OWASP Spring Of Code 2007 Project Ideas - Revision history

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Karakelian: /* General Ideas */

2007-04-19T14:15:56Z

‎General Ideas

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 This page contains project ideas for submissions to the [[OWASP_Spring_Of_Code_2007]]. Current OWASP project leaders should use this as a place to put their 'wish-list' for their projects.
@@ Line 89: / Line 46: @@
 * '''Data Flow''' - Adding true data flow analysis to LAPSE. Check out the jDFA project at sourceforge to see whether that can be applied to find tainted data attacks like XSS and SQL injection (as well as others)
-* '''Security Across the SDLC''' - Integrated security activities across the lifecycle.  Currently people are talking about âtouchpointsâ and âactivitiesâ but thereâs no unifying line of sight or theme.
+* '''Security Across the SDLC''' - Integrated security activities across the lifecycle.  Currently people are talking about “touchpoints” and “activities” but there’s no unifying line of sight or theme.
-* '''Honeycomb''' - It seems simple, but when you start trying to organize ALL the information thatâs out there it gets incredibly difficult.  The simple taxonomies are wrong, bad, and misleading.  Honeycomb is using a folksonomy approach that I hope will allow us to do something new here.  But it really needs someone to think it through â perfect for a thesis.
+* '''Honeycomb''' - It seems simple, but when you start trying to organize ALL the information that’s out there it gets incredibly difficult.  The simple taxonomies are wrong, bad, and misleading.  Honeycomb is using a folksonomy approach that I hope will allow us to do something new here.  But it really needs someone to think it through – perfect for a thesis.
 * '''Honeycomb+Tools''' - Integrating the Honeycomb information into tools would be incredibly helpful.  Things like the OWASP report generator need it.  Threat modeling tools need it.  Scanners need it.  We need to prepare the information there for tool use.
@@ Line 124: / Line 81: @@
 ==== .NET Tools to develop ====
-* Dynamically calculate required CAS permissions (donât get me started on PermCalc)
+* Dynamically calculate required CAS permissions (don’t get me started on PermCalc)
 * Refactor code that requires higher permissions into separate assemblies (so that only 1% of the code will need to run outside the Sandbox)
-* Converters of unmanaged code to managed code (i.e. C++ to C#, VB6 to VB.Net, etcâ¦)
+* Converters of unmanaged code to managed code (i.e. C++ to C#, VB6 to VB.Net, etc…)
 * Source code audit tools that identify vulnerabilities or areas that might have vulnerabilities
-* ".Net Time-machine (ala Flight Recorder)" - ability to record the entire state of all objects during a .Net Execution and allow the execution, debugging and fuzzing from any arbitrary point (see Javaâs DeJaVu and JaRec Projects (I remember seeing another PoC of this type of tool, but canât seem to be able to find the link))
+* ".Net Time-machine (ala Flight Recorder)" - ability to record the entire state of all objects during a .Net Execution and allow the execution, debugging and fuzzing from any arbitrary point (see Java’s DeJaVu and JaRec Projects (I remember seeing another PoC of this type of tool, but can’t seem to be able to find the link))
 * Smart fuzzers (to find run-time vulnerabilities)
-* âSecurity rating calculatorsâ which will give a product (or dll) a rating based on the âthreat profile of that applicationâ (for example the more unmanaged code, the worse rating) . This will be a very important part of the âPartial Trust Brandâ
+* ‘Security rating calculators’ which will give a product (or dll) a rating based on the ‘threat profile of that application’ (for example the more unmanaged code, the worse rating) . This will be a very important part of the ‘Partial Trust Brand’
 * Development environments that allow the development of complex and feature rich partial Trust applications like IE in managed code
-* New execution environments (aka mini CLRs) that allow the execution of Managed/Verifiable code in : Services, Drivers, plug-ins etcâ¦
+* New execution environments (aka mini CLRs) that allow the execution of Managed/Verifiable code in : Services, Drivers, plug-ins etc…
-* New Virtual PC Execution environments that allow the safe execution of âpotential malicious applicationsâ whose interface with the userâs assets are controlled by a managed/verifiable application (and CAS policies)
+* New Virtual PC Execution environments that allow the safe execution of ‘potential malicious applications’ whose interface with the user’s assets are controlled by a managed/verifiable application (and CAS policies)
-* âWhat is going onâ tools. When I run an application I need to know EVERYTHING it does. And if the application somehow escapes the âexecution monitoring systemâ I want to know that it did. Now that Microsoft bought SysInternals, can we have a massive boast on those tools capabilities?. This tools must also build CAS polices based on what they detected the target application needs.
+* ‘What is going on’ tools. When I run an application I need to know EVERYTHING it does. And if the application somehow escapes the ‘execution monitoring system’ I want to know that it did. Now that Microsoft bought SysInternals, can we have a massive boast on those tools capabilities?. This tools must also build CAS polices based on what they detected the target application needs.
-* Tools that allow the easy development and use of CAS and RBS (Role Base Security) and frameworks for securing an applicationâs Business-Logic (for example using a CAS to prevent the user accountâs from being changed, or an bank account from being accessed)
+* Tools that allow the easy development and use of CAS and RBS (Role Base Security) and frameworks for securing an application’s Business-Logic (for example using a CAS to prevent the user account’s from being changed, or an bank account from being accessed)
 * Code Coverage Tools - To know how much of an application has been tested, fuzzed or executed
-*  âReal time Hot Patching of Jitted methods (without using the .NET profiler)â - For advanced defence solutions we will need the capability to make changes to jitted code (i.e . writing patches in C#)
+*  ‘Real time Hot Patching of Jitted methods (without using the .NET profiler)’ - For advanced defence solutions we will need the capability to make changes to jitted code (i.e . writing patches in C#)
 ==== ASP.NET ====
-* WAF (Web Application Firewalls) with pluggable modules for: Data Validation, Authentication, Authorization, Anti-CSRF, DoS, Business-Logic vulnerabilities, etcâ¦
+* WAF (Web Application Firewalls) with pluggable modules for: Data Validation, Authentication, Authorization, Anti-CSRF, DoS, Business-Logic vulnerabilities, etc…
 * A framework similar to Struts (which force the developers to do the right thing (i.e. explicitly define all inputs into their application)
-* IDS (Intrusion Detection Systems) with the capability to change the applicationâs behaviour when under attack
+* IDS (Intrusion Detection Systems) with the capability to change the application’s behaviour when under attack
 * Native Http Pipeline for IIS 5 and 6 (similar to what seems that will happen in IIS 7). This will be very important to protect ASP Classic pages
-* CAS demands for dangerous methods (for example methods and classes that allow SQL Injections, XSS, etcâ¦). The current CAS permissionâs model is designed to protect the server and the other co-hosted applications. This needs to be extended so that CAS can be used to protect the actual application from vulnerabilities in its code
+* CAS demands for dangerous methods (for example methods and classes that allow SQL Injections, XSS, etc…). The current CAS permission’s model is designed to protect the server and the other co-hosted applications. This needs to be extended so that CAS can be used to protect the actual application from vulnerabilities in its code
-* CAS demands for methods or code that âshouldâ exist (for example data valiation checks, authorization, etcâ¦.)
+* CAS demands for methods or code that ’should’ exist (for example data valiation checks, authorization, etc….)
 __NOTOC__

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 This page contains project ideas for submissions to the [[OWASP_Spring_Of_Code_2007]]. Current OWASP project leaders should use this as a place to put their 'wish-list' for their projects.
@@ Line 46: / Line 89: @@
 * '''Data Flow''' - Adding true data flow analysis to LAPSE. Check out the jDFA project at sourceforge to see whether that can be applied to find tainted data attacks like XSS and SQL injection (as well as others)
-* '''Security Across the SDLC''' - Integrated security activities across the lifecycle.  Currently people are talking about “touchpoints” and “activities” but there’s no unifying line of sight or theme.
+* '''Security Across the SDLC''' - Integrated security activities across the lifecycle.  Currently people are talking about âtouchpointsâ and âactivitiesâ but thereâs no unifying line of sight or theme.
-* '''Honeycomb''' - It seems simple, but when you start trying to organize ALL the information that’s out there it gets incredibly difficult.  The simple taxonomies are wrong, bad, and misleading.  Honeycomb is using a folksonomy approach that I hope will allow us to do something new here.  But it really needs someone to think it through – perfect for a thesis.
+* '''Honeycomb''' - It seems simple, but when you start trying to organize ALL the information thatâs out there it gets incredibly difficult.  The simple taxonomies are wrong, bad, and misleading.  Honeycomb is using a folksonomy approach that I hope will allow us to do something new here.  But it really needs someone to think it through â perfect for a thesis.
 * '''Honeycomb+Tools''' - Integrating the Honeycomb information into tools would be incredibly helpful.  Things like the OWASP report generator need it.  Threat modeling tools need it.  Scanners need it.  We need to prepare the information there for tool use.
@@ Line 81: / Line 124: @@
 ==== .NET Tools to develop ====
-* Dynamically calculate required CAS permissions (don’t get me started on PermCalc)
+* Dynamically calculate required CAS permissions (donât get me started on PermCalc)
 * Refactor code that requires higher permissions into separate assemblies (so that only 1% of the code will need to run outside the Sandbox)
-* Converters of unmanaged code to managed code (i.e. C++ to C#, VB6 to VB.Net, etc…)
+* Converters of unmanaged code to managed code (i.e. C++ to C#, VB6 to VB.Net, etcâ¦)
 * Source code audit tools that identify vulnerabilities or areas that might have vulnerabilities
-* ".Net Time-machine (ala Flight Recorder)" - ability to record the entire state of all objects during a .Net Execution and allow the execution, debugging and fuzzing from any arbitrary point (see Java’s DeJaVu and JaRec Projects (I remember seeing another PoC of this type of tool, but can’t seem to be able to find the link))
+* ".Net Time-machine (ala Flight Recorder)" - ability to record the entire state of all objects during a .Net Execution and allow the execution, debugging and fuzzing from any arbitrary point (see Javaâs DeJaVu and JaRec Projects (I remember seeing another PoC of this type of tool, but canât seem to be able to find the link))
 * Smart fuzzers (to find run-time vulnerabilities)
-* ‘Security rating calculators’ which will give a product (or dll) a rating based on the ‘threat profile of that application’ (for example the more unmanaged code, the worse rating) . This will be a very important part of the ‘Partial Trust Brand’
+* âSecurity rating calculatorsâ which will give a product (or dll) a rating based on the âthreat profile of that applicationâ (for example the more unmanaged code, the worse rating) . This will be a very important part of the âPartial Trust Brandâ
 * Development environments that allow the development of complex and feature rich partial Trust applications like IE in managed code
-* New execution environments (aka mini CLRs) that allow the execution of Managed/Verifiable code in : Services, Drivers, plug-ins etc…
+* New execution environments (aka mini CLRs) that allow the execution of Managed/Verifiable code in : Services, Drivers, plug-ins etcâ¦
-* New Virtual PC Execution environments that allow the safe execution of ‘potential malicious applications’ whose interface with the user’s assets are controlled by a managed/verifiable application (and CAS policies)
+* New Virtual PC Execution environments that allow the safe execution of âpotential malicious applicationsâ whose interface with the userâs assets are controlled by a managed/verifiable application (and CAS policies)
-* ‘What is going on’ tools. When I run an application I need to know EVERYTHING it does. And if the application somehow escapes the ‘execution monitoring system’ I want to know that it did. Now that Microsoft bought SysInternals, can we have a massive boast on those tools capabilities?. This tools must also build CAS polices based on what they detected the target application needs.
+* âWhat is going onâ tools. When I run an application I need to know EVERYTHING it does. And if the application somehow escapes the âexecution monitoring systemâ I want to know that it did. Now that Microsoft bought SysInternals, can we have a massive boast on those tools capabilities?. This tools must also build CAS polices based on what they detected the target application needs.
-* Tools that allow the easy development and use of CAS and RBS (Role Base Security) and frameworks for securing an application’s Business-Logic (for example using a CAS to prevent the user account’s from being changed, or an bank account from being accessed)
+* Tools that allow the easy development and use of CAS and RBS (Role Base Security) and frameworks for securing an applicationâs Business-Logic (for example using a CAS to prevent the user accountâs from being changed, or an bank account from being accessed)
 * Code Coverage Tools - To know how much of an application has been tested, fuzzed or executed
-*  ‘Real time Hot Patching of Jitted methods (without using the .NET profiler)’ - For advanced defence solutions we will need the capability to make changes to jitted code (i.e . writing patches in C#)
+*  âReal time Hot Patching of Jitted methods (without using the .NET profiler)â - For advanced defence solutions we will need the capability to make changes to jitted code (i.e . writing patches in C#)
 ==== ASP.NET ====
-* WAF (Web Application Firewalls) with pluggable modules for: Data Validation, Authentication, Authorization, Anti-CSRF, DoS, Business-Logic vulnerabilities, etc…
+* WAF (Web Application Firewalls) with pluggable modules for: Data Validation, Authentication, Authorization, Anti-CSRF, DoS, Business-Logic vulnerabilities, etcâ¦
 * A framework similar to Struts (which force the developers to do the right thing (i.e. explicitly define all inputs into their application)
-* IDS (Intrusion Detection Systems) with the capability to change the application’s behaviour when under attack
+* IDS (Intrusion Detection Systems) with the capability to change the applicationâs behaviour when under attack
 * Native Http Pipeline for IIS 5 and 6 (similar to what seems that will happen in IIS 7). This will be very important to protect ASP Classic pages
-* CAS demands for dangerous methods (for example methods and classes that allow SQL Injections, XSS, etc…). The current CAS permission’s model is designed to protect the server and the other co-hosted applications. This needs to be extended so that CAS can be used to protect the actual application from vulnerabilities in its code
+* CAS demands for dangerous methods (for example methods and classes that allow SQL Injections, XSS, etcâ¦). The current CAS permissionâs model is designed to protect the server and the other co-hosted applications. This needs to be extended so that CAS can be used to protect the actual application from vulnerabilities in its code
-* CAS demands for methods or code that ’should’ exist (for example data valiation checks, authorization, etc….)
+* CAS demands for methods or code that âshouldâ exist (for example data valiation checks, authorization, etcâ¦.)
 __NOTOC__

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 This page contains project ideas for submissions to the [[OWASP_Spring_Of_Code_2007]]. Current OWASP project leaders should use this as a place to put their 'wish-list' for their projects.
@@ Line 91: / Line 46: @@
 * '''Data Flow''' - Adding true data flow analysis to LAPSE. Check out the jDFA project at sourceforge to see whether that can be applied to find tainted data attacks like XSS and SQL injection (as well as others)
-* '''Security Across the SDLC''' - Integrated security activities across the lifecycle.  Currently people are talking about âtouchpointsâ and âactivitiesâ but thereâs no unifying line of sight or theme.
+* '''Security Across the SDLC''' - Integrated security activities across the lifecycle.  Currently people are talking about “touchpoints” and “activities” but there’s no unifying line of sight or theme.
-* '''Honeycomb''' - It seems simple, but when you start trying to organize ALL the information thatâs out there it gets incredibly difficult.  The simple taxonomies are wrong, bad, and misleading.  Honeycomb is using a folksonomy approach that I hope will allow us to do something new here.  But it really needs someone to think it through â perfect for a thesis.
+* '''Honeycomb''' - It seems simple, but when you start trying to organize ALL the information that’s out there it gets incredibly difficult.  The simple taxonomies are wrong, bad, and misleading.  Honeycomb is using a folksonomy approach that I hope will allow us to do something new here.  But it really needs someone to think it through – perfect for a thesis.
 * '''Honeycomb+Tools''' - Integrating the Honeycomb information into tools would be incredibly helpful.  Things like the OWASP report generator need it.  Threat modeling tools need it.  Scanners need it.  We need to prepare the information there for tool use.
@@ Line 126: / Line 81: @@
 ==== .NET Tools to develop ====
-* Dynamically calculate required CAS permissions (donât get me started on PermCalc)
+* Dynamically calculate required CAS permissions (don’t get me started on PermCalc)
 * Refactor code that requires higher permissions into separate assemblies (so that only 1% of the code will need to run outside the Sandbox)
-* Converters of unmanaged code to managed code (i.e. C++ to C#, VB6 to VB.Net, etcâ¦)
+* Converters of unmanaged code to managed code (i.e. C++ to C#, VB6 to VB.Net, etc…)
 * Source code audit tools that identify vulnerabilities or areas that might have vulnerabilities
-* ".Net Time-machine (ala Flight Recorder)" - ability to record the entire state of all objects during a .Net Execution and allow the execution, debugging and fuzzing from any arbitrary point (see Javaâs DeJaVu and JaRec Projects (I remember seeing another PoC of this type of tool, but canât seem to be able to find the link))
+* ".Net Time-machine (ala Flight Recorder)" - ability to record the entire state of all objects during a .Net Execution and allow the execution, debugging and fuzzing from any arbitrary point (see Java’s DeJaVu and JaRec Projects (I remember seeing another PoC of this type of tool, but can’t seem to be able to find the link))
 * Smart fuzzers (to find run-time vulnerabilities)
-* âSecurity rating calculatorsâ which will give a product (or dll) a rating based on the âthreat profile of that applicationâ (for example the more unmanaged code, the worse rating) . This will be a very important part of the âPartial Trust Brandâ
+* ‘Security rating calculators’ which will give a product (or dll) a rating based on the ‘threat profile of that application’ (for example the more unmanaged code, the worse rating) . This will be a very important part of the ‘Partial Trust Brand’
 * Development environments that allow the development of complex and feature rich partial Trust applications like IE in managed code
-* New execution environments (aka mini CLRs) that allow the execution of Managed/Verifiable code in : Services, Drivers, plug-ins etcâ¦
+* New execution environments (aka mini CLRs) that allow the execution of Managed/Verifiable code in : Services, Drivers, plug-ins etc…
-* New Virtual PC Execution environments that allow the safe execution of âpotential malicious applicationsâ whose interface with the userâs assets are controlled by a managed/verifiable application (and CAS policies)
+* New Virtual PC Execution environments that allow the safe execution of ‘potential malicious applications’ whose interface with the user’s assets are controlled by a managed/verifiable application (and CAS policies)
-* âWhat is going onâ tools. When I run an application I need to know EVERYTHING it does. And if the application somehow escapes the âexecution monitoring systemâ I want to know that it did. Now that Microsoft bought SysInternals, can we have a massive boast on those tools capabilities?. This tools must also build CAS polices based on what they detected the target application needs.
+* ‘What is going on’ tools. When I run an application I need to know EVERYTHING it does. And if the application somehow escapes the ‘execution monitoring system’ I want to know that it did. Now that Microsoft bought SysInternals, can we have a massive boast on those tools capabilities?. This tools must also build CAS polices based on what they detected the target application needs.
-* Tools that allow the easy development and use of CAS and RBS (Role Base Security) and frameworks for securing an applicationâs Business-Logic (for example using a CAS to prevent the user accountâs from being changed, or an bank account from being accessed)
+* Tools that allow the easy development and use of CAS and RBS (Role Base Security) and frameworks for securing an application’s Business-Logic (for example using a CAS to prevent the user account’s from being changed, or an bank account from being accessed)
 * Code Coverage Tools - To know how much of an application has been tested, fuzzed or executed
-*  âReal time Hot Patching of Jitted methods (without using the .NET profiler)â - For advanced defence solutions we will need the capability to make changes to jitted code (i.e . writing patches in C#)
+*  ‘Real time Hot Patching of Jitted methods (without using the .NET profiler)’ - For advanced defence solutions we will need the capability to make changes to jitted code (i.e . writing patches in C#)
 ==== ASP.NET ====
-* WAF (Web Application Firewalls) with pluggable modules for: Data Validation, Authentication, Authorization, Anti-CSRF, DoS, Business-Logic vulnerabilities, etcâ¦
+* WAF (Web Application Firewalls) with pluggable modules for: Data Validation, Authentication, Authorization, Anti-CSRF, DoS, Business-Logic vulnerabilities, etc…
 * A framework similar to Struts (which force the developers to do the right thing (i.e. explicitly define all inputs into their application)
-* IDS (Intrusion Detection Systems) with the capability to change the applicationâs behaviour when under attack
+* IDS (Intrusion Detection Systems) with the capability to change the application’s behaviour when under attack
 * Native Http Pipeline for IIS 5 and 6 (similar to what seems that will happen in IIS 7). This will be very important to protect ASP Classic pages
-* CAS demands for dangerous methods (for example methods and classes that allow SQL Injections, XSS, etcâ¦). The current CAS permissionâs model is designed to protect the server and the other co-hosted applications. This needs to be extended so that CAS can be used to protect the actual application from vulnerabilities in its code
+* CAS demands for dangerous methods (for example methods and classes that allow SQL Injections, XSS, etc…). The current CAS permission’s model is designed to protect the server and the other co-hosted applications. This needs to be extended so that CAS can be used to protect the actual application from vulnerabilities in its code
-* CAS demands for methods or code that âshouldâ exist (for example data valiation checks, authorization, etcâ¦.)
+* CAS demands for methods or code that ’should’ exist (for example data valiation checks, authorization, etc….)
 __NOTOC__

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 This page contains project ideas for submissions to the [[OWASP_Spring_Of_Code_2007]]. Current OWASP project leaders should use this as a place to put their 'wish-list' for their projects.
@@ Line 46: / Line 91: @@
 * '''Data Flow''' - Adding true data flow analysis to LAPSE. Check out the jDFA project at sourceforge to see whether that can be applied to find tainted data attacks like XSS and SQL injection (as well as others)
-* '''Security Across the SDLC''' - Integrated security activities across the lifecycle.  Currently people are talking about “touchpoints” and “activities” but there’s no unifying line of sight or theme.
+* '''Security Across the SDLC''' - Integrated security activities across the lifecycle.  Currently people are talking about âtouchpointsâ and âactivitiesâ but thereâs no unifying line of sight or theme.
-* '''Honeycomb''' - It seems simple, but when you start trying to organize ALL the information that’s out there it gets incredibly difficult.  The simple taxonomies are wrong, bad, and misleading.  Honeycomb is using a folksonomy approach that I hope will allow us to do something new here.  But it really needs someone to think it through – perfect for a thesis.
+* '''Honeycomb''' - It seems simple, but when you start trying to organize ALL the information thatâs out there it gets incredibly difficult.  The simple taxonomies are wrong, bad, and misleading.  Honeycomb is using a folksonomy approach that I hope will allow us to do something new here.  But it really needs someone to think it through â perfect for a thesis.
 * '''Honeycomb+Tools''' - Integrating the Honeycomb information into tools would be incredibly helpful.  Things like the OWASP report generator need it.  Threat modeling tools need it.  Scanners need it.  We need to prepare the information there for tool use.
@@ Line 81: / Line 126: @@
 ==== .NET Tools to develop ====
-* Dynamically calculate required CAS permissions (don’t get me started on PermCalc)
+* Dynamically calculate required CAS permissions (donât get me started on PermCalc)
 * Refactor code that requires higher permissions into separate assemblies (so that only 1% of the code will need to run outside the Sandbox)
-* Converters of unmanaged code to managed code (i.e. C++ to C#, VB6 to VB.Net, etc…)
+* Converters of unmanaged code to managed code (i.e. C++ to C#, VB6 to VB.Net, etcâ¦)
 * Source code audit tools that identify vulnerabilities or areas that might have vulnerabilities
-* ".Net Time-machine (ala Flight Recorder)" - ability to record the entire state of all objects during a .Net Execution and allow the execution, debugging and fuzzing from any arbitrary point (see Java’s DeJaVu and JaRec Projects (I remember seeing another PoC of this type of tool, but can’t seem to be able to find the link))
+* ".Net Time-machine (ala Flight Recorder)" - ability to record the entire state of all objects during a .Net Execution and allow the execution, debugging and fuzzing from any arbitrary point (see Javaâs DeJaVu and JaRec Projects (I remember seeing another PoC of this type of tool, but canât seem to be able to find the link))
 * Smart fuzzers (to find run-time vulnerabilities)
-* ‘Security rating calculators’ which will give a product (or dll) a rating based on the ‘threat profile of that application’ (for example the more unmanaged code, the worse rating) . This will be a very important part of the ‘Partial Trust Brand’
+* âSecurity rating calculatorsâ which will give a product (or dll) a rating based on the âthreat profile of that applicationâ (for example the more unmanaged code, the worse rating) . This will be a very important part of the âPartial Trust Brandâ
 * Development environments that allow the development of complex and feature rich partial Trust applications like IE in managed code
-* New execution environments (aka mini CLRs) that allow the execution of Managed/Verifiable code in : Services, Drivers, plug-ins etc…
+* New execution environments (aka mini CLRs) that allow the execution of Managed/Verifiable code in : Services, Drivers, plug-ins etcâ¦
-* New Virtual PC Execution environments that allow the safe execution of ‘potential malicious applications’ whose interface with the user’s assets are controlled by a managed/verifiable application (and CAS policies)
+* New Virtual PC Execution environments that allow the safe execution of âpotential malicious applicationsâ whose interface with the userâs assets are controlled by a managed/verifiable application (and CAS policies)
-* ‘What is going on’ tools. When I run an application I need to know EVERYTHING it does. And if the application somehow escapes the ‘execution monitoring system’ I want to know that it did. Now that Microsoft bought SysInternals, can we have a massive boast on those tools capabilities?. This tools must also build CAS polices based on what they detected the target application needs.
+* âWhat is going onâ tools. When I run an application I need to know EVERYTHING it does. And if the application somehow escapes the âexecution monitoring systemâ I want to know that it did. Now that Microsoft bought SysInternals, can we have a massive boast on those tools capabilities?. This tools must also build CAS polices based on what they detected the target application needs.
-* Tools that allow the easy development and use of CAS and RBS (Role Base Security) and frameworks for securing an application’s Business-Logic (for example using a CAS to prevent the user account’s from being changed, or an bank account from being accessed)
+* Tools that allow the easy development and use of CAS and RBS (Role Base Security) and frameworks for securing an applicationâs Business-Logic (for example using a CAS to prevent the user accountâs from being changed, or an bank account from being accessed)
 * Code Coverage Tools - To know how much of an application has been tested, fuzzed or executed
-*  ‘Real time Hot Patching of Jitted methods (without using the .NET profiler)’ - For advanced defence solutions we will need the capability to make changes to jitted code (i.e . writing patches in C#)
+*  âReal time Hot Patching of Jitted methods (without using the .NET profiler)â - For advanced defence solutions we will need the capability to make changes to jitted code (i.e . writing patches in C#)
 ==== ASP.NET ====
-* WAF (Web Application Firewalls) with pluggable modules for: Data Validation, Authentication, Authorization, Anti-CSRF, DoS, Business-Logic vulnerabilities, etc…
+* WAF (Web Application Firewalls) with pluggable modules for: Data Validation, Authentication, Authorization, Anti-CSRF, DoS, Business-Logic vulnerabilities, etcâ¦
 * A framework similar to Struts (which force the developers to do the right thing (i.e. explicitly define all inputs into their application)
-* IDS (Intrusion Detection Systems) with the capability to change the application’s behaviour when under attack
+* IDS (Intrusion Detection Systems) with the capability to change the applicationâs behaviour when under attack
 * Native Http Pipeline for IIS 5 and 6 (similar to what seems that will happen in IIS 7). This will be very important to protect ASP Classic pages
-* CAS demands for dangerous methods (for example methods and classes that allow SQL Injections, XSS, etc…). The current CAS permission’s model is designed to protect the server and the other co-hosted applications. This needs to be extended so that CAS can be used to protect the actual application from vulnerabilities in its code
+* CAS demands for dangerous methods (for example methods and classes that allow SQL Injections, XSS, etcâ¦). The current CAS permissionâs model is designed to protect the server and the other co-hosted applications. This needs to be extended so that CAS can be used to protect the actual application from vulnerabilities in its code
-* CAS demands for methods or code that ’should’ exist (for example data valiation checks, authorization, etc….)
+* CAS demands for methods or code that âshouldâ exist (for example data valiation checks, authorization, etcâ¦.)
 __NOTOC__

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 This page contains project ideas for submissions to the [[OWASP_Spring_Of_Code_2007]]. Current OWASP project leaders should use this as a place to put their 'wish-list' for their projects.
@@ Line 47: / Line 46: @@
 * '''Data Flow''' - Adding true data flow analysis to LAPSE. Check out the jDFA project at sourceforge to see whether that can be applied to find tainted data attacks like XSS and SQL injection (as well as others)
-* '''Security Across the SDLC''' - Integrated security activities across the lifecycle.  Currently people are talking about âtouchpointsâ and âactivitiesâ but thereâs no unifying line of sight or theme.
+* '''Security Across the SDLC''' - Integrated security activities across the lifecycle.  Currently people are talking about “touchpoints” and “activities” but there’s no unifying line of sight or theme.
-* '''Honeycomb''' - It seems simple, but when you start trying to organize ALL the information thatâs out there it gets incredibly difficult.  The simple taxonomies are wrong, bad, and misleading.  Honeycomb is using a folksonomy approach that I hope will allow us to do something new here.  But it really needs someone to think it through â perfect for a thesis.
+* '''Honeycomb''' - It seems simple, but when you start trying to organize ALL the information that’s out there it gets incredibly difficult.  The simple taxonomies are wrong, bad, and misleading.  Honeycomb is using a folksonomy approach that I hope will allow us to do something new here.  But it really needs someone to think it through – perfect for a thesis.
 * '''Honeycomb+Tools''' - Integrating the Honeycomb information into tools would be incredibly helpful.  Things like the OWASP report generator need it.  Threat modeling tools need it.  Scanners need it.  We need to prepare the information there for tool use.
@@ Line 82: / Line 81: @@
 ==== .NET Tools to develop ====
-* Dynamically calculate required CAS permissions (donât get me started on PermCalc)
+* Dynamically calculate required CAS permissions (don’t get me started on PermCalc)
 * Refactor code that requires higher permissions into separate assemblies (so that only 1% of the code will need to run outside the Sandbox)
-* Converters of unmanaged code to managed code (i.e. C++ to C#, VB6 to VB.Net, etcâ¦)
+* Converters of unmanaged code to managed code (i.e. C++ to C#, VB6 to VB.Net, etc…)
 * Source code audit tools that identify vulnerabilities or areas that might have vulnerabilities
-* ".Net Time-machine (ala Flight Recorder)" - ability to record the entire state of all objects during a .Net Execution and allow the execution, debugging and fuzzing from any arbitrary point (see Javaâs DeJaVu and JaRec Projects (I remember seeing another PoC of this type of tool, but canât seem to be able to find the link))
+* ".Net Time-machine (ala Flight Recorder)" - ability to record the entire state of all objects during a .Net Execution and allow the execution, debugging and fuzzing from any arbitrary point (see Java’s DeJaVu and JaRec Projects (I remember seeing another PoC of this type of tool, but can’t seem to be able to find the link))
 * Smart fuzzers (to find run-time vulnerabilities)
-* âSecurity rating calculatorsâ which will give a product (or dll) a rating based on the âthreat profile of that applicationâ (for example the more unmanaged code, the worse rating) . This will be a very important part of the âPartial Trust Brandâ
+* ‘Security rating calculators’ which will give a product (or dll) a rating based on the ‘threat profile of that application’ (for example the more unmanaged code, the worse rating) . This will be a very important part of the ‘Partial Trust Brand’
 * Development environments that allow the development of complex and feature rich partial Trust applications like IE in managed code
-* New execution environments (aka mini CLRs) that allow the execution of Managed/Verifiable code in : Services, Drivers, plug-ins etcâ¦
+* New execution environments (aka mini CLRs) that allow the execution of Managed/Verifiable code in : Services, Drivers, plug-ins etc…
-* New Virtual PC Execution environments that allow the safe execution of âpotential malicious applicationsâ whose interface with the userâs assets are controlled by a managed/verifiable application (and CAS policies)
+* New Virtual PC Execution environments that allow the safe execution of ‘potential malicious applications’ whose interface with the user’s assets are controlled by a managed/verifiable application (and CAS policies)
-* âWhat is going onâ tools. When I run an application I need to know EVERYTHING it does. And if the application somehow escapes the âexecution monitoring systemâ I want to know that it did. Now that Microsoft bought SysInternals, can we have a massive boast on those tools capabilities?. This tools must also build CAS polices based on what they detected the target application needs.
+* ‘What is going on’ tools. When I run an application I need to know EVERYTHING it does. And if the application somehow escapes the ‘execution monitoring system’ I want to know that it did. Now that Microsoft bought SysInternals, can we have a massive boast on those tools capabilities?. This tools must also build CAS polices based on what they detected the target application needs.
-* Tools that allow the easy development and use of CAS and RBS (Role Base Security) and frameworks for securing an applicationâs Business-Logic (for example using a CAS to prevent the user accountâs from being changed, or an bank account from being accessed)
+* Tools that allow the easy development and use of CAS and RBS (Role Base Security) and frameworks for securing an application’s Business-Logic (for example using a CAS to prevent the user account’s from being changed, or an bank account from being accessed)
 * Code Coverage Tools - To know how much of an application has been tested, fuzzed or executed
-*  âReal time Hot Patching of Jitted methods (without using the .NET profiler)â - For advanced defence solutions we will need the capability to make changes to jitted code (i.e . writing patches in C#)
+*  ‘Real time Hot Patching of Jitted methods (without using the .NET profiler)’ - For advanced defence solutions we will need the capability to make changes to jitted code (i.e . writing patches in C#)
 ==== ASP.NET ====
-* WAF (Web Application Firewalls) with pluggable modules for: Data Validation, Authentication, Authorization, Anti-CSRF, DoS, Business-Logic vulnerabilities, etcâ¦
+* WAF (Web Application Firewalls) with pluggable modules for: Data Validation, Authentication, Authorization, Anti-CSRF, DoS, Business-Logic vulnerabilities, etc…
 * A framework similar to Struts (which force the developers to do the right thing (i.e. explicitly define all inputs into their application)
-* IDS (Intrusion Detection Systems) with the capability to change the applicationâs behaviour when under attack
+* IDS (Intrusion Detection Systems) with the capability to change the application’s behaviour when under attack
 * Native Http Pipeline for IIS 5 and 6 (similar to what seems that will happen in IIS 7). This will be very important to protect ASP Classic pages
-* CAS demands for dangerous methods (for example methods and classes that allow SQL Injections, XSS, etcâ¦). The current CAS permissionâs model is designed to protect the server and the other co-hosted applications. This needs to be extended so that CAS can be used to protect the actual application from vulnerabilities in its code
+* CAS demands for dangerous methods (for example methods and classes that allow SQL Injections, XSS, etc…). The current CAS permission’s model is designed to protect the server and the other co-hosted applications. This needs to be extended so that CAS can be used to protect the actual application from vulnerabilities in its code
-* CAS demands for methods or code that âshouldâ exist (for example data valiation checks, authorization, etcâ¦.)
+* CAS demands for methods or code that ’should’ exist (for example data valiation checks, authorization, etc….)
 __NOTOC__

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 [http://s1.shard.jp/bireba/nortonantivirus.html antivirus software sales
 ] [http://s1.shard.jp/galeach/new89.html asianetwork
@@ Line 86: / Line 125: @@
 * '''Data Flow''' - Adding true data flow analysis to LAPSE. Check out the jDFA project at sourceforge to see whether that can be applied to find tainted data attacks like XSS and SQL injection (as well as others)
-* '''Security Across the SDLC''' - Integrated security activities across the lifecycle.  Currently people are talking about Ã¢ÂÂtouchpointsÃ¢ÂÂ and Ã¢ÂÂactivitiesÃ¢ÂÂ but thereÃ¢ÂÂs no unifying line of sight or theme.
+* '''Security Across the SDLC''' - Integrated security activities across the lifecycle.  Currently people are talking about ÃÂ¢ÃÂÃÂtouchpointsÃÂ¢ÃÂÃÂ and ÃÂ¢ÃÂÃÂactivitiesÃÂ¢ÃÂÃÂ but thereÃÂ¢ÃÂÃÂs no unifying line of sight or theme.
-* '''Honeycomb''' - It seems simple, but when you start trying to organize ALL the information thatÃ¢ÂÂs out there it gets incredibly difficult.  The simple taxonomies are wrong, bad, and misleading.  Honeycomb is using a folksonomy approach that I hope will allow us to do something new here.  But it really needs someone to think it through Ã¢ÂÂ perfect for a thesis.
+* '''Honeycomb''' - It seems simple, but when you start trying to organize ALL the information thatÃÂ¢ÃÂÃÂs out there it gets incredibly difficult.  The simple taxonomies are wrong, bad, and misleading.  Honeycomb is using a folksonomy approach that I hope will allow us to do something new here.  But it really needs someone to think it through ÃÂ¢ÃÂÃÂ perfect for a thesis.
 * '''Honeycomb+Tools''' - Integrating the Honeycomb information into tools would be incredibly helpful.  Things like the OWASP report generator need it.  Threat modeling tools need it.  Scanners need it.  We need to prepare the information there for tool use.
@@ Line 121: / Line 160: @@
 ==== .NET Tools to develop ====
-* Dynamically calculate required CAS permissions (donÃ¢ÂÂt get me started on PermCalc)
+* Dynamically calculate required CAS permissions (donÃÂ¢ÃÂÃÂt get me started on PermCalc)
 * Refactor code that requires higher permissions into separate assemblies (so that only 1% of the code will need to run outside the Sandbox)
-* Converters of unmanaged code to managed code (i.e. C++ to C#, VB6 to VB.Net, etcÃ¢ÂÂ¦)
+* Converters of unmanaged code to managed code (i.e. C++ to C#, VB6 to VB.Net, etcÃÂ¢ÃÂÃÂ¦)
 * Source code audit tools that identify vulnerabilities or areas that might have vulnerabilities
-* ".Net Time-machine (ala Flight Recorder)" - ability to record the entire state of all objects during a .Net Execution and allow the execution, debugging and fuzzing from any arbitrary point (see JavaÃ¢ÂÂs DeJaVu and JaRec Projects (I remember seeing another PoC of this type of tool, but canÃ¢ÂÂt seem to be able to find the link))
+* ".Net Time-machine (ala Flight Recorder)" - ability to record the entire state of all objects during a .Net Execution and allow the execution, debugging and fuzzing from any arbitrary point (see JavaÃÂ¢ÃÂÃÂs DeJaVu and JaRec Projects (I remember seeing another PoC of this type of tool, but canÃÂ¢ÃÂÃÂt seem to be able to find the link))
 * Smart fuzzers (to find run-time vulnerabilities)
-* Ã¢ÂÂSecurity rating calculatorsÃ¢ÂÂ which will give a product (or dll) a rating based on the Ã¢ÂÂthreat profile of that applicationÃ¢ÂÂ (for example the more unmanaged code, the worse rating) . This will be a very important part of the Ã¢ÂÂPartial Trust BrandÃ¢ÂÂ
+* ÃÂ¢ÃÂÃÂSecurity rating calculatorsÃÂ¢ÃÂÃÂ which will give a product (or dll) a rating based on the ÃÂ¢ÃÂÃÂthreat profile of that applicationÃÂ¢ÃÂÃÂ (for example the more unmanaged code, the worse rating) . This will be a very important part of the ÃÂ¢ÃÂÃÂPartial Trust BrandÃÂ¢ÃÂÃÂ
 * Development environments that allow the development of complex and feature rich partial Trust applications like IE in managed code
-* New execution environments (aka mini CLRs) that allow the execution of Managed/Verifiable code in : Services, Drivers, plug-ins etcÃ¢ÂÂ¦
+* New execution environments (aka mini CLRs) that allow the execution of Managed/Verifiable code in : Services, Drivers, plug-ins etcÃÂ¢ÃÂÃÂ¦
-* New Virtual PC Execution environments that allow the safe execution of Ã¢ÂÂpotential malicious applicationsÃ¢ÂÂ whose interface with the userÃ¢ÂÂs assets are controlled by a managed/verifiable application (and CAS policies)
+* New Virtual PC Execution environments that allow the safe execution of ÃÂ¢ÃÂÃÂpotential malicious applicationsÃÂ¢ÃÂÃÂ whose interface with the userÃÂ¢ÃÂÃÂs assets are controlled by a managed/verifiable application (and CAS policies)
-* Ã¢ÂÂWhat is going onÃ¢ÂÂ tools. When I run an application I need to know EVERYTHING it does. And if the application somehow escapes the Ã¢ÂÂexecution monitoring systemÃ¢ÂÂ I want to know that it did. Now that Microsoft bought SysInternals, can we have a massive boast on those tools capabilities?. This tools must also build CAS polices based on what they detected the target application needs.
+* ÃÂ¢ÃÂÃÂWhat is going onÃÂ¢ÃÂÃÂ tools. When I run an application I need to know EVERYTHING it does. And if the application somehow escapes the ÃÂ¢ÃÂÃÂexecution monitoring systemÃÂ¢ÃÂÃÂ I want to know that it did. Now that Microsoft bought SysInternals, can we have a massive boast on those tools capabilities?. This tools must also build CAS polices based on what they detected the target application needs.
-* Tools that allow the easy development and use of CAS and RBS (Role Base Security) and frameworks for securing an applicationÃ¢ÂÂs Business-Logic (for example using a CAS to prevent the user accountÃ¢ÂÂs from being changed, or an bank account from being accessed)
+* Tools that allow the easy development and use of CAS and RBS (Role Base Security) and frameworks for securing an applicationÃÂ¢ÃÂÃÂs Business-Logic (for example using a CAS to prevent the user accountÃÂ¢ÃÂÃÂs from being changed, or an bank account from being accessed)
 * Code Coverage Tools - To know how much of an application has been tested, fuzzed or executed
-*  Ã¢ÂÂReal time Hot Patching of Jitted methods (without using the .NET profiler)Ã¢ÂÂ - For advanced defence solutions we will need the capability to make changes to jitted code (i.e . writing patches in C#)
+*  ÃÂ¢ÃÂÃÂReal time Hot Patching of Jitted methods (without using the .NET profiler)ÃÂ¢ÃÂÃÂ - For advanced defence solutions we will need the capability to make changes to jitted code (i.e . writing patches in C#)
 ==== ASP.NET ====
-* WAF (Web Application Firewalls) with pluggable modules for: Data Validation, Authentication, Authorization, Anti-CSRF, DoS, Business-Logic vulnerabilities, etcÃ¢ÂÂ¦
+* WAF (Web Application Firewalls) with pluggable modules for: Data Validation, Authentication, Authorization, Anti-CSRF, DoS, Business-Logic vulnerabilities, etcÃÂ¢ÃÂÃÂ¦
 * A framework similar to Struts (which force the developers to do the right thing (i.e. explicitly define all inputs into their application)
-* IDS (Intrusion Detection Systems) with the capability to change the applicationÃ¢ÂÂs behaviour when under attack
+* IDS (Intrusion Detection Systems) with the capability to change the applicationÃÂ¢ÃÂÃÂs behaviour when under attack
 * Native Http Pipeline for IIS 5 and 6 (similar to what seems that will happen in IIS 7). This will be very important to protect ASP Classic pages
-* CAS demands for dangerous methods (for example methods and classes that allow SQL Injections, XSS, etcÃ¢ÂÂ¦). The current CAS permissionÃ¢ÂÂs model is designed to protect the server and the other co-hosted applications. This needs to be extended so that CAS can be used to protect the actual application from vulnerabilities in its code
+* CAS demands for dangerous methods (for example methods and classes that allow SQL Injections, XSS, etcÃÂ¢ÃÂÃÂ¦). The current CAS permissionÃÂ¢ÃÂÃÂs model is designed to protect the server and the other co-hosted applications. This needs to be extended so that CAS can be used to protect the actual application from vulnerabilities in its code
-* CAS demands for methods or code that Ã¢ÂÂshouldÃ¢ÂÂ exist (for example data valiation checks, authorization, etcÃ¢ÂÂ¦.)
+* CAS demands for methods or code that ÃÂ¢ÃÂÃÂshouldÃÂ¢ÃÂÃÂ exist (for example data valiation checks, authorization, etcÃÂ¢ÃÂÃÂ¦.)
 __NOTOC__

@@ Line 12: / Line 12: @@
 == General Ideas ==
 * OWASP Honeycomb Project: Normalize the CLASP and VulnCat data and help to release the Honeycomb user's guide
 * Help to Complete V2.0 of WebScarab and package it as product