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EJB Bad Practices: Use of Class Loader

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This is a Vulnerability. To view all vulnerabilities, please see the Vulnerability Category page.


Abstract

The program violates the Enterprise JavaBeans specification by using the class loader.

Description

The Enterprise JavaBeans specification requires that every bean provider follow a set of programming guidelines designed to ensure that the bean will be portable and behave consistently in any EJB container. [1]

In this case, the program violates the following EJB guideline:

"The enterprise bean must not attempt to create a class loader; obtain the current class loader; set the context class loader; set security manager; create a new security manager; stop the JVM; or change the input, output, and error streams."

A requirement that the specification justifies in the following way:

"These functions are reserved for the EJB container. Allowing the enterprise bean to use these functions could compromise security and decrease the container's ability to properly manage the runtime environment."

References

[1] Enterprise JavaBeans 2.1 Specification. Sun Microsystems. http://java.sun.com/products/ejb/docs.html.