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Difference between revisions of "Talk:Industry:Project Review/NIST SP 800-37r1 FPD Appendix I"

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<big>APPENDIX I SECURITY CONTROLS IN EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENTS'''</big>
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PARTNERSHIPS, OUTSOURCING ARRANGEMENTS, SUPPLY CHAIN EXCHANGES
  
PARTNERSHIPS, OUTSOURCING ARRANGEMENTS, SUPPLY CHAIN EXCHANGES
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For Appendix I, my major comment is that it did not seem to have covered issues with outsourced application development, which happens a lot. In this scenario, you could provide the service provider with your security requirements and standards. But you may have to rely on the service provider to choose and implement the security controls. It is probably necessary to conduct a review of the chosen security controls before they are implemented. And eventually, the steps of "assess security controls" and "authorize information systems" would need to be conducted by internal people. Furthermore, security code review need to be conducted if the service provider has development software code that is deemed critical from a security perspective. -William Zhang
  
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== APPENDIX I SECURITY CONTROLS IN EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENTS  ==
  
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[https://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/swa/downloads/ContractLanguage_ID_DH_090806.pdf Software Assurance in Acquisition and Contract Language] Version 1.1 July 31, 2009.
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Integrating software security in the acquisition life cycle promotes the acquisition of secure software. This version includes sample SwA Request for Proposal (RFP)/ Contract language. Buyers and evaluators of software and suppliers can gain security risk-based insight. They can put suppliers on notice that consumers are concerned about software security and the risks to their organizations that are attributable to exploitable software.
  
==APPENDIX I
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[https://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/swa/downloads/DueDiligenceMWV12_01AM090909.pdf Software Supply Chain Risk Management and Due Diligence] Version 1.2 June 16, 2009.
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Software security enhanced due-diligence is a critical element of software supply chain risk management. Buyers and evaluators of software and services can gain security risk-based insight. They can put suppliers on notice that consumers are concerned about software security and the risks to their organizations that are attributable to exploitable software.
  
SECURITY CONTROLS IN EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENTS
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[https://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/swa/downloads/SwA_in_Acquisition_102208.pdf Software Assurance in Acquisition: Mitigating Risks to the Enterprise] "... provides information on how to incorporate SwA considerations in key decisions and how to exercise due diligence throughout the acquisition process relative to potential risk exposures that could be introduced by the supply chain."
  
==
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[http://www.sans.org/appseccontract/ Application Security Procurement Language]. These guidelines incorporate substantial language from the [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Secure_Software_Contract_Annex OWASP Secure Software Contract Annex]. These ... enable buyers of custom software to more explicitly focus on the responsibilities of code writers for checking the code and for fixing security flaws before software is delivered. The sample procurement language ... addresses:
  
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*Personnel, Security Training, Background Checks of Developers, Vulnerabilities, Risks and Threats, and Application Development.
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*Development environment: Secure Coding, Configuration Management, Distribution, Disclosure, and Evaluation.
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*Testing: test planning, source code reviews, as well as vulnerability and penetration tests.
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*Patches and Updates, along with notification and testing of those modifications to the software.
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*Tracking Security Issues. - vendor ... “certification package” that establishes the security requirements, design, implementation, and test results were properly completed and all security issues were resolved appropriately. Its provisions include specifying that the developer is to warrant that the software shall not contain any code that does not support a software requirement and weakens the security of the application, including computer viruses, worms, time bombs, back doors, Trojan horses, Easter eggs, and all other forms of malicious code. It offers procurement language for how security issues will be investigated."
  
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See Software Assurance [https://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/swa/acqwg.html Acquisition and Outsourcing Working Group]. 
  
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<br>--[[User:Walter Houser|Walter Houser]] 23:22, 19 December 2009 (UTC)
  
 
[[Category:GIC-NISTSP80037r1FPD]]
 
[[Category:GIC-NISTSP80037r1FPD]]

Latest revision as of 21:39, 24 December 2009

PARTNERSHIPS, OUTSOURCING ARRANGEMENTS, SUPPLY CHAIN EXCHANGES

For Appendix I, my major comment is that it did not seem to have covered issues with outsourced application development, which happens a lot. In this scenario, you could provide the service provider with your security requirements and standards. But you may have to rely on the service provider to choose and implement the security controls. It is probably necessary to conduct a review of the chosen security controls before they are implemented. And eventually, the steps of "assess security controls" and "authorize information systems" would need to be conducted by internal people. Furthermore, security code review need to be conducted if the service provider has development software code that is deemed critical from a security perspective. -William Zhang

APPENDIX I SECURITY CONTROLS IN EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENTS

Software Assurance in Acquisition and Contract Language Version 1.1 July 31, 2009. Integrating software security in the acquisition life cycle promotes the acquisition of secure software. This version includes sample SwA Request for Proposal (RFP)/ Contract language. Buyers and evaluators of software and suppliers can gain security risk-based insight. They can put suppliers on notice that consumers are concerned about software security and the risks to their organizations that are attributable to exploitable software.

Software Supply Chain Risk Management and Due Diligence Version 1.2 June 16, 2009. Software security enhanced due-diligence is a critical element of software supply chain risk management. Buyers and evaluators of software and services can gain security risk-based insight. They can put suppliers on notice that consumers are concerned about software security and the risks to their organizations that are attributable to exploitable software.

Software Assurance in Acquisition: Mitigating Risks to the Enterprise "... provides information on how to incorporate SwA considerations in key decisions and how to exercise due diligence throughout the acquisition process relative to potential risk exposures that could be introduced by the supply chain."

Application Security Procurement Language. These guidelines incorporate substantial language from the OWASP Secure Software Contract Annex. These ... enable buyers of custom software to more explicitly focus on the responsibilities of code writers for checking the code and for fixing security flaws before software is delivered. The sample procurement language ... addresses:

  • Personnel, Security Training, Background Checks of Developers, Vulnerabilities, Risks and Threats, and Application Development.
  • Development environment: Secure Coding, Configuration Management, Distribution, Disclosure, and Evaluation.
  • Testing: test planning, source code reviews, as well as vulnerability and penetration tests.
  • Patches and Updates, along with notification and testing of those modifications to the software.
  • Tracking Security Issues. - vendor ... “certification package” that establishes the security requirements, design, implementation, and test results were properly completed and all security issues were resolved appropriately. Its provisions include specifying that the developer is to warrant that the software shall not contain any code that does not support a software requirement and weakens the security of the application, including computer viruses, worms, time bombs, back doors, Trojan horses, Easter eggs, and all other forms of malicious code. It offers procurement language for how security issues will be investigated."

See Software Assurance Acquisition and Outsourcing Working Group.


--Walter Houser 23:22, 19 December 2009 (UTC)