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Difference between revisions of "Top 10 2014-I1 Insecure Web Interface"

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<center>[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Internet_of_Things_Top_Ten_Project#tab=OWASP_Internet_of_Things_Top_10_for_2014 Back To The Internet of Things Top 10]</center>
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<center>[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Internet_of_Things_Project#tab=Top_10_IoT_Vulnerabilities__282014_29 Back To The Internet of Things Top 10]</center>
  
 
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     <td {{Template:Top 10 2010:SummaryTableRowStyleTemplate|year=2013}}>Consider anyone who has access to the web interface including external users, internal users, and administrators.
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     <td {{Template:Top 10 2010:SummaryTableRowStyleTemplate|year=2013}}>Consider anyone who has access to the web interface including internal and external users.
  
 
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     <td {{Template:Top 10 2010:SummaryTableRowStyleTemplate|year=2013}}>Attacker uses default, weak or credentials passed in the clear to access the web interface. Depending on setup, attack could come from external or internal users.
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     <td {{Template:Top 10 2010:SummaryTableRowStyleTemplate|year=2013}}>Attacker uses weak credentials, captures plain-text credentials or enumerates accounts to access the web interface. Attack could come from external or internal users.
  
 
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     <td colspan=2  {{Template:Top 10 2010:SummaryTableRowStyleTemplate|year=2013}}>[http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Injection_Flaws  Injection flaws] occur when an application sends untrusted data to an interpreter. Injection flaws are very prevalent, particularly in legacy code. They are often found in SQL, LDAP, Xpath, or NoSQL queries; OS commands; XML parsers, SMTP Headers, program arguments, etc. Injection flaws are easy to discover when examining code, but frequently hard to discover via testing. Scanners and fuzzers can help attackers find injection flaws.
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     <td colspan=2  {{Template:Top 10 2010:SummaryTableRowStyleTemplate|year=2013}}>An insecure web interface can be present when issues such as account enumeration, lack of account lockout or weak credenitals are present. Insecure web interfaces are prevalent as the intent is to have these interfaces exposed only on internal networks, however threats from the internal users can be just as significant as threats from external users. Issues with the web interface are easy to discover when examining the interface manually along with automated testing tools to identify other issues such as cross-site scripting.
  
 
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     <td {{Template:Top 10 2010:SummaryTableRowStyleTemplate|year=2013}}>Injection can result in data loss or corruption, lack of accountability, or denial of access. Injection can sometimes lead to complete host takeover.
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     <td {{Template:Top 10 2010:SummaryTableRowStyleTemplate|year=2013}}>Insecure web interfaces can result in data loss or corruption, lack of accountability, or denial of access and can lead to complete device takeover.
  
 
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     <td {{Template:Top 10 2010:SummaryTableRowStyleTemplate|year=2013}}>Consider the business value of the affected data and the platform running the interpreter. All data could be stolen, modified, or deleted.  Could your reputation be harmed?
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     <td {{Template:Top 10 2010:SummaryTableRowStyleTemplate|year=2013}}>Consider the business impact of poorly secured web interfaces that could lead to compromised devices along with compromised customers. Could your customers be harmed? Could your brand be harmed?
  
 
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{{Top_10:SubsectionTableBeginTemplate|type=main}} {{Top_10_2010:SubsectionAdvancedTemplate|type={{Top_10_2010:StyleTemplate}}|subsection=freetext|title=Is My Web Interface Secure?|position=firstLeft|year=2013|language=en}}
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The best way to find out if an application is vulnerable to injection is to verify that all use of interpreters clearly separates untrusted data from the command or query. For SQL calls, this means using bind variables in all prepared statements and stored procedures, and avoiding dynamic queries.
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Checking for an Insecure Web Interface includes:
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* Determining if the default username and password can be changed during initial product setup
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* Determining if a specific user account is locked out after 3 - 5 failed login attempts
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* Determining if valid accounts can be identified using password recovery mechanisms or new user pages
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* Reviewing the interface for issues such as cross-site scripting, cross-site request forgery and sql injection.
  
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Checking the code is a fast and accurate way to see if the application uses interpreters safely. Code analysis tools can help a security analyst find the use of interpreters and trace the data flow through the application. Penetration testers can validate these issues by crafting exploits that confirm the vulnerability.
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A secure web interface requires:
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Automated dynamic scanning which exercises the application may provide insight into whether some exploitable injection flaws exist. Scanners cannot always reach interpreters and have difficulty detecting whether an attack was successful. Poor error handling makes injection flaws easier to discover
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# Default passwords and ideally default usernames to be changed during initial setup
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# Ensuring password recovery mechanisms are robust and do not supply an attacker with information indicating a valid account
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Preventing injection requires keeping untrusted data separate from commands and queries.
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# Ensuring web interface is not susceptible to XSS, SQLi or CSRF
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# The preferred option is to use a safe API which avoids the use of the interpreter entirely or provides a parameterized interface.  Be careful with APIs, such as stored procedures, that are parameterized, but can still introduce injection under the hood.
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# Ensuring credentials are not exposed in internal or external network traffic
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# If a parameterized API is not available, you should carefully escape special characters using the specific escape syntax for that interpreter. [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/ESAPI  OWASP’s ESAPI] provides many of these [http://owasp-esapi-java.googlecode.com/svn/trunk_doc/latest/org/owasp/esapi/Encoder.html  escaping routines].
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# Ensuring weak passwords are not allowed
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# Positive or “white list” input validation is also recommended, but is not a complete defense as many applications require special characters in their input. If special characters are required, only approaches 1. and 2. above will make their use safe. [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/ESAPI  OWASP’s ESAPI] has an extensible library of [http://owasp-esapi-java.googlecode.com/svn/trunk_doc/latest/org/owasp/esapi/Validator.html  white list input validation routines].
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# Ensuring account lockout after 3 -5 failed login attempts
  
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Please review the following tabs for more detail based on whether you are a [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Internet_of_Things_Top_Ten_Project#tab=Manufacturers Manufacturer], [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Internet_of_Things_Top_Ten_Project#tab=Developers Developer] or [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Internet_of_Things_Top_Ten_Project#tab=Consumers Consumer]
 
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'''Scenario #1:''' The application uses untrusted data in the construction of the following '''vulnerable''' SQL call:
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'''Scenario #1:''' The web interface presents "Forgot Password" functionality which upon entering an invalid account informs the attacker that the account does not exist. Once valid accounts are identified, password guessing can begin for an indefinite amount of time if no account lockout controls exist.
  
 
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String query = "SELECT * FROM accounts WHERE custID='" + request.getParameter("id") + "'";
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Account [email protected] does not exist.
  
 
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'''Scenario #2:''' Similarly, an application’s blind trust in frameworks may result in queries that are still vulnerable, (e.g., Hibernate Query Language (HQL)):
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'''Scenario #2:''' Web interface is susceptible to cross-site scripting.
 
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Query HQLQuery = session.createQuery(“FROM accounts
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<nowiki>http://xyz.com/index.php?user=<script>alert(123)</script>
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WHERE custID='“ + request.getParameter("id") + "'");'''
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</nowiki>... Response from browser is an alert popup.
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In both cases, the attacker modifies the ‘id’ parameter value in her browser to send:  <span style="color:red;">' or '1'='1</span>. For example:
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In the cases above, the attacker is able to easily determine if an account is valid or not and is also able to determine that the site is susceptible to cross-site scripting (XSS).
  
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http://example.com/app/accountView?id=' or '1'='1
 
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This changes the meaning of both queries to return all the records from the accounts table.  More dangerous attacks could modify data or even invoke stored procedures.
 
  
 
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* [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2013-A1-Injection Top 10 2013-A1-Injection]
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* [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2013-A3-Cross-Site_Scripting_(XSS) Top 10 2013-A3-Cross-Site Scripting]
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* [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2013-A8-Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_(CSRF) Top 10 2013-A8-Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)]
 
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Latest revision as of 23:00, 1 December 2015

Back To The Internet of Things Top 10
Threat Agents Attack Vectors Security Weakness Technical Impacts Business Impacts
Application Specific Exploitability
EASY		 Prevalence
COMMON		 Detectability
EASY		 Impact
SEVERE		 Application / Business Specific
Consider anyone who has access to the web interface including internal and external users. Attacker uses weak credentials, captures plain-text credentials or enumerates accounts to access the web interface. Attack could come from external or internal users. An insecure web interface can be present when issues such as account enumeration, lack of account lockout or weak credenitals are present. Insecure web interfaces are prevalent as the intent is to have these interfaces exposed only on internal networks, however threats from the internal users can be just as significant as threats from external users. Issues with the web interface are easy to discover when examining the interface manually along with automated testing tools to identify other issues such as cross-site scripting. Insecure web interfaces can result in data loss or corruption, lack of accountability, or denial of access and can lead to complete device takeover. Consider the business impact of poorly secured web interfaces that could lead to compromised devices along with compromised customers. Could your customers be harmed? Could your brand be harmed?
Is My Web Interface Secure?

Checking for an Insecure Web Interface includes:

  • Determining if the default username and password can be changed during initial product setup
  • Determining if a specific user account is locked out after 3 - 5 failed login attempts
  • Determining if valid accounts can be identified using password recovery mechanisms or new user pages
  • Reviewing the interface for issues such as cross-site scripting, cross-site request forgery and sql injection.
How Do I Make My Web Interface Secure?

A secure web interface requires:

  1. Default passwords and ideally default usernames to be changed during initial setup
  2. Ensuring password recovery mechanisms are robust and do not supply an attacker with information indicating a valid account
  3. Ensuring web interface is not susceptible to XSS, SQLi or CSRF
  4. Ensuring credentials are not exposed in internal or external network traffic
  5. Ensuring weak passwords are not allowed
  6. Ensuring account lockout after 3 -5 failed login attempts

Please review the following tabs for more detail based on whether you are a Manufacturer, Developer or Consumer

Example Attack Scenarios

Scenario #1: The web interface presents "Forgot Password" functionality which upon entering an invalid account informs the attacker that the account does not exist. Once valid accounts are identified, password guessing can begin for an indefinite amount of time if no account lockout controls exist.

Account [email protected] does not exist.

Scenario #2: Web interface is susceptible to cross-site scripting.

http://xyz.com/index.php?user=<script>alert(123)</script> ... Response from browser is an alert popup.

In the cases above, the attacker is able to easily determine if an account is valid or not and is also able to determine that the site is susceptible to cross-site scripting (XSS).


References

OWASP

External
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