

# **Static Analysis and code review**

## **A journey through time**

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# Audit this code

```
/* Make these globals rather than local to mapping_chdir to avoid stack overflow */
char pathspace[MAXPATHLEN];
char old_mapped_path[MAXPATHLEN];

void do_elem(char *dir)
{
    /* . */
    if (dir[0] == '.' && dir[1] == '\0') {
        /* ignore it */
        return;
    }

    /* .. */
    if (dir[0] == '.' && dir[1] == '.' && dir[2] == '\0') {
        char *last;
        /* lop the last directory off the path */
        if ((last = strrchr(mapped_path, '/'))) {
            /* If start of pathname leave the / */
            if (last == mapped_path)
                last++;
            last++;
            *last = '\0';
        }
        return;
    }

    /* append the dir part with a leading / unless at root */
    if (!(mapped_path[0] == '/' && mapped_path[1] == '\0'))
        if (strlen(mapped_path) < sizeof(mapped_path) - 1)
            strcat(mapped_path, "/");
    if (sizeof(mapped_path) - strlen(mapped_path) > 1)
        strncat(mapped_path, dir, sizeof(mapped_path) - strlen(mapped_path) - 1);
    }

int mapping_chdir(char *orig_path)
{
    int ret;
    char *sl, *path;

    strcpy(old_mapped_path, mapped_path);
    path = &pathspace[0];
    strcpy(path, orig_path);

    /* / at start of path, set the start of the mapped_path to / */
    if (path[0] == '/') {
        mapped_path[0] = '/';
        mapped_path[1] = '\0';
        path++;
    }

    /* Helper function for sgetpwname(). */
    char *sgetsave(char *s)
    {
        char *new;

        new = (char *) malloc(strlen(s) + 1);

        if (new == NULL) {
            perror_reply(421, "Local resource failure: malloc");
            dologout(1);
            /* NOTREACHED */
        }
        (void) strcpy(new, s);
        return (new);
    }

    /* Save the result of a getpwname. Used for USER command, since the data
     * returned must not be clobbered by any other command (e.g., globbing). */
    struct passwd *sgetpwname(char *name)
    {
        static struct passwd save;
        register struct passwd *p;
#define M_UNIX
        struct passwd *ret = (struct passwd *) NULL;
#endif
        char *sgetsave(char *s);
#define KERBEROS
        register struct authorization *q;
#endif /* KERBEROS */

#if defined(SecureWare) || defined(HPUX_10_TRUSTED)
        struct pr_passwd *pr;
#endif
        #ifdef KERBEROS
            init_krb();
            q = getauthuid(p->pw_uid);
            end_krb();
#endif /* KERBEROS */

#ifdef M_UNIX
        #if defined(SecureWare) || defined(HPUX_10_TRUSTED)
            if ((pr = getprpwname(name)) == NULL)
                goto DONE;
        #endif /* SecureWare || HPUX 10 TRUSTED */
            if ((p = getpwname(name)) == NULL)
                goto DONE;
        #else /* M_UNIX */
            #if defined(SecureWare) || defined(HPUX_10_TRUSTED)
                if ((pr = getprpwname(name)) == NULL)
                    return ((struct passwd *) pr);
            #endif
        #endif
    }
}
```

# A quick recap: Where we are today

- Small coding errors can have a big effect on security.
- Typical software development practices don't address the problem.
- As a group, developers tend to make the same security mistakes over and over.
- Static analysis tools can help identify common security errors early.




# What to find?

- **Web-based enterprise applications**
  - ✓ SQLI (and other injection attacks), XSS
  - ✓ Missing data validation
  - ✓ Session management errors (length, identifier)
  - ✓ Information leakage between sessions (concurrency)
  - ✓ Bad error handling (allowing system probing)
  - ✓ Compliance errors (treatment of personal data)
  - ✓ Insecure configuration









# Proof

# Program verification take #1




# Program verification take #2

Specification



Program




Automatic  
analyzer

Proof

# Program verification: a snag

Specification



Program




Automatic  
analyzer




Proof

# Program verification: a practical dilemma

# Specification



## Program




# Automatic analyzer




## Proof

# Program verification: the maiden voyage




# Program verification: one more tweak

Specification




Program



Automatic  
analyzer


Hints about what  
went wrong  
*or*  
Proof

# time passes ...




# Program verification today

Specification



Program




Automatic  
analyzer

Hints about what  
went wrong  
*or*  
Proof

# A less ambitious plan


Specification



Program




Checker



Hints about what  
went wrong  
*or*  
Proof

# A less ambitious plan


Specification



Program




Checker



bug reports

# A less ambitious plan


Property



Program




Checker



bug reports

# Three hard problems



**Make  
sense of  
the  
program**


**Compute  
findings**

**Explain  
findings to  
user**




# Make sense of the program

- Academic solutions typically target a limited number of languages (often tackling just a language subset).
- Enterprise applications use:
  - ✓ C/C++
  - ✓ Java / JSP / JS
  - ✓ PL/SQL
  - ✓ C#
  - ✓ Visual Basic
- Critical for success: robustness over precision



# Compute findings

- Focus of most academic research
- Problem: No one-size fits all technique
- Solution: Build a flexible model, use multiple analyzers
- Gotchas: context, capacity
- Tricky:
  - ✓ pointers/pointer aliasing
  - ✓ function pointers/reflection/inversion of control (IOC)
  - ✓ loops



# Context is King: token

read

# Context is King: line

```
read(f,buf+len1,len-len1);
```

# Context is King: function

```
static int my_read(int f,char *buf,int len)
{
    int len1 = 0;
    int ret;

    while(len1 < len) {
        ret = read(f,buf+len1,len-len1);
        if(ret < 0)
            return -1;
        len1 += ret;
    }
    return len;
}
```

# Context is King: file

```
/* Make these globals rather than local to mapping_chdir to avoid stack overflow */
char pathspace[MAXPATHLEN];
char old_mapped_path[MAXPATHLEN];


void do_elem(char *dir)
{
    /* . */
    if (dir[0] == '.' && dir[1] == '\0') {
        /* ignore it */
        return;
    }

    /* .. */
    if (dir[0] == '.' && dir[1] == '.' && dir[2] == '\0') {
        char *last;
        /* lop the last directory off the path */
        if ((last = strrchr(mapped_path, '/'))) {
            /* If start of pathname leave the / */
            if (last == mapped_path)
                last++;
            *last = '\0';
        }
        return;
    }


    /* append the dir part with a leading / unless at root */
    if (!(mapped_path[0] == '/' && mapped_path[1] == '\0'))
        if (strlen(mapped_path) < sizeof(mapped_path) - 1)
            strcat(mapped_path, "/");
    if (sizeof(mapped_path) - strlen(mapped_path) > 1)
        strncat(mapped_path, dir, sizeof(mapped_path) - strlen(mapped_path) - 1);
}
```

# Context is King: process

## Process



# Context is King: system




# Explain output to user

- Less studied in academia
- Most of the perceived value is actually here

The screenshot displays the Fortify Audit Workbench interface, specifically the 'Audit Guide' view. On the left, a summary bar shows various issue counts: Critical (673), Major (395), Medium (145), Low (588), and Info (1801). Below this is a tree view of security issues categorized by type, such as Cross-Site Scripting, Password Management, and Path Manipulation. A specific issue, 'checkoutList.jsp:30 (Privacy Violation)', is highlighted in orange. The main pane shows the source code for 'checkoutList.jsp' with line numbers 25 to 42. The code includes JSP tags like <display:table>, <c:out>, and <html:form>. A red box highlights the line <c:out value="\${buttons}" escapeXml="false" />. To the right, a 'Functions' panel lists package-level functions, and a 'Correlated Issues' tab shows a call graph diagram. The diagram illustrates the flow of data from 'StringUtil.encodePassword' through 'UserAction.save' to 'UserAction.save', with annotations like 'Taint from PRIVATE' and 'Assignment to userForm'.

# A Critical Fourth Problem



# Future developments

- Use context to infer intent from the code
  - Weakly typed languages
- Speed up analysis utilizing multi core multi CPU setups
  - Use the ‘time gained’ to do more analysis (breadth and depth)
- Incremental analysis

**GRACIAS** **THANK**  
**ARIGATO** **YOU**  
**SHUKURIA** **BOLZİN**  
JUNNAKXAP MERCİ  
DZAMAKAŞTA OŞCHENİTO  
GRAZIE MEHRBANI  
TASHAKKUR ATU SUKSAMA  
SHUKURIA BİYYAN