Insufficient Session-ID Length - Revision history

Imifos: Moved page into the right category. See Java space page for me details. Content has not been reviewed in this edit.

2017-11-10T11:48:34Z

Moved page into the right category. See Java space page for me details. Content has not been reviewed in this edit.

Imifos: Removed Fortify logo since company does not exist anymore

2015-12-14T08:35:02Z

Removed Fortify logo since company does not exist anymore

Imifos at 13:03, 1 December 2015

2015-12-01T13:03:12Z

Tgondrom at 11:10, 13 June 2015

2015-06-13T11:10:33Z

Tgondrom: corrected maths for session brute force attack at 32 bits

2015-06-13T11:10:11Z

corrected maths for session brute force attack at 32 bits

KirstenS: /* References */

2009-02-26T13:53:32Z

‎References

KirstenS at 13:52, 26 February 2009

2009-02-26T13:52:57Z

KirstenS: /* Risk Factors */

2009-02-26T13:50:40Z

‎Risk Factors

KirstenS at 01:30, 21 February 2009

2009-02-21T01:30:03Z

KirstenS at 02:36, 18 February 2009

2009-02-18T02:36:02Z

@@ Line 77: / Line 77: @@
 [[Category:OWASP ASDR Project]]
 [[Category:Deployment]]
-[[Category:OWASP Java Project]]
+[[Category:Java]]
 [[Category:Environmental Vulnerability]]
 [[Category:Session Management Vulnerability]]

← Older revision		Revision as of 08:35, 14 December 2015
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	{{Template:Vulnerability}}		{{Template:Vulnerability}}
−	~~{{Template:Fortify}}~~

	Last revision (mm/dd/yy): '''{{REVISIONMONTH}}/{{REVISIONDAY}}/{{REVISIONYEAR}}'''		Last revision (mm/dd/yy): '''{{REVISIONMONTH}}/{{REVISIONDAY}}/{{REVISIONYEAR}}'''

@@ Line 78: / Line 78: @@
 [[Category:OWASP ASDR Project]]
 [[Category:Deployment]]
-[[Category:Java]]
+[[Category:OWASP Java Project]]
 [[Category:Environmental Vulnerability]]
 [[Category:Session Management Vulnerability]]
 [[Category:Cryptographic Vulnerability]]
-[[Category:FIXME|link doesn't exist
+[[Category:FIXME|link doesn't exist]]
-Category:WebLogic]]
+[[Category:WebLogic]]

@@ Line 28: / Line 28: @@
 A lower bound on the number of valid session identifiers that are available to be guessed is the number of users that are active on a site at any given moment. However, any users that abandon their sessions without logging out will increase this number. (This is one of many good reasons to have a short inactive session timeout.)
-With a 64 bit session identifier, assume 32 bits of entropy. For a large web site, assume that the attacker can try 1,000 guesses per second and that there are 10,000 valid session identifiers at any given moment. Given these assumptions, the expected time for an attacker to successfully guess a valid session identifier is less than 7 minutes.  (32bit = 4294967296 / 10.000 = 429496. At 1000 attempts per second that is 429 seconds or 7.15 minutes.)
+With a 64 bit session identifier, assume 32 bits of entropy. For a large web site, assume that the attacker can try 1,000 guesses per second and that there are 10,000 valid session identifiers at any given moment. Given these assumptions, the expected time for an attacker to successfully guess a valid session identifier is about 7 minutes.  (32bit = 4294967296 / 10.000 = 429496. At 1000 attempts per second that is 429 seconds or 7.15 minutes.)
 Now assume a 128 bit session identifier that provides 64 bits of entropy. With a very large web site, an attacker might try 10,000 guesses per second with 100,000 valid session identifiers available to be guessed. Given these assumptions, the expected time for an attacker to successfully guess a valid session identifier is greater than 292 years.

@@ Line 28: / Line 28: @@
 A lower bound on the number of valid session identifiers that are available to be guessed is the number of users that are active on a site at any given moment. However, any users that abandon their sessions without logging out will increase this number. (This is one of many good reasons to have a short inactive session timeout.)
-With a 64 bit session identifier, assume 32 bits of entropy. For a large web site, assume that the attacker can try 1,000 guesses per second and that there are 10,000 valid session identifiers at any given moment. Given these assumptions, the expected time for an attacker to successfully guess a valid session identifier is less than 4 minutes.
+With a 64 bit session identifier, assume 32 bits of entropy. For a large web site, assume that the attacker can try 1,000 guesses per second and that there are 10,000 valid session identifiers at any given moment. Given these assumptions, the expected time for an attacker to successfully guess a valid session identifier is less than 7 minutes.  (32bit = 4294967296 / 10.000 = 429496. At 1000 attempts per second that is 429 seconds or 7.15 minutes.)
 Now assume a 128 bit session identifier that provides 64 bits of entropy. With a very large web site, an attacker might try 10,000 guesses per second with 100,000 valid session identifiers available to be guessed. Given these assumptions, the expected time for an attacker to successfully guess a valid session identifier is greater than 292 years.

← Older revision		Revision as of 13:52, 26 February 2009
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	==Related [[Vulnerabilities]]==		==Related [[Vulnerabilities]]==

−	* [[Insufficient cryptographic key length]]	+	[[Category:FIXME\|link doesn't exist
		+
		+	* Insufficient cryptographic key length]]

@@ Line 35: / Line 35: @@
 ==Risk Factors==
-* Attackers that are try to obtain a valid session id for [[Session hijacking]].
+* Attackers that are try to obtain a valid session ID for [[Session hijacking attack|Session hijacking]].
 ==Examples==

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 {{Template:Vulnerability}}
 {{Template:Fortify}}
 Last revision (mm/dd/yy): '''{{REVISIONMONTH}}/{{REVISIONDAY}}/{{REVISIONYEAR}}'''
+[[ASDR_TOC_Vulnerabilities|Vulnerabilities Table of Contents]]
 ==Description==