



Black Hat 2008 Highlights

OWASP KC Meeting

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DNS Flaw – Dan Kaminsky

DNS Flaw – Dan Raminsky

■ Distributed DNS

- ▶ Map names to numbers
- ▶ Delegation and name servers
 - Send message out
 - Receive replies back

■ Bad guys vs Good guys (good name server)

- ▶ Race between good guy and bad guy
 - Bad guy could guess TXID and reply first
 - Odds are with the good guy





■ Bad guy

- could start multiple races with good name server
 - 1.foo.com, 2.foo.com etc
- When he gets one he could say:
 - Go ask www.foo.com and here's it's address and set TTL

DNS Flaw Contd..

- Transaction ID – “random” number between 0 and 65535. The real name server knows the number, because it was contained in the request. The bad guy doesn’t know – at best, he can guess
- TTL not a security feature
 - ▶ 1 day
 - ▶ 1 hour
 - ▶ ...
- Issues
 - ▶ Redirect to malicious sites
 - ▶ Intercept and corrupt email attachments
 - ▶

DNS Patching



Xploiting Google Gadgets: Gmalware and Beyond

- Robert Hansen and Tom Stracener

Xploiting Google Gadgets: Gmalware and Beyond

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- Gadgets are web-based software components based on HTML, CSS, and JavaScript.
 - ▶ <http://code.google.com/apis/gadgets/docs/spec.html>
- Gadget server must be able to satisfy a Gadget Rendering Request and a JavaScript Request
 - ▶ Get XML
 - ▶ Parse XML
 - ▶ Identify Locale and fetch messages
 - ▶ ..
 - ▶ Output gadget content

- Gadgets are largely 3rd party code and potentially malicious
- Gadgets can be easily weaponized into attack tools or payloads
- Gadgets can attack other gadgets, the desktop, or web sites
- Gadgets can have (most of) the same vulnerabilities as web applications

- Threat vectors
 - ▶ Spyware
 - ▶ Malware
 - ▶ Worms
 - ▶ Personal information theft
- Gmodules domain vulnerable to XSS
- Hosted code insecure
- Current architecture flawed
 - ▶ Security model opt-in

Get Rich or Die Trying *"Making money on the Web, the black hat way"* – Jeremiah Grossman and Arian Evans

CAPTCHA

■ Solving Captcha's for cash

▶ CAPTCHA

- Automated turing test to test for humans vs. bots

■ Why?

- ▶ Spammers would like to register for multiple email addresses

■ Solving Captcha's for cash

▶ CAPTCHA

- Automated turing test to test for humans vs. bots

■ Why?

- ▶ Spammers would like to register for multiple email addresses

■ How?

- ▶ Flawed implementation
 - Answer replay
- ▶ Low cost automated attack
- ▶ Mechanical turk
- ▶ Low cost
 - *"300-500 CAPTCHAs per person per hour. The clients pay between \$9-15 per 1000 CAPTCHAs solved"*

Password Recovery

- China-based online “Password Recovery” services:
- You pay them to hack into “your” account.
- 300 Yuan (\$43) to break an overseas mailbox password,
- with 85% probability of success.
- 200 Yuan (\$29) to break a domestic mailbox password,
- with 90% probability of success.
- 1000 Yuan (\$143) to break a company’s mailbox
- password (no success rate given).

OTHER

- Hire to Hack
- Monetize eCoupon
- Hacking banks
- Flawed return policies
- ...

***Bad Sushi: Beating Phishers at their Own Game—
Nitesh Dhanjani & Billy Rios***

- Backtrack phishing e-mails to their malware and data repositories Monetize eCoupon
- Phishers use poor programming practices
 - ▶ Store credentials unprotected
 - ▶ Store CVV2
 - ▶ Sell credit cards and CVV2
 - 500 credit card numbers for \$2500
- ATM Skimmers
 - ▶ Link to sites that sell physical skimming equipment

Spring Framework Vulnerability – Ounce Labs

■ Data Submission of non-editable fields

- ▶ Web MVC
- ▶ DataBinder will bind all parameters to a server side command object
- ▶ Hackers could use this to add parameters to *submit data to non-editable fields*
- ▶ Mitigation: Explicitly configure set of fields to bind by calling the `setAllowedFields` property of each `dataBinder`

■ ModelAndViewInjection

- ▶ Client data is used as view name
- ▶ <http://www.springsource.com/securityadvisory>