacks, we need to encode known bad input (as mentioned before). Note that this code might not be vulnerable if the developers use a proper declarative validation (ASPX regexp validator or routine, and validateRequest not set to False).

Classic ASP Example

Classic ASP is also XSS prone, just like most Web technologies.

 <%
    ...
    Response.Write "<div class='label'>Please confirm your data</div><br />" 
    Response.Write "Name: " & Request.Form("UserFullName")
    ...
 %>
 

Protecting against XSS

In the .NET framework there are some in-built security functions which can assist in data validation and HTML encoding, namely, ASP.NET 1.1 request validation feature and HttpUtility.HtmlEncode.

Microsoft in their wisdom state that you should not rely solely on ASP.NET request validation and that it should be used in conjunction with your own data validation, such as regular expressions (mentioned below).

The request validation feature is disabled on an individual page by specifying in the page directive.

 <%@ Page validateRequest="false" %>

or by setting ValidateRequest="false" on the @ Pages element.

or in the web.config file:

You can disable request validation by adding a

 <pages> element with validateRequest="false"

So when reviewing code, make sure the validateRequest directive is enabled and if not, investigate what method of data validation is being used, if any. Check that ASP.NET Request validation is enabled in Machine.config. Request validation is enabled by ASP.NET by default. You can see the following default setting in the Machine.config file.

 <pages validateRequest="true" ... /> 

HTML Encoding:

Content to be displayed can easily be encoded using the HtmlEncode function. This is done by calling:

 Server.HtmlEncode(string)

Using the HTML encoder example for a form:

Text Box: <%@ Page Language="C#" ValidateRequest="false" %>

 <script runat="server"> 
 void searchBtn _Click(object sender, EventArgs e) { 
 Response.Write(HttpUtility.HtmlEncode(inputTxt.Text)); } 
 </script> 
 <html> 
 <body> 
 <form id="form1" runat="server"> 
 <asp:TextBox ID="inputTxt" Runat="server" TextMode="MultiLine" Width="382px" Height="152px"> 
 </asp:TextBox> 
 <asp:Button ID="searchBtn" Runat="server" Text="Submit" OnClick=" searchBtn _Click" /> 
 </form> 
 </body> 
 </html>

For Classic ASP pages the encoding function is used pretty much the same as in ASP.NET

Response.Write Server.HtmlEncode(inputTxt.Text)

Stored Cross Site Script

Using HTML encoding to encode potentially unsafe output.

Malicious scripts can be stored/persisted in a database and will not execute until retrieved by a user. This has been seen in bulletin boards and some early webmail applications. This incubated attack can sit dormant for a long period of time until a user decides to view the page where the injected script is present. At this point the script executes on the user’s browser.

The original source of input for the injected script may be from another vulnerable application, which is common in enterprise architectures. Therefore the application at hand may have good input data validation but the data persisted may not have been entered via this application per se, but via another application.

In this case we cannot be 100% sure the data to be displayed to the user is safe (as it could have found its way in via another path in the enterprise). The approach to mitigate against this is to ensure that data sent to the browser with the purpose of being displayed literally is not going to be interpreted by the browser as mark-up.

We encode known bad to mitigate against this “enemy within”. This, in effect, assures that the browser interprets any special characters as data and markup. How is this done? HTML encoding usually means < becomes &lt;, > becomes &gt;, & becomes &amp;, and " becomes &quot;.

So, for example, if the application has a string "<script>" and it wants a browser to display it as "<script>", it can first HTML-encode it to the form "&lt;script&gt;" before including it in the web page that gets sent to the browser.