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Difference between revisions of "ProblemsCBCModeForPANs"

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1. Abstract
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Link To Document -
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[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Image:PanEncryption.pdf Problems With Using CBC Mode For PAN Encryption]
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'''Author Ashok Misra'''
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Abstract''
  
 
Permanant Account Number (PAN) encryption in an ecommerce merchant
 
Permanant Account Number (PAN) encryption in an ecommerce merchant
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functionality.
 
functionality.
  
Since CBC encryption mode is not idempotent [8][1] one way hashes for
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Since CBC encryption mode is not idempotent, one way hashes for
 
PANs are needed in order to support lookup.
 
PANs are needed in order to support lookup.
  

Latest revision as of 18:00, 14 July 2008

Link To Document - Problems With Using CBC Mode For PAN Encryption

Author Ashok Misra

Abstract

Permanant Account Number (PAN) encryption in an ecommerce merchant databases presents unique application issues.

Block encryption primitives using Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode preclude the possibility of supporting an efficient lookup functionality.

Since CBC encryption mode is not idempotent, one way hashes for PANs are needed in order to support lookup.

The payment community does not view a one way hash of a PAN as a security violation. Ironicaly, its use is recommended by PCI DSS best practices.

On the other hand, security experts categorically proscribe the use of an idempotent block cipher implementation such as Electronic Code Book (ECB).

Storage of SHA1 hashes for payment information follows best practise, PCI guidelines and buzzword compliance.

This paper presents a minority opinion and argues that security is weakened dramatically by employing one way cryptographic primitives for PANs in order to support lookup.