



# Sandboxing JavaScript

Lieven Desmet

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**OWASP**

The Open Web Application Security Project

**KU LEUVEN**

DISTRINET RESEARCH GROUP

The iMinds logo icon consists of three overlapping semi-circles in pink, purple, and blue.

**iMinds**

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@lieven\_desmet

- Lieven Desmet
- Research manager of the iMinds-DistriNet Research Group (KU Leuven, Belgium)
  - Software security lab with 80+ researchers
  - Dedicated team on Web App Sec
- Active participation in OWASP:
  - Board member of the OWASP Belgium Chapter



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- Integrating JavaScript
- Large-scale analysis of script inclusions
- Overview of mitigation techniques
  - HTML5 Sandbox/CSP-enabled security architecture
  - JSand: Server-driven sandboxing of JavaScript
- Conclusion



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# INTEGRATING JAVASCRIPT

# JavaScript inclusion: security model




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```
<html><body>  
...  
<script src="http://3rdparty.com/script.js"></script>  
...  
</body></html>
```

Security model:



# Third-party JavaScript is everywhere



# OWASP


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- Advertisements
  - Adhese ad network
- Social web
  - Facebook Connect
  - Google+
  - Twitter
  - Feedburner
- Tracking
  - Scorecardresearch
- Web Analytics
  - Yahoo! Web Analytics
  - Google Analytics
- ...

The screenshot shows a news article from 'DS De Standaard Online' with several red boxes highlighting third-party content:

- Advertisement 1:** A banner for 'DE PIZZA-JONGEN' vs 'DE WEGENWACHTER' with a 'GO' button, highlighted with a red box.
- Advertisement 2:** An Audi Q3 advertisement with a form for newsletter sign-up, highlighted with a red box.
- Advertisement 3:** A social sharing box at the bottom of the page, showing '34k' likes and '821' shares, highlighted with a red box.

The page also features a sidebar with a 'CHRONOLOGISCH OVERZICHT' (Chronological Overview) of recent news items.



“88.45% of the Alexa top 10,000 websites included at least one remote JavaScript library”

CCS 2013

# Malicious third-party scripts can ...



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The screenshot shows a news article about the Belgian government's handling of the Eurozone crisis. The sidebar on the right contains a list of recent news items and a 'Chronological Overview'. A red box highlights a sidebar with a cartoon character of a man in a mask and a green beret. A blue arrow points from the top right to this sidebar, and a red arrow points from the bottom left to the same sidebar.

DS http://www.standaard.be/ DS De Standaard Online

NIEUWS OPINIES ECONOMIE.BIZ LIFE & STYLE ONTSPANNING IN BEELD

Meest recent Binnenland Buitenland Cultuur Media Sport Wetenschap Beroemd en bizar Regio

7°C BEL20 - 1.01% 202 km file

Actuele dossiers : Regeringsvorming - Eurozone in crisis

Jij bent DE PIZZA-JONGEN VS DE TOURING WEGENWACHTER GO

'Dit is een zeer gevaarlijke situatie'

Huidig premier Yves Leterme noemt de stijgende Belgische rente een 'zeer gevaarlijke situatie'. Het is een Europees probleem, zegt hij. Maar voor de onderhandelaars is het ook slecht nieuws. 11,3 miljard besparen zal misschien niet volstaan.

LEES MEER LEES LATER

Rekening Dexia-redding loopt op

Arco, een grote aandeelhouder van Dexia, wil overgaan tot de vereffening van enkele van zijn deelvennootschappen. Door de nieuwe waarborgregeling voor coöperanten kan dit de staat heel wat kosten.

LEES MEER LEES LATER

Gewonde na schietpartij op Brussels Airport

Bij een schietpartij op Brussels Airport is woensdagmorgen een man gewond geraakt. Het slachtoffer kwam tussen bij een poging tot handtasdiefstal.

LEES MEER LEES LATER

MEEST RECENT Meest aangeraden Meest gelezen

wo 09:38 Gewonde bij schietpartij op Brussels Airport

wo 09:34 'Aziatische beleggers zijn de saga in Europa beu'

wo 09:30 Leterme: 'Dit is een zeer gevaarlijke situatie'

wo 07:32 Rekening Dexia-redding loopt op

wo 07:32 Syrische soldaten vallen intelligentiediensten van Regime aan

CHRONOLOGISCH OVERZIJK

LEES MEER LEES LATER

De Nieuwe

Knokse dames, vraag geen dure hingen meer'

Dat zegt de Brugse procureur Jean-Marie Berkvens, nadat de afgelopen maanden negen rijke vrouwen werden beroofd.

LEES MEER LEES LATER

'Spuiten en slikken moet kunnen op de VRT'

Verhit debat in televisiestudio

Een debat tussen twee Libanese politici is uit de hand gelopen, live op antenne.

34k 821


Like +1 Follow @destandaard 20.1K followers

# And it happens in practice...



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If you downloaded the qTip2 library between *8th December 2011 and 10th of January 2012*, please make sure to re-download the library as the site was compromised ~~between these dates~~ due to malicious code injected via a Wordpress bug. Apologies for any inconvenience caused by this but as usual vulnerabilities like this can only be pro-actively remedied as they occur.

**32 days...**

## Download latest: 1.0.0-rc3

Which package would you like?

- Production - YUICompressed source code - 38KB
- Development - Uncompressed source code - 83KB
- Debugger - qTip debug plugin for easier development - 5KB
- jQuery 1.3.2 - Tested and recommended for qTip - 56KB



Download!

94KB





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Nick Nikiforaki *et. al.* You are what you include: Large-scale evaluation of remote JavaScript inclusions. In *Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security*. 2012.

# LARGE-SCALE ANALYSIS OF SCRIPT INCLUSIONS



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
- Crawled over 3,300,000 pages belonging to the Alexa top 10,000
- Discovered:
  - 8,439,799 remote inclusions
  - 301,968 unique JS files
  - 20,225 uniquely-addressed remote hosts

# How many remote hosts?



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# Popular JavaScript libraries and APIs



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Offered service	JavaScript file	% Top Alexa
Web analytics	<a href="http://www.google-analytics.com/ga.js">www.google-analytics.com/ga.js</a>	68.37%
Dynamic Ads	<a href="http://pagead2.googlesyndication.com/pagead/show_ads.js">pagead2.googlesyndication.com/pagead/show_ads.js</a>	23.87%
Web analytics	<a href="http://www.google-analytics.com/urchin.js">www.google-analytics.com/urchin.js</a>	17.32%
Social Networking	<a href="http://connect.facebook.net/en_us/all.js">connect.facebook.net/en_us/all.js</a>	16.82%
Social Networking	<a href="http://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js">platform.twitter.com/widgets.js</a>	13.87%
Social Networking & Web analytics	<a href="http://s7.addthis.com/js/250/addthis_widget.js">s7.addthis.com/js/250/addthis_widget.js</a>	12.68%
Web analytics & Tracking	<a href="http://edge.quantserve.com/quant.js">edge.quantserve.com/quant.js</a>	11.98%
Market Research	<a href="http://b.scorecardresearch.com/beacon.js">b.scorecardresearch.com/beacon.js</a>	10.45%
Google Helper Functions	<a href="http://www.google.com/jsapi">www.google.com/jsapi</a>	10.14%
Web analytics	<a href="http://ssl.google-analytics.com/ga.js">ssl.google-analytics.com/ga.js</a>	10.12%

JS Action	# of Top scripts
Reading Cookies	41
<code>document.write()</code>	36
Writing Cookies	30
<code>eval()</code>	28
XHR	14
Accessing LocalStorage	3
Accessing SessionStorage	0
Geolocation	0



- 8.5 million records of remote inclusions
- Are there new attack vectors to exploit the script-inclusion pattern?
- 4 new attack vectors
  - Cross-user & Cross-network Scripting
  - Stale domain-based inclusions
  - Stale IP-based inclusions
  - Typo-squatting Cross-Site Scripting





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- What happens when you trust a remote site and the domain of that site expires?
  - Anyone can register it, and start serving malicious JS
  - Equal in power to stored XSS
- 56 domains found, used in 47 sites



- Registered some of the stale domains:
  - blogtools.us -> goldprice.org (4,779th in Alexa)
  - hbotapadmin.us -> hbo.com

	Blogtools.us	Hbotapadmin.com
Visits	80,466	4,615
Including domains	24	4
Including pages	84	41



- Typo-squatting
  - registering domains that are mistypes of popular domains
  - Serve ads, phishing, drive-by downloads etc. to users that mistype the domain
- Unfortunately... developers are also humans
  - `<script src=http://googlesyndicatio.com/...>`



Googlesyndicatio.com	
Unique visitors	163,188
Including domains	1185
Including pages	21,830

Intended domain	Actual domain
googlesyndication.com	googlesyndicatio.com
purdue.edu	purude.edu
worldofwarcraft.com	worldofwaircraft.com
lesechos.fr	lessechos.fr
onegrp.com	onegrp.nl



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# OVERVIEW OF MITIGATION TECHNIQUES



- Limit third-party code to safe subset of JavaScript
  - Facebook JS, ADSafe, ADSafety, ...
- Browser-based sandboxing solutions
  - ConScript, WebJail, Contego, ...
- Server-side transformations of scripts to be included
  - Google Caja, Jacaranda, BrowserShield, ...

No compatibility with existing scripts

Browser modifications imply short-term deployment issues

No direct script delivery to browser

Changes architecture of the web



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- JavaScript security architecture on top of mainstream browsers
  - Sandboxing/isolation of untrusted JavaScript code
  - Policy-controlled mediation to the actual DOM
- HTML5 sandbox/CSP-enabled security architecture
- TreeHouse: web workers sandbox architecture
- JSand: SES-enabled sandbox architecture



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Based on the talk of Mike West at Devoxx 2012

Securing the Client-Side: Building safe web applications with HTML5

<https://mikewest.org/2013/02/securing-the-client-side-devoxx-2012>

# HTML5 SANDBOX/CSP-ENABLED SECURITY ARCHITECTURE



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- Issued as HTTP response header
  - Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'
- Specifies which resources are allowed to be loaded as part of your page
- Extremely promising as an additional layer of defense against script injection

# Example of sandboxing unsafe JavaScript



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Sandboxed iframe  
Runs in unique origin  
Allowed to run JS



Sandboxed JS execution environment

“Used in office document reader on Chrome OS”



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## Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self'

```
<html><head>
  <script src="main.js"></script>
</head>
<body>
  <a href="#" id="sandboxFrame"/>Click here</a>
  <iframe id="sandboxFrame" sandbox="allow-scripts"
src="sandbox.html">
  </iframe>
  <div = "#content"></div>
</body></html>
```



```
<html><head>
<script>
  window.addEventListener('message', function(event) {
    var command = event.data.command;
    var context = event.data.context;
    var result = callUnsafeFunction(command, context);
    event.source.postMessage({
      html: result}, event.origin);
  });
</script>
</head></html>
```



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```
document.querySelector('#click').addEventListener('click',
  function(){
    var iframe = document.querySelector('#sandboxFrame');
    var message = { command: 'render', context: {thing: 'world'} };
    iframe.contentWindow.postMessage(message, '*');
  });
}

window.addEventListener('message', function(event){
  //Would be dangerous without the CSP policy!
  var content = document.querySelector('#content');
  content.innerHTML = event.data.html;
});
```



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Pieter Agten *et. al.* JSand: Complete Client-Side Sandboxing of Third-Party JavaScript without Browser Modifications. In proceedings of the Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC 2012).

# JSAND: SERVER-DRIVEN SANDBOXING OF JAVASCRIPT




# JSand: Server-driven sandboxing of JavaScript



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
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- Secure ECMAScript library (SES)
  - Developed by Google CAJA Team
  - Provides object-capability functionality within JavaScript
- JS Proxy API
  - Provides transparent proxy capabilities in wrapping native functionality
- Membrane pattern
  - Guarantees that no object capabilities (i.e. References) leak through the sandbox perimeter





```
<html>
  <head>
    <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
    <title>JSP Page</title>
    <jsand:initialize/>
    <jsand:sandbox policy="my embedded script">
      <jsand:code>alert("inline code on the page");</jsand:code>
    </jsand:sandbox>
  </head>
  <body>
    <h1>Hello World!</h1>
  </body>
</html>
```



```
<jsand:sandbox policy="googlemapsNoGeolocation">  
  <jsand:code>  
    canvasID = "map_canvas2";  
    failcity = "New York";  
    failpos = new google.maps.LatLng(40.69, -73.95);  
  </jsand:code>  
  <jsand:script src="googlemaps-geolocation.js"/>  
</jsand:sandbox>
```



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- Google Analytics 
- Needs 1 client-side JS AST transformation
- Google Maps 
- Needs support for dynamic script loading
- Needs 3 client-side JS AST transformation
- JQuery 

Demo available at <http://demo-jsand.websand.eu/>

DEMO



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# CONCLUSION



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- Most common way of integrating 3<sup>rd</sup> party JavaScript
  - More than 88% of websites integrate 3<sup>rd</sup> party scripts
  - Google is the absolute #1 script provider
- Malicious or compromised script providers obtain full control over websites on which they are integrated
  - E.g. qTip2, googlesyndycatio.com, blogtoos.us, ...



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- None of them can be integrated seamlessly
  - Require browser modifications
  - Require server-side processing
  - Require re-architecting the application
  - Have restrictions on JS the language features
- Showed some insights in 2 promising directions
  - iFrame/CSP based sandboxing
  - Server-driven sandboxing with JSand

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