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| − | {| style="padding: 0;margin:0;margin-top:10px;text-align:left;" |-
| + | The Cheat Sheet Series project has been moved to [https://github.com/OWASP/CheatSheetSeries GitHub]! |
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| − | Last revision (mm/dd/yy): '''{{REVISIONMONTH}}/{{REVISIONDAY}}/{{REVISIONYEAR}}'''
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| − | <br/>
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| − | __TOC__{{TOC hidden}}
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| − | = DRAFT CHEAT SHEET - WORK IN PROGRESS =
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| − | = Introduction =
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| − | The objective of this cheat sheet is to provide guidance to developers, reviewers, designers and architects on conducting successful threat modeling. The main goal of threat modeling is to understand the controls needed for a software system. This is a complex endeavor that will involve investigations into:
| + | Please visit [https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Threat_Modeling_Cheat_Sheet.html Threat Modeling Cheat Sheet] to see the latest version of the cheat sheet. |
| − | # The trust boundaries to and within the solution that we build
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| − | # The actors that interact within and outside of the trust boundaries
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| − | # Information flows within and to and from the trust boundaries
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| − | # Information persistence within and out of trust boundaries
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| − | # Vulnerabilities at trust boundaries
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| − | # Threat agents that can exploit the vulnerabilities
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| − | # Impact of exploitation of vulnerability by a threat agents
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| − | # Controls and process needed to treat specific risks
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| − | =Why do we need to perform threat modeling=
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| − | 1. Performing threat model at the architecture level, helps in
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| − | a. confirming on suitability of the identified security features to be implemented
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| − | b. identification of any gaps in the security features to be implemented
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| − | c. identification of any further security features
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| − | d. identification of policy and process requirements
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| − | e. identification of requirements to be fed into security operations
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| − | f. identification of logging and monitoring requirements
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| − | g. arriving at abuse cases when used in agile methodology
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| − | h. understanding business continuity requirements
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| − | i. understanding capacity and availability requirements
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| − | 2. Performing threat model at the design level, helps in,
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| − | a. identification of vulnerabilities that need to be closed at design level and input this into build phase
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| − | b. identification of information assets that need security controls
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| − | c. mapping of identified security controls into technical / administrative / physical controls as the case may be (this activity can be done at the architecture level as well, but doing it at design level helps in being granular)
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| − | d. identification of security test cases / security test scenarios to test the security requirements
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| − | =Starting the threat modeling exercise=
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| − | It is important to have a risk assessment policy at an organisation which gives guidance to the practitioners on when to do a threat model, management guidance, owners of the risks etc
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| − | It is also important to the following before starting with this exercise,
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| − | 1. Make of list of all the stakeholders who need to participate in this exercise. For example application architects, infrastructure architects, solution architects, business owners
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| − | 2. Get management buy-in to ensure that there is management support for involvement of all necessary stakeholders.
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| − | 3. It is assumed that the threat modeling exercise is led by the security team of the organisation and the risk log is maintained by the security team
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| − | 1. The trust boundaries to and within the solution that we build
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| − | 2. The actors that interact within and outside of the trust boundaries
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| − | 3. Information flows within and to and from the trust boundaries
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| − | 4. Information persistence within and out of trust boundaries
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| − | 5. Threats to transgression of trust boundaries by actors and for information flow and persistence
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| − | 6. Vulnerabilities at trust boundaries as accessed by actors and for information flow and persistence
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| − | 7. Threat agents that can exploit the vulnerabilities
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| − | 8. Impact of exploitation of vulnerability by a threat agents
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| − | 9. Decision tree to treat the risk
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| − | =Decompose and Model the system=
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| − | To perform a threat model, it is important to understand how the system works and interacts with its ecosystem.
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| − | To start with, create a high level information flow diagram, something like this:
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| − | 1. Identify the trusted boundaries of your system / application / module / ecosystem that you may want to start off with.
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| − | 2. Add actors – internal and external
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| − | 3. Define internal trusted boundaries. These can be the different security zones that have been designed
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| − | 4. Relook at the actors you have identified in #2 for consistency
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| − | 5. Add information flows
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| − | a. Information in transit
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| − | b. Information at rest
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| − | c. Information processing
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| − | d. In the above diagram, following are the information flows:
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| − | i. Login Information
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| − | ii. Transmit login information
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| − | iii. Data process
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| − | iv. Data store
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| − | 6. Identify the information elements and their classification as per your information classification policy
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| − | 7. Where possible add assets to the identified information flows
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| − | 8. Identify threat agents for each of the information flows
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| − | 9. Draw attack vectors and attack trees in an iteratively to make sure that no major attack vector is missed.
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| − | 10. For each of the information flows perform threat assessment using any of the methodologies that meets the organisation’s requirements:
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| − | a. STRIDE
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| − | b. DREAD
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| − | c. Any other model that meets your organisation’s requirements
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| − | 11. Add a probability value to the materialisation of each of the threat
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| − | 12. Add a value for impact of each threat materialisation
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| − | 13. Identify the acceptable level of risk for the organisation or the identified scope
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| − | 14. Identify the risks for mitigation that are above the acceptable level of risk
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| − | 15. Mitigate the risks by doing one or more of the following:
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| − | a. Accept
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| − | b. Transfer
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| − | c. Avoid
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| − | d. Reduce
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| − | =How to work on getting the mitigations in place, track them to closure and keep monitoring risks=
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| − | 1. Upon completion of the initial threat modelling exercise, assign the risks to the relevant business / risk owners of threats for example
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| − | a. If there is an identified risk with the way the database is implemented, assign the risk to the owner of the database team.
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| − | b. If there is an identified risk with the application design assign the risk to the owner of the application team
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| − | c. However these are responsibilities that are assigned. The accountability of getting these risks addressed lies with the business owner for whose business the application is being developed for. End of the day, it is the business owner who needs to understand if the risk is aligned with the risk appetite of his/her business unit. And if the risk is above or below the acceptable level.
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| − | 2. Maintain a Threat Traceability Matrix which at the minimum lists the following:
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| − | a. Information flow (along with the list of assets)
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| − | b. Threats for the information flows
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| − | c. Probability of occurrence of the risk
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| − | d. Impact of materialisation of the risk
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| − | e. Risk owner – responsibility wise
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| − | f. Risk owner – accountability wise
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| − | g. Mitigation
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| − | h. Last review date
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| − | i. Next review date
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| − | j. Instances of materialisation of the risk
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| − | 3. Test the risk as a part of security testing to ensure that the mitigation works as expected
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| − | Periodically retest the risk in either a vulnerability scan or as a test scenario as part of penetration test or security test to ensure that the mitigation is still in place and works as expected
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| − | =Further Reading=
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| − | https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Application_Threat_Modeling
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| − | == Authors and Primary Editors ==
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| − | TODO
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| − | == Other Cheatsheets ==
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| − | {{Cheatsheet_Navigation_Body}}
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| − | [[Category:Cheatsheets]]
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