HTTP Strict Transport Security - Revision history

Jmanico: Redirected page to HTTP Strict Transport Security Cheat Sheet

2016-07-08T07:01:02Z

Redirected page to HTTP Strict Transport Security Cheat Sheet

Simon Waters: /* Problems */

2015-09-07T16:14:02Z

‎Problems

Simon Waters: /* Problems */ Added reference that the non-overlap of HSTS and Cookie scope re-enables a number of cookie attacks which would otherwise be presented.

2015-09-07T16:12:42Z

‎Problems: Added reference that the non-overlap of HSTS and Cookie scope re-enables a number of cookie attacks which would otherwise be presented.

Till Maas: /* Browser Support */ HSTS check page

2015-08-01T22:13:28Z

‎Browser Support: HSTS check page

Till Maas: /* Always Use includeSubDomains */ This is an attack from site owners against users, therefore setting includeSubdomains does not help, since the attacking site owner would just not do it

2015-08-01T22:09:51Z

‎Always Use includeSubDomains: This is an attack from site owners against users, therefore setting includeSubdomains does not help, since the attacking site owner would just not do it

Jmanico: /* Always Use includeSubDomains */

2015-07-08T19:40:55Z

‎Always Use includeSubDomains

Jmanico: /* Description */

2015-07-08T19:40:37Z

‎Description

Jmanico: moving threats

2015-07-08T19:40:30Z

moving threats

Jmanico: dropping server config data, way to basic info

2015-07-08T19:40:13Z

dropping server config data, way to basic info

Jmanico: switching warning to recommend the use of includeSubDomains

2015-07-08T19:39:21Z

switching warning to recommend the use of includeSubDomains

← Older revision		Revision as of 07:01, 8 July 2016
Line 1:		Line 1:
−	~~<br>~~	+	#REDIRECT [[HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security_Cheat_Sheet]]
−	~~== Description ==~~
−
−	HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) is an opt-in security enhancement that is specified by a web application through the use of a special response header. Once a supported browser receives this header that browser will prevent any communications from being sent over HTTP to the specified domain and will instead send all communications over HTTPS. It also prevents HTTPS click through prompts on browsers.
−
−	~~The specification has been released and published end of 2012 as RFC 6797 (HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS)) by the IETF. (Reference see in the links at the bottom.)~~
−
−	~~== Threats ==~~
−
−	~~HSTS addresses the following threats:~~
−	* User bookmarks or manually types http://example.com and is subject to a man-in-the-middle attacker
−	** HSTS automatically redirects HTTP requests to HTTPS for the target domain
−	* Web application that is intended to be purely HTTPS inadvertently contains HTTP links or serves content over HTTP
−	** HSTS automatically redirects HTTP requests to HTTPS for the target domain
−	* A man-in-the-middle attacker attempts to intercept traffic from a victim user using an invalid certificate and hopes the user will accept the bad certificate
−	** HSTS does not allow a user to override the invalid certificate message
−
−	~~== Examples ==~~
−
−	~~Simple example, using a long (1 year) max-age:~~
−
−	~~Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000~~
−
−	~~If all present and future subdomains will be HTTPS:~~
−
−	~~Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains~~
−
−	~~'''Recommended:''' If the site owner would like their domain to be included in the [https://hstspreload.appspot.com/ HSTS preload list] maintained by Chrome (and used by Firefox and Safari), then use:~~
−
−	~~Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload~~
−
−	~~The `preload` flag indicates the site owner's consent to have their domain preloaded. The site owner still needs to then go and submit the domain to the list.~~
−
−	~~== Problems ==~~
−
−	~~Site owners can use HSTS to identify users without cookies. This can lead to a significant privacy leak[http://www.leviathansecurity.com/blog/the-double-edged-sword-of-hsts-persistence-and-privacy].~~
−
−	Cookies can be manipulated from sub-domains, so omitting the include "includeSubDomains" option permits a broad range of cookie-related attacks that HSTS would otherwise prevent by requiring a valid certificate for a subdomain. Ensuring the "Secure Flag" is set on all cookies will also prevent, some, but not all, of the same attacks.
−
−	~~== Browser Support ==~~
−
−	~~{\| width="400" cellspacing="1" cellpadding="1" border="1"~~
−	\|-
−	~~\| '''Browser'''<br>~~
−	~~\| '''Support Introduced'''<br>~~
−	\|-
−	~~\| Internet Explorer <br>~~
−	~~\| Internet Explorer 11 on Windows 8.1 and Windows 7[http://blogs.windows.com/msedgedev/2015/06/09/http-strict-transport-security-comes-to-internet-explorer-11-on-windows-8-1-and-windows-7/]<br>~~
−	\|-
−	~~\| Firefox<br>~~
−	~~\| 4<br>~~
−	\|-
−	~~\| Opera<br>~~
−	~~\| 12<br>~~
−	\|-
−	~~\| Safari<br>~~
−	~~\| Mavericks (Mac OS X 10.9)<br>~~
−	\|-
−	~~\| Chrome<br>~~
−	~~\| 4.0.211.0<br>~~
−	\|}
−
−	~~<br>~~
−	~~A detailed overview of supporting browsers can be found at [http://caniuse.com/~~#~~feat=stricttransportsecurity caniuse.com]. There is also a [https://badssl.com/ TLS Browser Test Page] to check whether your current browser supports HSTS.~~
−
−	~~== Links ==~~
−	* [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zEV3HOuM_Vw&feature=youtube_gdata AppSecTutorial Series - Episode 4]
−	* [http://dev.chromium.org/sts Chromium Projects/HSTS]
−	* [http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6797 HSTS Spec]
−	* [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security Wikipedia]
−	* [https://developer.mozilla.org/en/Security/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security Mozilla Developer Network]
−	* [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Transport_Layer_Protection_Cheat_Sheet OWASP TLS Protection Cheat Sheet]
−	* [https://developer.mozilla.org/en/Security/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security Firefox STS Support]
−	* [http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webapps/2009JulSep/1148.html Google Chrome STS Support]
−	* [http://www.thoughtcrime.org/software/sslstrip/ Moxie Marlinspike's Black Hat 2009 talk on sslstrip, that demonstrates why you need HSTS]
−
−	[[~~Category:Control\|Control~~]]

@@ Line 36: / Line 36: @@
 Site owners can use HSTS to identify users without cookies. This can lead to a significant privacy leak[http://www.leviathansecurity.com/blog/the-double-edged-sword-of-hsts-persistence-and-privacy].
-Cookies can be manipulated from sub-domains, so omitting the include "includeSubDomains" option permits a broad range of cookie-related attacks that HSTS would otherwise prevents by requiring a valid certificate for a subdomain. Ensuring the "Secure Flag" is set on all cookies will also prevent, some, but not all, of the same attacks.
+Cookies can be manipulated from sub-domains, so omitting the include "includeSubDomains" option permits a broad range of cookie-related attacks that HSTS would otherwise prevent by requiring a valid certificate for a subdomain. Ensuring the "Secure Flag" is set on all cookies will also prevent, some, but not all, of the same attacks.
 == Browser Support ==

← Older revision		Revision as of 16:12, 7 September 2015
Line 35:		Line 35:

	Site owners can use HSTS to identify users without cookies. This can lead to a significant privacy leak[http://www.leviathansecurity.com/blog/the-double-edged-sword-of-hsts-persistence-and-privacy].		Site owners can use HSTS to identify users without cookies. This can lead to a significant privacy leak[http://www.leviathansecurity.com/blog/the-double-edged-sword-of-hsts-persistence-and-privacy].
		+
		+	Cookies can be manipulated from sub-domains, so omitting the include "includeSubDomains" option permits a broad range of cookie-related attacks that HSTS would otherwise prevents by requiring a valid certificate for a subdomain. Ensuring the "Secure Flag" is set on all cookies will also prevent, some, but not all, of the same attacks.

	== Browser Support ==		== Browser Support ==

@@ Line 60: / Line 60: @@
 <br>
-A detailed overview of supporting browsers can be found at [http://caniuse.com/#feat=stricttransportsecurity caniuse.com].
+A detailed overview of supporting browsers can be found at [http://caniuse.com/#feat=stricttransportsecurity caniuse.com]. There is also a [https://badssl.com/ TLS Browser Test Page] to check whether your current browser supports HSTS.
 == Links ==

@@ Line 32: / Line 32: @@
 The `preload` flag indicates the site owner's consent to have their domain preloaded. The site owner still needs to then go and submit the domain to the list.
-== Always Use <i>includeSubDomains</i> ==
+== Problems ==
-The lack of use of includeSubDomains can lead to a significant privacy leak[http://www.leviathansecurity.com/blog/the-double-edged-sword-of-hsts-persistence-and-privacy]. Be sure to use includeSubDomains on all wildcard certificates, at least.
+Site owners can use HSTS to identify users without cookies. This can lead to a significant privacy leak[http://www.leviathansecurity.com/blog/the-double-edged-sword-of-hsts-persistence-and-privacy].
 == Browser Support ==

← Older revision		Revision as of 19:40, 8 July 2015
Line 5:		Line 5:

	The specification has been released and published end of 2012 as RFC 6797 (HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS)) by the IETF. (Reference see in the links at the bottom.)		The specification has been released and published end of 2012 as RFC 6797 (HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS)) by the IETF. (Reference see in the links at the bottom.)
		+
		+	== Threats ==
		+
		+	HSTS addresses the following threats:
		+	* User bookmarks or manually types http://example.com and is subject to a man-in-the-middle attacker
		+	** HSTS automatically redirects HTTP requests to HTTPS for the target domain
		+	* Web application that is intended to be purely HTTPS inadvertently contains HTTP links or serves content over HTTP
		+	** HSTS automatically redirects HTTP requests to HTTPS for the target domain
		+	* A man-in-the-middle attacker attempts to intercept traffic from a victim user using an invalid certificate and hopes the user will accept the bad certificate
		+	** HSTS does not allow a user to override the invalid certificate message

	== Examples ==		== Examples ==

@@ Line 51: / Line 51: @@
 <br>
 A detailed overview of supporting browsers can be found at [http://caniuse.com/#feat=stricttransportsecurity caniuse.com].
 == Threats ==

@@ Line 22: / Line 22: @@
 The `preload` flag indicates the site owner's consent to have their domain preloaded. The site owner still needs to then go and submit the domain to the list.
-== Excessively Strict STS ==
+== Always Use includeSubDomains ==
-Use caution when setting excessively strict STS policies. Including subdomains should only be used in environments where all sites within your organization for the given domain name require ssl. Max-age limits should be carefully considered as infrequent visitors may find your site inaccessible if you relax your policy.
+The lack of use of includeSubDomains can lead to a significant privacy leak[http://www.leviathansecurity.com/blog/the-double-edged-sword-of-hsts-persistence-and-privacy]. Be sure to use includeSubDomains on all wildcard certificates, at least.
 == Browser Support ==