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Difference between revisions of "Top 10 2014-I1 Insecure Web Interface"
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− | <center>[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/ | + | <center>[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Internet_of_Things_Project#tab=Top_10_IoT_Vulnerabilities__282014_29 Back To The Internet of Things Top 10]</center> |
{{Top_10_2010:SummaryTableHeaderBeginTemplate|year=2013|language=en}} | {{Top_10_2010:SummaryTableHeaderBeginTemplate|year=2013|language=en}} | ||
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</td> | </td> | ||
− | <td {{Template:Top 10 2010:SummaryTableRowStyleTemplate|year=2013}}>Attacker uses weak | + | <td {{Template:Top 10 2010:SummaryTableRowStyleTemplate|year=2013}}>Attacker uses weak credentials, captures plain-text credentials or enumerates accounts to access the web interface. Attack could come from external or internal users. |
</td> | </td> | ||
− | <td colspan=2 {{Template:Top 10 2010:SummaryTableRowStyleTemplate|year=2013}}>An insecure web interface can be present when issues such as account enumeration, lack of account lockout or weak | + | <td colspan=2 {{Template:Top 10 2010:SummaryTableRowStyleTemplate|year=2013}}>An insecure web interface can be present when issues such as account enumeration, lack of account lockout or weak credenitals are present. Insecure web interfaces are prevalent as the intent is to have these interfaces exposed only on internal networks, however threats from the internal users can be just as significant as threats from external users. Issues with the web interface are easy to discover when examining the interface manually along with automated testing tools to identify other issues such as cross-site scripting. |
</td> | </td> | ||
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{{Top_10:SubsectionTableBeginTemplate|type=main}} {{Top_10_2010:SubsectionAdvancedTemplate|type={{Top_10_2010:StyleTemplate}}|subsection=freetext|title=Is My Web Interface Secure?|position=firstLeft|year=2013|language=en}} | {{Top_10:SubsectionTableBeginTemplate|type=main}} {{Top_10_2010:SubsectionAdvancedTemplate|type={{Top_10_2010:StyleTemplate}}|subsection=freetext|title=Is My Web Interface Secure?|position=firstLeft|year=2013|language=en}} | ||
− | + | Checking for an Insecure Web Interface includes: | |
+ | * Determining if the default username and password can be changed during initial product setup | ||
+ | * Determining if a specific user account is locked out after 3 - 5 failed login attempts | ||
+ | * Determining if valid accounts can be identified using password recovery mechanisms or new user pages | ||
+ | * Reviewing the interface for issues such as cross-site scripting, cross-site request forgery and sql injection. | ||
− | |||
− | |||
− | |||
{{Top_10_2010:SubsectionAdvancedTemplate|type={{Top_10_2010:StyleTemplate}}|subsection=freetext|title=How Do I Make My Web Interface Secure?|position=right|year=2013|language=en}} | {{Top_10_2010:SubsectionAdvancedTemplate|type={{Top_10_2010:StyleTemplate}}|subsection=freetext|title=How Do I Make My Web Interface Secure?|position=right|year=2013|language=en}} | ||
A secure web interface requires: | A secure web interface requires: | ||
− | # Default passwords and ideally default usernames to be changed during initial setup | + | # Default passwords and ideally default usernames to be changed during initial setup |
− | # Ensuring password recovery mechanisms are robust and do not supply an attacker information | + | # Ensuring password recovery mechanisms are robust and do not supply an attacker with information indicating a valid account |
− | # Ensuring web interface is not susceptible to XSS, SQLi or CSRF | + | # Ensuring web interface is not susceptible to XSS, SQLi or CSRF |
− | # Ensuring credentials are not exposed in internal or external network traffic | + | # Ensuring credentials are not exposed in internal or external network traffic |
− | # Ensuring account lockout after | + | # Ensuring weak passwords are not allowed |
+ | # Ensuring account lockout after 3 -5 failed login attempts | ||
+ | |||
+ | Please review the following tabs for more detail based on whether you are a [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Internet_of_Things_Top_Ten_Project#tab=Manufacturers Manufacturer], [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Internet_of_Things_Top_Ten_Project#tab=Developers Developer] or [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Internet_of_Things_Top_Ten_Project#tab=Consumers Consumer] | ||
{{Top_10_2010:SubsectionAdvancedTemplate|type={{Top_10_2010:StyleTemplate}}|subsection=example|position=left|risk=1|year=2013|language=en}} | {{Top_10_2010:SubsectionAdvancedTemplate|type={{Top_10_2010:StyleTemplate}}|subsection=example|position=left|risk=1|year=2013|language=en}} | ||
− | '''Scenario #1:''' The web interface | + | '''Scenario #1:''' The web interface presents "Forgot Password" functionality which upon entering an invalid account informs the attacker that the account does not exist. Once valid accounts are identified, password guessing can begin for an indefinite amount of time if no account lockout controls exist. |
{{Top_10_2010:ExampleBeginTemplate|year=2013}}<span style="color:red;"> | {{Top_10_2010:ExampleBeginTemplate|year=2013}}<span style="color:red;"> | ||
− | + | Account [email protected] does not exist. | |
</span>{{Top_10_2010:ExampleEndTemplate}} | </span>{{Top_10_2010:ExampleEndTemplate}} | ||
− | '''Scenario #2:''' | + | '''Scenario #2:''' Web interface is susceptible to cross-site scripting. |
{{Top_10_2010:ExampleBeginTemplate|year=2013}}<span style="color:red;"> | {{Top_10_2010:ExampleBeginTemplate|year=2013}}<span style="color:red;"> | ||
<nowiki>http://xyz.com/index.php?user=<script>alert(123)</script> | <nowiki>http://xyz.com/index.php?user=<script>alert(123)</script> | ||
</nowiki>... Response from browser is an alert popup. | </nowiki>... Response from browser is an alert popup. | ||
</span>{{Top_10_2010:ExampleEndTemplate}} | </span>{{Top_10_2010:ExampleEndTemplate}} | ||
− | In the cases above, the attacker is able to easily | + | In the cases above, the attacker is able to easily determine if an account is valid or not and is also able to determine that the site is susceptible to cross-site scripting (XSS). |
{{Top_10_2010:SubsectionAdvancedTemplate|type={{Top_10_2010:StyleTemplate}}|subsection=references|position=right|risk=1|year=2013|language=en}} | {{Top_10_2010:SubsectionAdvancedTemplate|type={{Top_10_2010:StyleTemplate}}|subsection=references|position=right|risk=1|year=2013|language=en}} | ||
{{Top_10_2010:SubSubsectionOWASPReferencesTemplate}} | {{Top_10_2010:SubSubsectionOWASPReferencesTemplate}} | ||
− | + | * [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2013-A1-Injection Top 10 2013-A1-Injection] | |
+ | * [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2013-A3-Cross-Site_Scripting_(XSS) Top 10 2013-A3-Cross-Site Scripting] | ||
+ | * [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2013-A8-Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_(CSRF) Top 10 2013-A8-Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)] | ||
{{Top_10_2010:SubSubsectionExternalReferencesTemplate}} | {{Top_10_2010:SubSubsectionExternalReferencesTemplate}} |
Latest revision as of 23:00, 1 December 2015
Threat Agents | Attack Vectors | Security Weakness | Technical Impacts | Business Impacts | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Application Specific | Exploitability EASY |
Prevalence COMMON |
Detectability EASY |
Impact SEVERE |
Application / Business Specific |
Consider anyone who has access to the web interface including internal and external users. | Attacker uses weak credentials, captures plain-text credentials or enumerates accounts to access the web interface. Attack could come from external or internal users. | An insecure web interface can be present when issues such as account enumeration, lack of account lockout or weak credenitals are present. Insecure web interfaces are prevalent as the intent is to have these interfaces exposed only on internal networks, however threats from the internal users can be just as significant as threats from external users. Issues with the web interface are easy to discover when examining the interface manually along with automated testing tools to identify other issues such as cross-site scripting. | Insecure web interfaces can result in data loss or corruption, lack of accountability, or denial of access and can lead to complete device takeover. | Consider the business impact of poorly secured web interfaces that could lead to compromised devices along with compromised customers. Could your customers be harmed? Could your brand be harmed? |
Is My Web Interface Secure?
Checking for an Insecure Web Interface includes:
|
How Do I Make My Web Interface Secure?
A secure web interface requires:
Please review the following tabs for more detail based on whether you are a Manufacturer, Developer or Consumer |
Example Attack Scenarios
Scenario #1: The web interface presents "Forgot Password" functionality which upon entering an invalid account informs the attacker that the account does not exist. Once valid accounts are identified, password guessing can begin for an indefinite amount of time if no account lockout controls exist. Account [email protected] does not exist. Scenario #2: Web interface is susceptible to cross-site scripting. http://xyz.com/index.php?user=<script>alert(123)</script> ... Response from browser is an alert popup. In the cases above, the attacker is able to easily determine if an account is valid or not and is also able to determine that the site is susceptible to cross-site scripting (XSS).
|
References
OWASP External |