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Difference between revisions of "Insufficient Entropy"
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{{Template:Vulnerability}} | {{Template:Vulnerability}} | ||
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| + | Last revision (mm/dd/yy): '''{{REVISIONMONTH}}/{{REVISIONDAY}}/{{REVISIONYEAR}}''' | ||
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| + | [[ASDR_TOC_Vulnerabilities|Vulnerabilities Table of Contents]] | ||
==Description== | ==Description== | ||
| − | When an undesirably low amount of | + | When an undesirably low amount of entropy is available. Psuedo Random Number Generators are susceptible to suffering from insufficient entropy when they are initialized, because entropy data may not be available to them yet. |
| + | |||
| + | ==Risk Factors== | ||
| + | |||
| + | TBD | ||
| + | |||
| + | ==Examples== | ||
| + | |||
| + | TBD | ||
| + | |||
| + | ==Related [[Attacks]]== | ||
| + | |||
| + | * In many case,s a PRNG uses a combination of the system clock and entropy to create seed data. If insufficient entropy is available, an attacker can reduce the size magnitude of the seed value considerably. Furthermore, by guessing values of the system clock, they can create a manageable set of possible PRNG outputs. | ||
| + | |||
| + | ==Related [[Vulnerabilities]]== | ||
| − | + | * [[Vulnerability 1]] | |
| + | * [[Vulnerabiltiy 2]] | ||
| − | |||
| − | + | ==Related [[Controls]]== | |
| − | + | * Many PRNG's (/dev/random and /dev/urandom for example) store their last value before shutdown. By using this value at intialization, they can sometimes avoid insufficient or predictable starting entropy. | |
| − | ==Related | + | ==Related [[Technical Impacts]]== |
| − | + | * [[Technical Impact 1]] | |
| + | * [[Technical Impact 2]] | ||
| − | |||
| − | == | + | ==References== |
| − | |||
| − | + | TBD | |
| − | + | ||
| + | __NOTOC__ | ||
| + | |||
| + | |||
| + | [[Category:OWASP ASDR Project]] | ||
| + | [[Category:Cryptographic Vulnerability]] | ||
| + | [[Category:Vulnerability]] | ||
Latest revision as of 00:06, 17 November 2014
This article is a stub. You can help OWASP by expanding it or discussing it on its Talk page.
This is a Vulnerability. To view all vulnerabilities, please see the Vulnerability Category page.
Last revision (mm/dd/yy): 11/17/2014
Vulnerabilities Table of Contents
Description
When an undesirably low amount of entropy is available. Psuedo Random Number Generators are susceptible to suffering from insufficient entropy when they are initialized, because entropy data may not be available to them yet.
Risk Factors
TBD
Examples
TBD
Related Attacks
- In many case,s a PRNG uses a combination of the system clock and entropy to create seed data. If insufficient entropy is available, an attacker can reduce the size magnitude of the seed value considerably. Furthermore, by guessing values of the system clock, they can create a manageable set of possible PRNG outputs.
Related Vulnerabilities
Related Controls
- Many PRNG's (/dev/random and /dev/urandom for example) store their last value before shutdown. By using this value at intialization, they can sometimes avoid insufficient or predictable starting entropy.
Related Technical Impacts
References
TBD
