This site is the archived OWASP Foundation Wiki and is no longer accepting Account Requests.
To view the new OWASP Foundation website, please visit https://owasp.org
Difference between revisions of "Mobile code: invoking untrusted mobile code"
From OWASP
| (19 intermediate revisions by 2 users not shown) | |||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
{{Template:Attack}} | {{Template:Attack}} | ||
| + | |||
| + | <br> | ||
| + | [[Category:OWASP ASDR Project]] | ||
| + | |||
| + | |||
| + | Last revision (mm/dd/yy): '''{{REVISIONMONTH}}/{{REVISIONDAY}}/{{REVISIONYEAR}}''' | ||
| + | |||
==Description== | ==Description== | ||
| − | + | This attack consists of a manipulation of a mobile code in order to execute malicious operations at the client side. By intercepting client traffic using the [[Man-in-the-middle_attack|man-in-the-middle]] technique, a malicious user could modify the original mobile code with arbitrary operations that will be executed on the client’s machine under his credentials. | |
| − | This attack consists | + | In another scenario, the malicious mobile code could be hosted in an untrustworthy web site or it could be permanently injected on a vulnerable web site through an injection attack. |
| − | In | + | This attack can be performed over Java or C++ applications and affects any operating system. |
| − | This attack can be performed over Java or C++ applications and affects any | ||
| + | ==Risk Factors== | ||
| + | TBD | ||
==Examples == | ==Examples == | ||
| − | |||
The following code demonstrates how this attack could be performed using a Java applet. | The following code demonstrates how this attack could be performed using a Java applet. | ||
| Line 23: | Line 30: | ||
</pre> | </pre> | ||
| + | To solve this issue, it’s necessary to use some type of integrity mechanism to assure that the mobile code has not been modified. | ||
| − | |||
| − | + | ==Related [[Threat Agents]]== | |
| + | * TBD | ||
| − | * | + | ==Related [[Attacks]]== |
| + | * [[Mobile code: non-final public field]] | ||
| + | * [[Mobile code: object hijack]] | ||
| + | ==Related [[Vulnerabilities]]== | ||
| + | * [[:Category: Unsafe Mobile Code]] | ||
| − | ==Related | + | ==Related [[Controls]]== |
| − | + | * [[Hashing]] | |
| + | * [[Bounds Checking]] | ||
| + | * [[Safe Libraries]] | ||
| + | * [[Static Code Analysis]] | ||
| + | * [[Executable space protection]] | ||
| + | * [[Address space layout randomization (ASLR)]] | ||
| + | * [[Stack-smashing Protection (SSP)]] | ||
| − | + | ==References== | |
| − | + | * https://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/daisy/bsi/100/version/1/part/4/data/CLASP_ApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf?branch=main&language=default | |
| − | + | * http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/494.html | |
| − | == | ||
| − | |||
| − | * | ||
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | [[:Category: | + | [[Category: Abuse of Functionality]] |
| + | [[Category:Attack]] | ||
Latest revision as of 11:44, 23 April 2009
- This is an Attack. To view all attacks, please see the Attack Category page.
Last revision (mm/dd/yy): 04/23/2009
Description
This attack consists of a manipulation of a mobile code in order to execute malicious operations at the client side. By intercepting client traffic using the man-in-the-middle technique, a malicious user could modify the original mobile code with arbitrary operations that will be executed on the client’s machine under his credentials. In another scenario, the malicious mobile code could be hosted in an untrustworthy web site or it could be permanently injected on a vulnerable web site through an injection attack. This attack can be performed over Java or C++ applications and affects any operating system.
Risk Factors
TBD
Examples
The following code demonstrates how this attack could be performed using a Java applet.
// here declarer a object URL with the path of the malicious class
URL[] urlPath= new URL[]{new URL("file:subdir/")};
// here generate a object “loader” which is responsible to load a class in the URL path
URLClassLoader classLoader = new URLClassLoader(urlPath);
//here declare a object of a malicious class contained in “classLoader”
Class loadedClass = Class.forName("loadMe", true, classLoader);<br><br>
To solve this issue, it’s necessary to use some type of integrity mechanism to assure that the mobile code has not been modified.
Related Threat Agents
- TBD
Related Attacks
Related Vulnerabilities
Related Controls
- Hashing
- Bounds Checking
- Safe Libraries
- Static Code Analysis
- Executable space protection
- Address space layout randomization (ASLR)
- Stack-smashing Protection (SSP)
