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Difference between revisions of "Use of hard-coded cryptographic key"

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Revision as of 21:32, 30 July 2016


Overview

The use of a hard-coded cryptographic key tremendously increases the possibility that encrypted data may be recovered

Consequences

  • Authentication: If hard-coded cryptographic keys are used, it is almost certain that malicious users will gain access through the account in question.

Exposure period

  • Design: For both front-end to back-end connections and default account settings, alternate decisions must be made at design time.

Platform

  • Languages: All
  • Operating platforms: All

Required resources

Any

Severity

High

Likelihood of exploit

High

Avoidance and mitigation

  • Design: Prevention schemes mirror that of hard-coded password storage.

Discussion

The main difference between the use of hard-coded passwords and the use of hard-coded cryptographic keys is the false sense of security that the former conveys. Many people believe that simply hashing a hard-coded password before storage will protect the information from malicious users. However, many hashes are reversible (or at least vulnerable to brute force attacks) - and further, many authentication protocols simply request the hash itself, making it no better than a password.

Examples

In C\C++:

int VerifyAdmin(char *password) {
  if (strcmp(password,"68af404b513073584c4b6f22b6c63e6b")) {
    printf("Incorrect Password!\n");
    return(0)
  }

  printf("Entering Diagnostic Mode�\n");
  return(1);
}

In Java:

int VerifyAdmin(String password) {
  
  if (passwd.Eqauls("68af404b513073584c4b6f22b6c63e6b")) {
    return(0)
  }
  //Diagnostic Mode
  return(1);
}

Related problems