Category:Threat Modeling - Revision history

Adamshostack: Updated with more modern approaches

2018-10-14T16:40:44Z

Updated with more modern approaches

Adamshostack: /* Objectives of Threat Modeling */

2018-10-14T16:38:53Z

‎Objectives of Threat Modeling

Adamshostack: MS blog last updated in 2009; RockyH blog errors

2018-06-05T18:37:04Z

MS blog last updated in 2009; RockyH blog errors

Swierckx at 16:58, 5 June 2018

2018-06-05T16:58:12Z

Swierckx at 16:55, 5 June 2018

2018-06-05T16:55:58Z

Johanna Curiel: /* ThreatModel SDK */

2016-08-28T15:12:57Z

‎ThreatModel SDK

Johanna Curiel: /* ThreatModel SDK */

2016-08-27T22:17:24Z

‎ThreatModel SDK

Johanna Curiel at 22:16, 27 August 2016

2016-08-27T22:16:57Z

Sdeleersnyder at 12:04, 8 March 2015

2015-03-08T12:04:32Z

Sdeleersnyder at 11:55, 8 March 2015

2015-03-08T11:55:15Z

@@ Line 22: / Line 22: @@
 ==Threat Modeling - Generic Steps==
-For a threat to an application to exist, there must be a combination of the following where the combined likelihood and impact are important enough to do something about. Following is an outline of a generic methodology for Threat Modeling:
+For a threat to an application to exist, there must be a combination of the following where the combined likelihood and impact are important enough to do something about. Following is a four question framework that helps understand threat modeling:
-* Assessment Scope
+* What are we working on?
-* System Modeling
+* What can go wrong?
-* Identify Threats
+* What are we going to do about it?
-* Identify Vulnerabilities
+* Did we do a good job?
-To understand whether an application is secure enough or not, you have to search out combinations of these ingredients that lead to realistic threats. The real trick to threat modeling is not wasting time on threats that are too unlikely or too inconsequential. Beware threat modeling processes that are inefficient about pruning the search space of possible threats to eliminate threats that are very unlikely or have minimal impact.
+There are many ways to answer each of these questions.
-There is no "right" way to evaluate the search space of possible threats. But there are "wrong" ways. Attempting to evaluate all the possible combinations of threat agent, attack, vulnerability, and impact is a waste of time and effort. Note that many of the automated tools take this approach - gathering lots of data and producing thousands of possible threats. Generally it is more productive to focus on finding high likelihood and high impact threats.
+To understand whether an application is secure enough or not, you have to search out combinations of these ingredients that lead to realistic threats.
 The basic threat modeling process consists of the following generic steps. The process of exploring the search space is iterative and constantly refined based on what you have done so far. So, for example, starting with all possible vulnerabilities is usually pointless, as most of them are not attackable by the threat agents, protected by a safeguard, or do not lead to a conseequence. Therefore, it's generally best to start with the factors that make a lot of difference.

@@ Line 11: / Line 11: @@
 == '''Objectives of Threat Modeling''' ==
-Threat modeling is a procedure for optimizing Network/ Application/ Internet Security by identifying objectives and vulnerabilities, and then defining countermeasures to prevent, or mitigate the effects of, threats to the system.
+Threat modeling is a family of activities for improving security by identifying objectives and vulnerabilities, and then defining countermeasures to prevent, or mitigate the effects of, threats to the system.
 A threat is a potential or actual undesirable event that may be malicious (such as DoS attack) or incidental (failure of a Storage Device). Threat modeling is a planned activity for identifying and assessing application threats and vulnerabilities.

@@ Line 67: / Line 67: @@
 ==References==
-* [http://blogs.msdn.com/threatmodeling Microsoft's Application Consulting & Engineering Team's Threat Modeling Blog]
 * [http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/dnsecure/html/sdl.asp Microsoft's Security Development Process]
 [[Category:Activity]]
 [[Category:SAMM-TA-1]]

← Older revision		Revision as of 16:58, 5 June 2018
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	This category should be used to tag articles that are related to threat modeling.		This category should be used to tag articles that are related to threat modeling.

−	~~#REDIRECT [[owasp-threatmodeling.com]]~~
	==Overview==		==Overview==

← Older revision		Revision as of 16:55, 5 June 2018
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	This category should be used to tag articles that are related to threat modeling.		This category should be used to tag articles that are related to threat modeling.

		+	#REDIRECT [[owasp-threatmodeling.com]]
	==Overview==		==Overview==

@@ Line 63: / Line 63: @@
 *Mozilla SeaSponge
-For more information visit: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Threat_Risk_Modeling
+https://github.com/stevespringett/threatmodel-sdk
 ==References==

← Older revision		Revision as of 22:16, 27 August 2016
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	Done right, threat modeling provides a clear "line of sight" across a project that justifies security efforts. The threat model allows security decisions to be made rationally, with all the information on the table. The alternative is to make knee-jerk security decisions with no support. The threat modeling process naturally produces an assurance argument that can be used to explain and defend the security of an application. An assurance argument starts with a few high level claims, and justifies them with either subclaims or evidence.		Done right, threat modeling provides a clear "line of sight" across a project that justifies security efforts. The threat model allows security decisions to be made rationally, with all the information on the table. The alternative is to make knee-jerk security decisions with no support. The threat modeling process naturally produces an assurance argument that can be used to explain and defend the security of an application. An assurance argument starts with a few high level claims, and justifies them with either subclaims or evidence.
		+
		+	== ThreatModel SDK==
		+
		+	The ThreatModel SDK is a minimalistic Java library that provides a basic vendor-neutral object model along with the ability to parse reports generated from common threat modeling tools.
		+	Supported Threat Modeling Tools:
		+	*Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool 2016
		+
		+	Planned Threat Modeling Tools:
		+	Mozilla SeaSponge
		+
		+	For more information visit: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Threat_Risk_Modeling

	==References==		==References==

← Older revision		Revision as of 12:04, 8 March 2015
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	[[Category:Activity]]		[[Category:Activity]]
−	[[Category:SAMM-TM-1]]	+	[[Category:SAMM-TA-1]]

← Older revision		Revision as of 11:55, 8 March 2015
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	[[Category:Activity]]		[[Category:Activity]]
		+	[[Category:SAMM-TM-1]]