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Difference between revisions of "ESAPI Roadmap"
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Revision as of 19:28, 23 November 2010
Priorities
Focus on project charter... Volunteers get to work on what they want...
ESAPI 2.1
- Remove JavaEncryptor as singleton (required so we can use persistent asymmetric key pairs and create dsigs that persist across a JVM instance).
- Add simpler means to use different cipher algorithms and/or key sizes. (Requires a major kludge today, which is not really thread-safe.
- Support for persist asymmetric key pairs in either Java or PKCS#12 key stores.
- Separate out crypto properties from rest of ESAPI.propertie. (i.e., Google Issue #48).
ESAPI 3.0
- Add support for / integration with some key management system.
Q2 2009
- CSRF protection
- Pilot
Q3 2009
- Update ESAPI 2.0 to take advantage of Java 5
- Improve Unit Test Coverage
Q4 2009
- Documentation - Installation Guide
- Reference Implementation - Encryption Refactor
- Ensure Thread-Safety
- Resolve Fortify and FindBugs issues
- Release ESAPI 2.0
Other Improvements
- Internationalization
- ESAPI Scala Edition
- ESAPI PHP Edition
- ESAPI .NET Edition
- Documentation
- Guide to fixing specific vulnerabilities with ESAPI
- How to integrate into existing app
- Marketing pages to "sell" ESAPI
- Threat Model for each control (assumptions and coverage)
- Filter to do intrusion detection and/or virtual patching (WAF?)
- Real example Struts application showing before and after security problems
- Easy and efficient dev environment and install w/ clear documentation
- Framework layer integration features (bridges?)
- Threat Model - SRA of encryption implementation
- Separate "day-to-day" calls from "admin-like" calls