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| | <div style="width:100%;height:160px;border:0,margin:0;overflow: hidden;">[[File:Cheatsheets-header.jpg|link=]]</div> | | <div style="width:100%;height:160px;border:0,margin:0;overflow: hidden;">[[File:Cheatsheets-header.jpg|link=]]</div> |
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| − | {| style="padding: 0;margin:0;margin-top:10px;text-align:left;" |-
| + | The Cheat Sheet Series project has been moved to [https://github.com/OWASP/CheatSheetSeries GitHub]! |
| − | | valign="top" style="border-right: 1px dotted gray;padding-right:25px;" |
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| − | Last revision (mm/dd/yy): '''{{REVISIONMONTH}}/{{REVISIONDAY}}/{{REVISIONYEAR}}'''
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| − | <br />
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| − | __TOC__{{TOC hidden}}
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| − | = Introduction =
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| | | | |
| − | This article is focused on providing clear, actionable guidance for safely deserializing untrusted data in your applications.
| + | Please visit [https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Deserialization_Cheat_Sheet.html Deserialization Cheat Sheet] to see the latest version of the cheat sheet. |
| − | | |
| − | =What is Deserialization?=
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| − | | |
| − | Serialization is the process of turning some object into a data format that can be restored later. People often serialize objects in order to save them to storage, or to send as part of communications. Deserialization is the reverse of that process -- taking data structured from some format, and rebuilding it into an object. Today, the most popular data format for serializing data is JSON. Before that, it was XML.
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| − | | |
| − | However, many programming languages offer a native capability for serializing objects. These native formats usually offer more features than JSON or XML, including customizability of the serialization process. Unfortunately, the features of these native deserialization mechanisms can be repurposed for malicious effect when operating on untrusted data. Attacks against deserializers have been found to allow denial-of-service, access control, and remote code execution attacks.
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| − | | |
| − | =Guidance on Deserializing Objects Safely=
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| − | The following language-specific guidance attempts to enumerate safe methodologies for deserializing data that can't be trusted.
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| − | | |
| − | ==PHP==
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| − | ===WhiteBox Review===
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| − | Check the use of 'unserialize()' and review how the external parameters are accepted.
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| − | Use a safe, standard data interchange format such as JSON (via json_decode() and json_encode()) if you need to pass serialized data to the user.
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| − | Please also refer to to http://php.net/manual/en/function.unserialize.php | |
| − | | |
| − | ==Python==
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| − | ===BlackBox Review===
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| − | If the traffic data contains the symbol dot . at the end, it's very likely that the data was sent in serialization.
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| − | | |
| − | ===WhiteBox Review===
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| − | The following API in Python will be vulnerable to serialization attack. Search code for the pattern below.
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| − | | |
| − | 1. The uses of pickle/c_pickle/_pickle with load/loads
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| − | <pre>
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| − | import pickle
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| − | data = """ cos.system(S'dir')tR. """
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| − | pickle.loads(data)
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| − | </pre>
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| − | | |
| − | 2. Uses of PyYAML with load
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| − | <pre>
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| − | import yaml
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| − | document = "!!python/object/apply:os.system ['ipconfig']"
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| − | print(yaml.load(document))
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| − | </pre>
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| − | | |
| − | 3. Uses of jsonpickle with encode or store methods
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| − | | |
| − | ==Java==
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| − | The following techniques are all good for preventing attacks against deserialization against [http://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/api/java/io/Serializable.html Java's Serializable format].
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| − | | |
| − | Implementation: In your code, override the ObjectInputStream#resolveClass() method to prevent arbitrary classes from being deserialized. This safe behavior can be wrapped in a library like SerialKiller.
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| − | Implementation: Use a safe replacement for the generic readObject() method as seen here. Note that this addresses "billion laughs" type attacks by checking input length and number of objects deserialized.
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| − | | |
| − | ===WhiteBox Review ===
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| − | Be aware of the following Java API uses for potential serilization vulnerability.
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| − | 1. 'XMLdecoder' with external user defined parameters
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| − | 2. XStream with fromXML method. (xstream version <= v1.46 is vulnerable to the serialization issue.)
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| − | 3. 'ObjectInputSteam' with 'readObject'
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| − | 4. Uses of 'readObject' 'readObjectNodData' 'readResolve' 'readExternal'
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| − | 5. 'ObjectInputStream.readUnshared'
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| − | 6. 'Serializable'
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| − | | |
| − | === BlackBox Review ===
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| − | If the captured traffic data include the following patterns may suggest that the data was sent in Java serialization streams
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| − | * "AC ED 00 05" in Hex
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| − | * "''rO0" in Base64''
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| − | * Content-type = '<nowiki/>''application/x-java-serialized-object'''
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| − | | |
| − | ===Prevent Data Leakage and Trusted Field Clobbering===
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| − | If there are data members of an object that should never be controlled by end users during deserialization or exposed to users during serialization, they should be declared as [https://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/platform/serialization/spec/serial-arch.html#6250 the <code>transient</code> keyword].
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| − | | |
| − | For a class that defined as Serializable, the sensitive information variable should be declared as 'private transient'.
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| − | For example, the class myAccount, the variable 'profile' and 'margin' were declared as transient to avoid to be serialized.
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| − | | |
| − | <pre>
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| − | public class myAccount implements Serializable
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| − | {
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| − | private transient double profit; // declared transient
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| − |
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| − | private transient double margin; // declared transient
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| − | ....
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| − | ....
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| − | | |
| − | </pre>
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| − | | |
| − | ===Prevent Deserialization of Domain Objects===
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| − | Some of your application objects may be forced to implement Serializable due to their hierarchy. To guarantee that your application objects can't be deserialized, a <code>readObject()</code> should be declared (with a <code>final</code> modifier) which always throws an exception.
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| − | | |
| − | <pre>private final void readObject(ObjectInputStream in) throws java.io.IOException {
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| − | throw new java.io.IOException("Cannot be deserialized");
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| − | }</pre>
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| − | | |
| − | ===Harden Your Own java.io.ObjectInputStream===
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| − | The <code>java.io.ObjectInputStream</code> class is used to deserialize objects. It's possible to harden its behavior by subclassing it. This is the best solution if:
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| − | | |
| − | * You can change the code that does the deserialization
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| − | * You know what classes you expect to deserialize
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| − | | |
| − | The general idea is to override [http://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/api/java/io/ObjectInputStream.html#resolveClass(java.io.ObjectStreamClass) <code>ObjectInputStream.html#resolveClass()</code>] in order to restrict which classes are allowed to be deserialized. Because this call happens before a <code>readObject()</code> is called, you can be sure that no deserialization activity will occur unless the type is one that you wish to allow. A simple example of this shown here, where the the LookAheadObjectInputStream class is guaranteed not to deserialize any other type besides the Bicycle class:
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| − | | |
| − | <pre>public class LookAheadObjectInputStream extends ObjectInputStream {
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| − | | |
| − | public LookAheadObjectInputStream(InputStream inputStream) throws IOException {
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| − | super(inputStream);
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| − | }
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| − | | |
| − | /**
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| − | * Only deserialize instances of our expected Bicycle class
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| − | */
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| − | @Override
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| − | protected Class<?> resolveClass(ObjectStreamClass desc) throws IOException,
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| − | ClassNotFoundException {
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| − | if (!desc.getName().equals(Bicycle.class.getName())) {
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| − | throw new InvalidClassException(
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| − | "Unauthorized deserialization attempt",
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| − | desc.getName());
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| − | }
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| − | return super.resolveClass(desc);
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| − | }
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| − | }</pre>
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| − | | |
| − | More complete implementations of this approach have been proposed by various community members:
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| − | | |
| − | * [https://github.com/ikkisoft/SerialKiller NibbleSec] - a library that allows whitelisting and blacklisting of classes that are allowed to be deserialized
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| − | * [https://www.ibm.com/developerworks/library/se-lookahead/ IBM] - the seminal protection, written years before the most devastating exploitation scenarios were envisioned.
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| − | | |
| − | ===Harden All java.io.ObjectInputStream Usage with an Agent===
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| − | As mentioned above, the <code>java.io.ObjectInputStream</code> class is used to deserialize objects. It's possible to harden its behavior by subclassing it. However, if you don't own the code or can't wait for a patch, using an agent to weave in hardening to <code>java.io.ObjectInputStream</code> is the best solution.
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| − | | |
| − | Globally changing ObjectInputStream is only safe for blacklisting known malicious types, because it's not possible to know for all applications what the expected classes to be deserialized are. Fortunately, there are very few classes needed in the blacklist to be safe from all the known attack vectors, today. It's inevitable that more "gadget" classes will be discovered that can be abused. However, there is an incredible amount of vulnerable software
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| − | exposed today, in need of a fix. In some cases, "fixing" the vulnerability may involve re-architecting messaging systems and breaking backwards compatibility as developers move towards not accepting serialized objects.
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| − | | |
| − | To enable these agents, simply add a new JVM parameter:
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| − | | |
| − | <pre>-javaagent:name-of-agent.jar</pre>
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| − | | |
| − | Agents taking this approach have been released by various community members:
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| − | * [https://github.com/gocd/invoker-defender Invoker Defender by Go-CD]
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| − | * [https://github.com/Contrast-Security-OSS/contrast-rO0 rO0 by Contrast Security]
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| − | | |
| − | A similar, but less scalable approach would be to manually patch and bootstrap your JVM's ObjectInputStream. Guidance on this approach is available [https://github.com/wsargent/paranoid-java-serialization here].
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| − | | |
| − | ==.Net C#==
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| − | | |
| − | === WhiteBox Review ===
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| − | Search the source code for the following terms<br />
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| − | | |
| − | # TypeNameHandling
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| − | # JavaScriptTypeResolver
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| − | | |
| − | Look for any serializers where the type is set by a user controlled variable.
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| − | | |
| − | === BlackBox Review ===
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| − | Search for the following base64 encoded content that starts with:
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| − | | |
| − | <pre>AAEAAAD/////</pre>
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| − | | |
| − | Search for content with the following text:
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| − | # "TypeObject"
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| − | # "$type":
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| − | | |
| − | === General Precautions ===
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| − | | |
| − | Don't allow the datastream to define the type of object that the stream will be deserialized to. You can prevent this by for example using the '''DataContractSerializer''' or '''XmlSerializer''' if at all possible.
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| − | | |
| − | Where '''JSON.Net''' is being used make sure the '''TypeNameHandling''' is only set to '''None'''.
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| − | | |
| − | <pre>TypeNameHandling = TypeNameHandling.None</pre>
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| − | | |
| − | If '''JavaScriptSerializer''' is to be used do not use it with a '''JavaScriptTypeResolver'''
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| − | | |
| − | If you must deserialise data streams that define their own type, then restrict the types that are allowed to be deserialized. One should be aware that this is still risky as many native .Net types potentially dangerous in themselves. e.g.
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| − | | |
| − | <pre>System.IO.FileInfo</pre>
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| − | | |
| − | FileInfo objects that reference files actually on the server can when deserialized, change the properties of those files e.g. to read-only, creating a potential denial of service attack.<br />
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| − | | |
| − | Even if you have limited the types that can be deserialised remember that some types have properties that are risky. '''System.ComponentModel.DataAnnotations.ValidationException''', for example has a property '''Value''' of type '''Object'''. if this type is the type allowed for deserialization then an attacker can set the '''Value''' property to any object type they choose.
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| − | | |
| − | Attackers should be prevented from steering the type that will be instantiated. If this is possible then even '''DataContractSerializer''' or '''XmlSerializer''' can be subverted e.g.
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| − | <pre>
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| − | var typename = GetTransactionTypeFromDatabase(); // <-- this is dangerous if the attacker can change the data in the database
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| − | | |
| − | var serializer = new DataContractJsonSerializer(Type.GetType(typename));
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| − | | |
| − | var obj = serializer.ReadObject(ms);
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| − | </pre>
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| − | | |
| − | Execution can occur within certain .Net types during deserialization. Creating a control such as the one shown below is ineffective.
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| − | | |
| − | <pre>
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| − | var suspectObject = myBinaryFormatter.Deserialize(untrustedData);
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| − | | |
| − | if (suspectObject is SomeDangerousObjectType) //Too late! Execution may have already occurred.
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| − | {
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| − | //generate warnings and dispose of suspectObject
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| − | }
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| − | </pre>
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| − | | |
| − | For '''BinaryFormatter''' and '''JSON.Net''' it is possible to create a safer form of white list control useing a custom '''SerializationBinder'''.<br />
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| − | | |
| − | Try to keep up-to-date on known .Net insecure deserialization gadgets and pay special attention where such types can be created by your deserialization processes. A deserializer can only only instantiate types that it knows about. Try to keep any code that might create potential gagdets separate from any code that Vas internet connectivity. As an example '''System.Windows.Data.ObjectDataProvider''' used in WPF applications is a known gadget that allows arbitrary method invocation. It would be risky to have this a reference to this assembly in a REST service project that deserializes untrusted data.
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| − | | |
| − | === Known .NET RCE Gadgets ===
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| − | System.Configuration.Install.AssemblyInstaller
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| − | * System.Activities.Presentation.WorkflowDesigner
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| − | * System.Windows.ResourceDictionary
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| − | * System.Windows.Data.ObjectDataProvider
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| − | * System.Windows.Forms.BindingSource
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| − | * Microsoft.Exchange.Management.SystemManager.WinForms.ExchangeSettingsProvider
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| − | * System.Data.DataViewManager, System.Xml.XmlDocument/XmlDataDocument
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| − | * System.Management.Automation.PSObject
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| − | | |
| − | | |
| − | = Language-Agnostic Methods for Deserializing Safely =
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| − | | |
| − | | |
| − | ==Using Alternative Data Formats==
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| − | A great reduction of risk is achieved by avoiding native (de)serialization formats. By switching to a pure data format like JSON or XML, you lessen the chance of custom deserialization logic being repurposed towards malicious ends.
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| − | | |
| − | Many applications rely on a [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_transfer_object data-transfer object pattern] that involves creating a separate domain of objects for the explicit purpose data transfer. Of course, it's still possible that the application will make security mistakes after a pure data object is parsed.
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| − | | |
| − | ==Only Deserialize Signed Data==
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| − | If the application knows before deserialization which messages will need to be processed, they could sign them as part of the serialization process. The application could then to choose not to deserialize any message which didn't have an authenticated signature.
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| − | | |
| − | = Mitigation Tools/Libraries =
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| − | * Java secure deserialization library https://github.com/ikkisoft/SerialKiller
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| − | | |
| − | * SWAT (Serial Whitelist Application Trainer) https://github.com/cschneider4711/SWAT
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| − | * NotSoSerial https://github.com/kantega/notsoserial
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| − | | |
| − | = Detection Tools =
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| − | * [https://github.com/GrrrDog/Java-Deserialization-Cheat-Sheet Java deserialization cheat sheet aimed at pen testers]
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| − | | |
| − | * [https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial A proof-of-concept tool for generating payloads that exploit unsafe Java object deserialization.]
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| − | * Java De-serialization toolkits https://github.com/brianwrf/hackUtils
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| − | * Java de-serialization tool https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial
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| − | * .Net payload generator https://github.com/pwntester/ysoserial.net
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| − | * Java de-serialization detection by DNS https://github.com/GoSeecure/break-fast-serial
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| − | * Burp Suite extension https://github.com/federicodotta/Java-Deserialization-Scanner/releases
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| − | * Java secure deserialization library https://github.com/ikkisoft/SerialKiller
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| − | * Serianalyzer is a static bytecode analyzer for deserialization https://github.com/mbechler/serianalyzer
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| − | * Payload generator https://github.com/mbechler/marshalsec
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| − | * Android Java Deserialization Vulnerability Tester https://github.com/modzero/modjoda
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| − | * Burp Suite Extension
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| − | ** JavaSerialKiller https://github.com/NetSPI/JavaSerialKiller
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| − | ** Java Deserialization Scanner https://github.com/federicodotta/Java-Deserialization-Scanner
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| − | ** Burp-ysoserial https://github.com/summitt/burp-ysoserial
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| − | ** SuperSerial https://github.com/DirectDefense/SuperSerial
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| − | ** SuperSerial-Active https://github.com/DirectDefense/SuperSerial-Active
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| − | | |
| − | = References =
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| − | * https://github.com/GrrrDog/Java-Deserialization-Cheat-Sheet
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| − | * [[Deserialization of untrusted data]]
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| − | * [[Media:GOD16-Deserialization.pdf|Java Deserialization Attacks - German OWASP Day 2016]]
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| − | * [http://www.slideshare.net/frohoff1/appseccali-2015-marshalling-pickles AppSecCali 2015 - Marshalling Pickles]
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| − | * [http://foxglovesecurity.com/2015/11/06/what-do-weblogic-websphere-jboss-jenkins-opennms-and-your-application-have-in-common-this-vulnerability/#websphere FoxGlove Security - Vulnerability Announcement]
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| − | * [https://github.com/GrrrDog/Java-Deserialization-Cheat-Sheet Java deserialization cheat sheet aimed at pen testers]
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| − | * [https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial A proof-of-concept tool for generating payloads that exploit unsafe Java object deserialization.]
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| − | * Java De-serialization toolkits https://github.com/brianwrf/hackUtils
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| − | * Java de-serialization tool https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial
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| − | * Java de-serialization detection by DNS https://github.com/GoSeecure/break-fast-serial
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| − | * Burp Suite extension https://github.com/federicodotta/Java-Deserialization-Scanner/releases
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| − | * Java secure deserialization library https://github.com/ikkisoft/SerialKiller
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| − | * Serianalyzer is a static bytecode analyzer for deserialization https://github.com/mbechler/serianalyzer
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| − | * Payload generator https://github.com/mbechler/marshalsec
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| − | * Android Java Deserialization Vulnerability Tester https://github.com/modzero/modjoda
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| − | * Burp Suite Extension
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| − | ** JavaSerialKiller https://github.com/NetSPI/JavaSerialKiller
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| − | ** Java Deserialization Scanner https://github.com/federicodotta/Java-Deserialization-Scanner
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| − | ** Burp-ysoserial https://github.com/summitt/burp-ysoserial
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| − | ** SuperSerial https://github.com/DirectDefense/SuperSerial
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| − | ** SuperSerial-Active https://github.com/DirectDefense/SuperSerial-Active
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| − | * .Net
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| − | ** Alvaro Muñoz: .NET Serialization: Detecting and defending vulnerable endpoints https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qDoBlLwREYk
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| − | ** James Forshaw - Black Hat USA 2012 - Are You My Type? Breaking .net Sandboxes Through Serialization https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xfbu-pQ1tIc
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| − | ** Jonathan Birch BlueHat v17 || Dangerous Contents - Securing .Net Deserialization https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oxlD8VWWHE8
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| − | ** Alvaro Muñoz & Oleksandr Mirosh - Friday the 13th: Attacking JSON - AppSecUSA 2017 Https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NqHsaVhlxAQ
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| − | | |
| − | = Authors and Primary Editors =
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| − | | |
| − | Arshan Dabirsiaghi - arshan [at] contrastsecurity dot org<br />
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| − | Tony Hsu (Hsiang-Chih)
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| − | Shane Murnion
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| − | | |
| − | = Other Cheatsheets =
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| − | | |
| − | {{Cheatsheet_Navigation_Body}}
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| − | [[Category:Cheatsheets]] [[Category:OWASP .NET Project]]
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| − | |}
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