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Difference between revisions of "PL/SQL:SQL Injection"
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===DDL=== | ===DDL=== | ||
Alter .. in case of a dynamic query. | Alter .. in case of a dynamic query. | ||
| + | ===Viewa=== | ||
| + | It is possible to update a view | ||
===Database links=== | ===Database links=== | ||
Query other databases with @database link | Query other databases with @database link | ||
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The reason that SQL injection is possible, is that the SQL statement is being generated from a language or enviroment that isn't working with SQL natively. So it does not know the consequences. The same goes for the database itself. As long as the SQL statement is syntactally correct and user that performs it has the rights, the database will execute it. There is no way for both side to determine what the impact would be. When trying to figure that out your essentially blacklisting and any new variant will be bypass your predetermined. | The reason that SQL injection is possible, is that the SQL statement is being generated from a language or enviroment that isn't working with SQL natively. So it does not know the consequences. The same goes for the database itself. As long as the SQL statement is syntactally correct and user that performs it has the rights, the database will execute it. There is no way for both side to determine what the impact would be. When trying to figure that out your essentially blacklisting and any new variant will be bypass your predetermined. | ||
| − | ==Stored Procedures== | + | ===Stored Procedures=== |
| + | We allready creating stored procedures since we are working with PL/SQL and as you can see it is still possible to write vunerable code. Plus there is an extra vunerabilty when running on the database, [[PL/SQL:Privilege escalation]] | ||
| − | ==Obfuscation== | + | ===Obfuscation=== |
Another solution often found is to obfuscate the table and columns. So instead of using APPUSERS we call it CWO2HIF. Now this is not going to work as one of the 13 rules that describe an Relational Database[4] is that the metadata or catalog describing the database is stored in the database. For instance a query on ALL_TAB_COLUMNS would return me all the available tables, it columns and the types. | Another solution often found is to obfuscate the table and columns. So instead of using APPUSERS we call it CWO2HIF. Now this is not going to work as one of the 13 rules that describe an Relational Database[4] is that the metadata or catalog describing the database is stored in the database. For instance a query on ALL_TAB_COLUMNS would return me all the available tables, it columns and the types. | ||
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* [2] [http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-europe-04/bh-eu-04-litchfield.pdf David Litchfield's presentation on SQL injection at Black Hat, May 2004] | * [2] [http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-europe-04/bh-eu-04-litchfield.pdf David Litchfield's presentation on SQL injection at Black Hat, May 2004] | ||
* [4] [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codd's_12_rules Codd's 12 rules (0..12)] | * [4] [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codd's_12_rules Codd's 12 rules (0..12)] | ||
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[[Category:OWASP Oracle Project]] | [[Category:OWASP Oracle Project]] | ||
| − | [[Category: | + | [[Category:SQL]] |
| − | |||
Latest revision as of 10:48, 21 January 2016
Status
WIP 13/11/2008
Overview
As the name implies, SQL injection vulnerabilities allow an attacker to inject (or execute) SQL commands within an application. It is one of the most wide spread and dangerous application vulnerability. The CLASP project provides a good overview of SQL injection.
Attack
Vunerabilities
UNIONS
Append the output of one or more other statements
SUBSELECTS
Blind SQL injection
PACKAGES
functions
DML
Insert, update and delete
DDL
Alter .. in case of a dynamic query.
Viewa
It is possible to update a view
Database links
Query other databases with @database link
Solution
The reason that SQL injection is possible, is that the SQL statement is being generated from a language or enviroment that isn't working with SQL natively. So it does not know the consequences. The same goes for the database itself. As long as the SQL statement is syntactally correct and user that performs it has the rights, the database will execute it. There is no way for both side to determine what the impact would be. When trying to figure that out your essentially blacklisting and any new variant will be bypass your predetermined.
Stored Procedures
We allready creating stored procedures since we are working with PL/SQL and as you can see it is still possible to write vunerable code. Plus there is an extra vunerabilty when running on the database, PL/SQL:Privilege escalation
Obfuscation
Another solution often found is to obfuscate the table and columns. So instead of using APPUSERS we call it CWO2HIF. Now this is not going to work as one of the 13 rules that describe an Relational Database[4] is that the metadata or catalog describing the database is stored in the database. For instance a query on ALL_TAB_COLUMNS would return me all the available tables, it columns and the types.
All of these just dont work or limit just a small part, so we need to make the understand eachother better. We can do this by seperating the data from the logic.
Bind variables
As with all languages and databases, the seperation of the SQL logic and the SQL data is the only way to prevent SQL injection. These are placeholders we can use to tell the database these parts of the query are dynamic and the rest is hardcoded. The communication is split up into multiple packages
But this is how a database wants you to communicate with it. Whenever a query passed to an Oracle database for execution, the first thing the RDMS will do is make a hashvalue of the query. Next it will to find the best way to collect the data that is needed and stores that in it's memory. After he is done with that it will selects the data and pass it on to the requester. A general rule is that if a query is responds within several seconds it was probaly spending more time in optimisation than the actual fetching.
When you are hardparsing each query, which is essentially the same but using diffrent parameters or values to match, this will result in a diffrent hash value for each statement. Thus the DBMS has to do it's work again. When you are softparsing (ie. using bind variables) the first time you execute the query it will take a fraction longer than the hardparsed version as it needs to send more packages to the database. But each time thereafter the database can skip that bit and just fetch what is needed. And if it is still in the buffercache even give you the results immediatly.
This is probably the only attackvector that when it is correctly fixed, it will also give you an performance improvement :)
