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Difference between revisions of "Pinning Cheat Sheat"

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Invariant trust of critical infrastructure such as DNS and PKI{X} with a public CA hierarchy has led to a number of high profile failures in the secure channel. This cheat sheet will help developers and organizations navigate the minefield of securing data in transit and by bringing integrity back to the channel when a pre-exisiting relationship exists between the user and an organization or service.
#REDIRECT [[Pinning Cheat Sheet]]
This cheat sheet is a technical guide to the Virginia chapter's presentation [[Media:Securing-Wireless-Channels-in-the-Mobile-Space.ppt|Securing Wireless Channels in the Mobile Space]]. Additional material included [[Media:pubkey-pin-supplement.pdf|Supplement with code excerpts]], [[|Android sample program]], [[|iOS sample program]], [[|.Net sample program]], and [[|OpenSSL sample program]].
== Introduction ==
Secure channels are a cornerstone to users and employees on the go. Users and developers expect end-to-end security when sending and receiving data - especially sensitive data on channels protected by VPN, SSL, or TLS. While organizations which control DNS and CA have likely reduced risk to trivial levels under most threat models, users and developers subjugated to other's DNS and a public CA hierarchy are exposed to non-trivial amounts of risk. In fact, history has shown those relying on outside services have suffered chronic breaches in their secure channels.
The pandemic abuse of trust has resulted in users, developers and applications making security related decisions on effectively untrusted user input. This article is focused on providing clear, simple, actionable guidance for securing the channel in a hostile environment where actors could be malicious and the conference of trust a liability.

Latest revision as of 04:43, 13 February 2013