

#### A LITTLE ABOUT ME

- British but starting to feel more and more like a Dane...
  - Yeah yeah, one day I will speak Danish to you all...
- Lived in Denmark 4.5 years, with my wife and 2 kids...
- Incident Response Lead/SOC Lead/SOC Architect/CTI/Whatever else is needed...
- I love open source security solutions, I run the Security Distractions blog...
- I also maintain ElastiMISPStash alongside Dennis Lund Christiensen...






#### INTRODUCTION

Tonight we will talk about the following stuff:-


- Theory Kill Chain, Courses of action, NIST IR model...
- Tools MISP, ELK stack, ElastAlert, The Hive, elastimispstash...

#### EXAMPLE - QBOT EARLY STAGES




A user recieves a mail reply as part of a previous mail correspondance with a friend. The new reply has a OneDrive link inside, they click on the link which retrieves a ZIP file to their machine. They unzip the file and it contains a file with a double extension, helpguide.docx.vbs. The file is shown by Windows to be a docx, so the user opens the file.

### EXAMPLE - QBOT EARLY STAGES



The file was actually a VBS script, which when executed retrieved some information from WMI about the OS version, AV engine etc. It then attempted to retrieve, via BITS, second stage malware from 3 different domains, which all failed due to intelligence in the proxy filter.



#### KILL CHAIN MAPPING

**Recon** – Previous user mail compromise

Weaponization - Email


**Delivery** – Spearphishing link: onedrive.com/file/1234

**Exploitation** – <u>User</u>

**Installation** – Execution of docx.vbs: helpquide.docx.vbs

**C2** – VBS (WMI, BITS): <u>domain1.com</u>, <u>domain2.com</u>, <u>domain3.com</u>

**Actions on objectives** – Retrieve second stage malware: <u>Hash</u>



#### **COURSES OF ACTION**

- Discover You gained an indicator, go search your logs for history of it
- Detect You gained an indicator, lets write a detection rule
- Deny Creating a firewall block rule, proxy filter, AV hash filter etc
- Disrupt Makes the event fail as it is occuring, example could be IPS
- Degrade Slow down the intrusion in progress, could be via bandwith throttling

## COURSES OF ACTION - CONTINUED


- Decieve Make the intruder think the attack is successful, forwarding traffic towards a honeypot
- Destroy Offensive action against the intruder, arrest, physical destruction of property, hacking back (don't do this)....!



## COMBINING COA AND CYBER KILL CHAIN

	Discover	Detect	Deny
Reconnaissance	-	-	-
Weaponization	-	_	_
Delivery (onedrive.com/file/1234)	Mail gateway logs, proxy logs	Mail gateway logs, proxy logs	Mail gateway
Exploitation (User - Spearphishing)	-	-	User awareness
Installation (helpguide.docx.vbs)	Host logs	AV alerts, host logs	AV (hash of docx)
C2 (domains)	Host logs, Proxy logs	Host logs, Intelligence alerts	Proxy filter, DNS Sinkholing
Actions on objectives (2 <sup>nd</sup> stage)	Proxy logs (domains)	AV alerts, host logs (hash)	AV (hash)

# NIST IR LIFECYCLE/MODEL/FRAMEWORK/WHATEVER...



https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.80 0-61r2.pdf

#### DISCOVER AND PREPARATION

Reconnaissance

Weaponization

Delivery (onedrive.com/file/1234)

**Exploitation** (User - Spearphishing)

Installation (helpguide.docx.vbs)

C2 (domains)

Actions on objectives (2<sup>nd</sup> stage)

**Discover** 

Mail gateway logs,

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
Host logs

Host logs, Proxy logs

Proxy logs (domains)




We're probably going to need some logs.....







- Made up of the following components:-
  - Filebeat Log shipper
  - Logstash Parsing logs, transforming and transporting them
  - Elasticsearch Indexing and storing of data
  - Kibana Displaying data from Elasticsearch and querying it
- Indexes on ingestion (sales sales)



#### DETECT AND DETECTION

Reconnaissance

Weaponization

Delivery (onedrive.com/file/1234)

**Exploitation** (User - Spearphishing)

Installation (helpguide.docx.vbs)

C2 (domains)

Actions on objectives (2<sup>nd</sup> stage)



- We're definitely going to need some logs......
- Intelligence sharing...





- Developed by YELP...
- Utilizes Elastic search API...
- Built in Python...
  - Rules are built in YAML...
- Modular rule design...
  - Monitor, Pattern, Alerter...

```
{
    name: MISP-Alerter
    type: any
    index: sd-*

filter:
    - query:
        query_string:
        query: "misp.tags: Feed-Alert"

alert: hivealerter"
}
```

#### ELASTALERT – EVEN MORE GOODNESS

- Plenty of Rule types
  - Any, Blacklist, Whitelist, Spike, etc etc
- Alerters
  - Slack, MS Teams, The Hive, HTTP POST, etc etc
- Sigma rule translator...
  - https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/blob/master/contrib/sigma2elastalert.py

#### DENY AND CONTAINMENT

Reconnaissance

Weaponization

Delivery (onedrive.com/file/1234)

Exploitation (User - Spearphishing)

Installation (helpguide.docx.vbs)

C2 (domains)

Actions on objectives (2<sup>nd</sup> stage)

Deny

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Mail gateway

User awareness

AV (hash of docx)

Proxy filter, DNS Sinkholing

AV (hash)

Containment Eradication & Recovery

- Security tools
  - Proxy, DNS sinkholing, AV
- User Awareness






- Threat Intelligence Sharing Platform
  - Not just threat data!!
- Developed by CIRCL in Luxembourg
  - Originally a NATO project...
- MISP API
  - Used for automating lots of interesting things...

## MISP - EXAMPLE

	F <b>=</b> ■	± ×	Scope toggle ▼	Deleted	(i) Context	▼ Filtering tool			
	Date 1	Org	Category	Туре	Value		Tags	Galaxies	Comment
0	2019-08-16		Payload installation	md5	321c3cf486 <b>Q</b>	ed509164edec1e1981fec8	Feed-Discover x  + +	<b>3</b> + <b>2</b> +	qbot 2nd stage
	2019-08-16		Artifacts dropped	md5	7e641f6b97 <b>Q</b>	06d860baf09fe418b6cc87	Feed-Deny x +	<b>3</b> + <b>2</b> +	helpguide.docx.vbs
	2019-08-16		Network activity	domain	domain1.co	m <b>Q</b>	Feed-Alert x +	<b>0</b> + <b>2</b> +	2nd stage retrieval domains
	2019-08-16		Network activity	domain	domain2.co	m 🗨	Feed-Alert X +	<b>0</b> + <b>2</b> +	2nd stage retrieval domains
	2019-08-16		Network activity	domain	domain3.co	m <b>Q</b>	Feed-Alert x +	<b>3</b> + <b>2</b> +	2nd stage retrieval domains

#### MISP - COURSES OF ACTION...

- Feed-Discover
  - Go and out find this indicator in the entire log estate...
- Feed-Alert (Detect)
- Feed-Deny




#### **ELASTIMISPSTASH**

Some great security guys have written an integration between ELK and MISP...

- Enrichment on ingestion in real time...
- Highly scalable...
- Currently has support for ECS field types:-
  - Domain, ip and sha256



#### **ELASTIMISPSTASH**




#### WHAT DO WE NEED NEXT TIME?



- New indicators = New detections
- Does my current awareness training work?

- Do my security tools work?
- Do I have the correct logs?
- Is my log retention good enough?
- Am I receiving good intel?

WHOA WHOA WAIT... ONE LAST THING... WHERE DO THE ALERTS GO??







- Incident response case management tool...
- Works with the concept of "alerts" and "cases" and "observables".
- Observables (indicators) can be correlated based on:-
  - Previous cases...
  - Incoming alerts...
- You can map your playbooks in as case templates...

DEMO – APT PERTO ON THE LOOSE