



DESIGN SECURE WEB APPLICATIONS



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- 4 years of IT Security Experience
- Security Consultant and Researcher – Application and Code Security Practice
- Expertise in performing Security Design reviews and Security Code Reviews
- Developed Code Review Checklists and Automation scripts for many platforms
- Conducted Trainings on Secure Development of Web and Mobile applications for different platforms



<http://arrechtalks.blogspot.in/>




- Application Design Understanding
- Need for Design Reviews
- Vulnerable Areas in the design
 - Business Logic Invocation
 - Backdoor parameters
 - Placement of checks
 - Inter-Application Communication
- Checklist for secure design

What is a design?



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Before



After

Design –

A plan or a diagram that translates ideas into models.



Application Design:

- A structure that determines execution flow
- Determines how different components interact with each other
- There are many design frameworks present today
- Most of such designs are based on “MVC”

What is MVC?



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John is a developer of an application and he wants to add a new feature that can let the admin user create new users in the system.

How should he code it?


Well, the very first question to ask is, how should he **DESIGN it?**

What is MVC?



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Write the entire code in one file....



It's a bad idea.
Design it well

What is MVC?



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- Things to develop:

- Form to add user



- A class to understand and process add user request



- A class to hold user data




What is MVC?



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- Segregation of code in logical components
- Makes code maintainable
- Easy to incorporate change
- *Easy to build security controls*



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- Can something go wrong in a design?



Why NOT?

- Design reviews are very important
- A flaw in the design can break the entire model



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- Insecure designs are big threat to the application
- Design flaws are:
 - Lesser known
 - Invisible
 - Hardly caught by scanners
 - Can lead to many security flaws in the applications



Things can go wrong in:

- Data Flow/Business Logic Invocation
- Handling Inputs
- Placement of Checks
- Inter Application communication



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
INSECURE BUSINESS LOGIC INVOCATION

Business Logic Invocation



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


Business Logic Invocation



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Identifies the business logic class/MVC components based on the request – **URL/Parameters**




- **Lets understand the design:**
 - The design uses user input to determine:
 - Business logic component
 - Fully qualified class names
 - Method name
 - View component

Insecure Business Logic Invocation



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DEMO -

Code Walk through



- **What can go wrong in this design:**
 - Unexposed *Files* may be accessible to the user

Insecure Business Logic Invocation




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Normal Functioning




Insecure Business Logic Invocation



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DEMO -

Unauthorized Access to Hidden Business Logic Class



Another important scenario –


Request parameters used to identify method names of the business logic class

Consider this design



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- **What can go wrong in this design:**
 - Users can try to perform actions not authorized to them



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DEMO –

Unauthorized Access to unexposed Business Logic Method



- **Security Measures:**
 - Remove **ALL** redundant/test/unexposed business logic configurations from the file
 - Apply Authorization check before processing business logic
 - Apply a mapping on method/class/view names with the privilege level of the users



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Backdoor Parameters

– Insecure Data Binding



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
- **Lets understand the design:**
 - The design uses a data binding logic to bind user inputs to business/form object variables

What is Data Binding?



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
- **What can go wrong in the design:**
 - A user may be able to assign values to unexposed variables of business objects

Insecure Data Binding



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DEMO –

Unauthorized access by exploiting data binding flaw



- **Security Measures:**

- Do not place key variables related to business rules, which are not dependent on user inputs in objects that get bound to request variables
- Initialize key variables **after** the request to variable binding logic
- Use “disallow” binding logic for certain variables, if provided by the framework



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BACKDOOR PARAMETERS

– Insecure Decision Logic



- **Lets understand the design**
 - The application takes business logic decisions based on **presence** or **absence** of a parameter.
 - For instance – isAdmin, isSuccess
 - Menus/input controls are hidden from certain users, generally observed in ASP.NET applications.



- **What can go wrong in the design:**
 - The design believes in the concept of – “what is hidden is secure”
 - Server side behavior can be influenced with request parameters
 - Users can perform unauthorized operations in the application.




- Consider a password reset feature of the applications:
 - **Scenario:**
 - Admin users can reset passwords of other users
 - Normal users can reset ONLY their passwords

Lets look at the flaw



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The screenshot shows a Java code editor with several tabs at the top: 'web.xml', 'Config.xml', 'ChangePasswordAction', 'ChangePwdForm.java', and 'MySessionE'. The 'ChangePasswordAction' tab is selected and highlighted with a red box. The code is as follows:

```
web.xml Config.xml ChangePasswordAction ChangePwdForm.java MySessionE

@Override
public boolean execute(Environment et) throws MyException {
    // TODO Auto-generated method stub

    ChangePwdForm form = new ChangePwdForm();

    form.bindForm(et); → Binding with request parameters
    String newPass = form.getNewPass();
    String reenterPass = form.getReenterpass();
    String username = form.getUsername();

    if (!newPass.equals(reenterPass)) {
        throw new MyException("New and Reenter Passwords do not match");
    }

    if (username == null) {
        username = (String) et.req.getSession().getAttribute("user");
    }
    try {
        Connection con = DataStoreAccess.getConnection(1);
        String query = QueryStore.updatePassword;
```

A red box highlights the line 'form.bindForm(et);'. A red arrow points from this box to the text 'Binding with request parameters'.

A blue box highlights the line 'if (username == null) {'. A blue arrow points from this box to a blue box containing the text 'Incorrect Logic'.

Incorrect Logic



Flaw:

- Here, **absence** of **username** in the request is considered as a request from normal user.

Assumption:

As an option to add username is not given to non-admin users, the username field will always be absent in their request.



What if a non-admin user sends additional username parameter in the request?

- The server will be fooled to believe that the request coming from the admin user.
- The user will be able to change password of other users



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DEMO

Unauthorized access to change password of other users



- **Security Measures:**

- Don't believe in – “If it is hidden it is secure”
- Apply authorization checks wherever necessary
- Do not use unvalidated inputs for taking business logic decisions – Use session variables/database values



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INCORRECT PLACEMENT OF CHECKS



- **Lets understand the design:**
 - The design uses multiple components like MVC.
 - The authentication check is implemented on all the views of the application
 - if we try to access any view – For instance, “Adduser.jsp” without authentication, it will be disallowed




- **What can go wrong in the design:**
 - Placement of checks can be incorrect
 - Business logic components could be placed before the authentication check
 - Users will be able to bypass the authentication or any such security check

Incorrect Placement of Checks



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DEMO –

Unauthorized access due to incorrect placement of checks



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- **Security Measures:**
 - Place all validation checks before request processing logic



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INTER APPLICATION COMMUNICATION




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- Verifying the authenticity of the user
- Secure Data transmission
- Tamper proof communication
- Prevention of Replay Attacks



- Verify authenticity of the user
 - Consider a case of **web** to **app** server communication






- Verify authenticity of the user
 - In the app server, verify the identity of the requesting user using:
 - Declarative access control (container managed)
 - Programmatic access control logic



- Secure Data transmission
 - Consider a server to server communication





- Secure Data transmission
 - Implement an encrypted channel like SSL or IPSec, wherever possible
 - If the channel cannot be encrypted, encrypt sensitive data like account ID, etc. using a pre-shared key



- Tamper proof communication
- Prevent Replay Attacks
 - Consider a scenario like SSO or payment gateway transaction

SSO Implementation



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- Verify the authenticity of the user
- Send data over an encrypted channel
- Implement HMAC of the request parameter wherever needed
- Use 2 way handshake in cases like SSO
 - Use different pair of pre-shared keys in scenarios where deployment is multiple customer sites



- Insecure Business Logic Invocations
 - Files
 - Methods
- Backdoor Parameters
 - Insecure Data Binding
 - Incorrect Decision Logic
- Incorrect Placement of Checks
- Inter Application Communication



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CHECKLIST FOR SECURE DESIGN



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Questions





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Thank You
&
Share your feedback
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