Difference between revisions of "HTML5 Security Cheat Sheet"
(Added CSRF recommendation on CORS)
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== Content Deliverability ==
== Content Deliverability ==
Revision as of 18:27, 18 September 2011
- 1 Introduction
- 2 HTML 5
- 2.1 Browser Securability Chart
- 2.2 Cross Origin Resource Sharing
- 2.3 Input Validation
- 2.4 Local Storage (a.k.a. Offline Storage, Web Storage)
- 2.5 WebDatabase
- 2.6 WebSockets
- 2.7 Geolocation
- 2.8 Use the "sandbox" attribute for untrusted content (iFrame)
- 2.9 Web Messaging
- 2.10 Content Deliverability
- 2.11 Progressive Enhancements and Graceful Degradation Risks
- 3 CSS 3
- 5 Related Cheat Sheets
- 6 Authors and Primary Editors
Browser Securability Chart
There are a few sites charting browser capabilities as they related to the HTML 5 / CSS 3 standard. I have not seen any that mention security. There may not be a need for it, but e.g. 'sandbox' will be ignored in down browsers, but which HTML 5 compliant browsers support it. If there are differences in implementations, my assumption is that there will be differences in security configuration / settings.
Cross Origin Resource Sharing
- Validate URLs passed to XMLHttpRequest.open, current browsers allow these URLS to be cross domain.
- Ensure that URLs responding with Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * do not include any sensitive content or information that might aid attacker in further attacks. Use Access-Control-Allow-Origin header only on chosen URLs that need to be accessed cross-domain. Don't use that header for the whole domain.
- Take special care when using Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true response header. Whitelist the allowed Origins and never echo back the Origin request header in Access-Control-Allow-Origin.
- Allow only selected, trusted domains in Access-Control-Allow-Origin header. Prefer whitelisting domains over blacklisting or allowing any domain (either through * wildcard or echoing the Origin header content).
- Keep in mind that CORS does not prevent the requested data from going to an un-authenticated location - it's still important for the server to perform usual CSRF prevention.
Local Storage (a.k.a. Offline Storage, Web Storage)
- Drop backward compatibility in implemented client/servers and use only protocol versions above hybi-00. Popular Hixie-76 version and olders are outdated and insecure.
- While it is relatively easy to tunnel TCP services through WebSockets (e.g. VNC, FTP), doing so enables access to these tunneled services for the in-browser attacker in case of a Cross-Site-Scripting attack. These services might also be called directly from a malicious page or program.
- The protocol doesn't handle authorisation and/or authentication. Application-level protocols should handle that separately in case sensitive data is being transferred.
- Endpoints exposed through ws:/ protocol are easily reversible to plaintext. Only wss:// (WebSockets over SSH) should be used for protection against Man-In-The-Middle attacks
- Spoofing the client is possible outside browser, so WebSockets server should be able to handle incorrect/malicious input. Always validate input coming from the remote site, as it might have been altered.
- When implementing servers, check the Origin: header in Websockets handshake. Though it might be spoofed outside browser, browsers always add the Origin of the page which initiated Websockets connection.
Use the "sandbox" attribute for untrusted content (iFrame)
Web Messaging provides a means of messaging between documents from different origins in a way which is generally safer than JSON-P, however, there are still some recommendations to keep in mind:
- When posting a message, explicitly state the expected origin as the second argument to postMessage rather than * in order to prevent sending the message to an unknown origin after a redirect or some other means of the target window's origin changing.
- The receiving page should always:
CDN or src links to foreign domains = know your content
Progressive Enhancements and Graceful Degradation Risks
The best practice now is to determine the capabilities that a browser supports and augment with some type of substitute for capabilities that are not directly supported. This may mean an onion-like element, e.g. falling through to a Flash Player if the <video> tag is unsupported, or it may mean additional scripting code from various sources that should be code reviewed.
I haven't seen any specific to CSS 3 and it's been a while since I worried about url / !import. I think privacy leaks are the most well know - e.g. querying global history using :visited (https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=147777)
Related Cheat Sheets
OWASP Cheat Sheets Project Homepage
Authors and Primary Editors
Mark Roxbury - mark.roxberry [at] owasp.org
Krzysztof Kotowicz - krzysztof [at] kotowicz.net