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Difference between revisions of "Architecture and design principles"

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The following is a merge of ENISA, OWASP and Veracode top 10. Note that there is a mixture of threats and vulnerabilities here - we should decide whether to use risks (threats with impact on assets which occur with probability) and vulnerabilities (system flaws which increase the probability of a threat occurring). I have cut those risks/vulnerabilities which cannot be addressed in any way by developers.  We should decide whether to include recommendations in the style of "code of practice"- e.g. activity monitoring should only be used in circumstances xyz...
+
The following is a merge of ENISA, OWASP and Veracode top 10. Note that there is a mixture of threats and vulnerabilities here - we should decide whether to use risks (threats with impact on assets which occur with probability) and vulnerabilities (system flaws which increase the probability of a threat occurring). I have cut those risks/vulnerabilities which cannot be addressed in any way by developers.  We should decide whether to include recommendations in the style of "code of practice"- e.g. activity monitoring should only be used in circumstances xyz... (feel free to restructure)
  
 
==Top Risks/Vulnerabilities==
 
==Top Risks/Vulnerabilities==
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* Unintentional disclosure of data: The smartphone user unintentionally discloses data on the smartphone.
 
* Unintentional disclosure of data: The smartphone user unintentionally discloses data on the smartphone.
 
** Apply the principle of minimal disclosure - only collect and disclose data which is required for the application (how to know what this is?)
 
** Apply the principle of minimal disclosure - only collect and disclose data which is required for the application (how to know what this is?)
 +
** Use non-persistent identifiers wherever possible - e.g. do not use the EMEI number as an identifier unless there is a good reason to do so.
 
** Apply techniques for the detection of covert channels - e.g. covert flow trees to discover information which may flow through shared resources such as file systems, resource use etc...
 
** Apply techniques for the detection of covert channels - e.g. covert flow trees to discover information which may flow through shared resources such as file systems, resource use etc...
 +
** Carefully control any data which is stored in public stores such as address book, media gallery etc...
 +
** Obtain user explicit user consent according to best practice (see implementation guidelines) for collection of personal data.
  
 +
* Attacks on decommissioned smartphones: The smartphone is decommissioned improperly allowing an attacker access to the data on the device.
 +
** See first risk
 +
** Provide a convenient way of resetting access credentials which does not require the device (consider an automated timeout on access credentials).
 +
** Consider using SIM card as default storage for small but sensitive data such as keys.
  
* Attacks on decommissioned smartphones: The smartphone is decommissioned improperly allowing an attacker access to the data on the device.
 
 
* Phishing attacks: An attacker collects user credentials (such as passwords and credit card numbers) by means of fake apps or (SMS, email) messages that seem genuine.
 
* Phishing attacks: An attacker collects user credentials (such as passwords and credit card numbers) by means of fake apps or (SMS, email) messages that seem genuine.
 +
** Provide appropriate trust cues for linking to unknown third party applications.
 +
** Do not train users to follow untrusted paths.
 +
** Provide a reporting channel for phishing from apps (e.g. if you are a browser plugin developer).
 +
 
* Spyware:  Spyware covers untargeted collection of personal information as opposed to targeted surveillance.
 
* Spyware:  Spyware covers untargeted collection of personal information as opposed to targeted surveillance.
 +
 
* Network Spoofing Attacks: An attacker deploys a rogue network access point (WiFi or GSM) and users connect to it. The attacker subsequently intercepts (or tampers with) the user communication to carry out further attacks such as phishing.
 
* Network Spoofing Attacks: An attacker deploys a rogue network access point (WiFi or GSM) and users connect to it. The attacker subsequently intercepts (or tampers with) the user communication to carry out further attacks such as phishing.
 +
** Use the GSM encryption flags to detect and signal downgrade attacks.
 +
 
* Surveillance attacks: An attacker keeps a specific user under surveillance through the target user’s smartphone.
 
* Surveillance attacks: An attacker keeps a specific user under surveillance through the target user’s smartphone.
 
* Diallerware attacks: An attacker steals money from the user by means of malware that makes hidden use of premium SMS services or numbers.
 
* Diallerware attacks: An attacker steals money from the user by means of malware that makes hidden use of premium SMS services or numbers.

Revision as of 12:42, 10 May 2011

The following is a merge of ENISA, OWASP and Veracode top 10. Note that there is a mixture of threats and vulnerabilities here - we should decide whether to use risks (threats with impact on assets which occur with probability) and vulnerabilities (system flaws which increase the probability of a threat occurring). I have cut those risks/vulnerabilities which cannot be addressed in any way by developers. We should decide whether to include recommendations in the style of "code of practice"- e.g. activity monitoring should only be used in circumstances xyz... (feel free to restructure)

Top Risks/Vulnerabilities

  • Unsafe sensitive data storage
    • Consider the whole data lifecycle in writing your application
    • Automatically delete data which is not required (how to know when it's not required?).
    • Securely delete data using standard shredding techniques.
    • Store a minimum of data on the client side device.
    • Securely wipe removable media
    • Be aware of caches and temporary storage as a possible leakage channel.
    • Implement key and password storage best practice.
    • Figure out what data needs to be protected most and what doesn't.
  • Unintentional disclosure of data: The smartphone user unintentionally discloses data on the smartphone.
    • Apply the principle of minimal disclosure - only collect and disclose data which is required for the application (how to know what this is?)
    • Use non-persistent identifiers wherever possible - e.g. do not use the EMEI number as an identifier unless there is a good reason to do so.
    • Apply techniques for the detection of covert channels - e.g. covert flow trees to discover information which may flow through shared resources such as file systems, resource use etc...
    • Carefully control any data which is stored in public stores such as address book, media gallery etc...
    • Obtain user explicit user consent according to best practice (see implementation guidelines) for collection of personal data.
  • Attacks on decommissioned smartphones: The smartphone is decommissioned improperly allowing an attacker access to the data on the device.
    • See first risk
    • Provide a convenient way of resetting access credentials which does not require the device (consider an automated timeout on access credentials).
    • Consider using SIM card as default storage for small but sensitive data such as keys.
  • Phishing attacks: An attacker collects user credentials (such as passwords and credit card numbers) by means of fake apps or (SMS, email) messages that seem genuine.
    • Provide appropriate trust cues for linking to unknown third party applications.
    • Do not train users to follow untrusted paths.
    • Provide a reporting channel for phishing from apps (e.g. if you are a browser plugin developer).
  • Spyware: Spyware covers untargeted collection of personal information as opposed to targeted surveillance.
  • Network Spoofing Attacks: An attacker deploys a rogue network access point (WiFi or GSM) and users connect to it. The attacker subsequently intercepts (or tampers with) the user communication to carry out further attacks such as phishing.
    • Use the GSM encryption flags to detect and signal downgrade attacks.
  • Surveillance attacks: An attacker keeps a specific user under surveillance through the target user’s smartphone.
  • Diallerware attacks: An attacker steals money from the user by means of malware that makes hidden use of premium SMS services or numbers.
  • Financial malware attacks The smartphone is infected with malware specifically designed for stealing credit card numbers, online banking credentials or subverting online banking or ecommerce transactions.
  • Network congestion Network resource overload due to smartphone usage leading to network unavailability for the end-user.
  • Unauthorized network connectivity (exfiltration or command & control)
  • UI Impersonation
  • System modification (rootkit, APN proxy config)
  • Logic or Time bomb (including runtime interpreter)
  • Unsafe sensitive data transmission
  • Hardcoded password/keys
  • Lack of data protection in transit
  • Client-side injection
  • Client-side DOS
  • Malicious third-party code
  • Client-side buffer overflow
  • Failure to properly handle inbound SMS messages
  • Failure to properly handle outbound SMS messages
  • Failure to disable insecure platform features in application (caching of keystrokes, screen data)