

Sandboxing JavaScript

Lieven Desmet

Nick Nikiforakis

Steven Van Acker



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KU LEUVEN

DISTRINET RESEARCH GROUP

iMinds
CONNECT.INNOVATE.CREATE



@lieven_desmet

- Lieven Desmet
- Research manager of the iMinds-DistriNet Research Group (KU Leuven, Belgium)
 - Software security lab with 80+ researchers
 - Dedicated team on Web App Sec
- Active participation in OWASP:
 - Board member of the OWASP Belgium Chapter



- Integrating JavaScript
- Large-scale analysis of script inclusions
- Overview of mitigation techniques
 - HTML5 Sandbox/CSP-enabled security architecture
 - JSand: Server-driven sandboxing of JavaScript
- Conclusion



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INTEGRATING JAVASCRIPT

JavaScript inclusion: security model



```
<html><body>
```


```
...
```

```
<script src="http://3rdparty.com/script.js"></script>
```

```
...
```

```
</body></html>
```

Security model:



Third-party JavaScript is everywhere



- Advertisements
 - Adhese ad network
- Social web
 - Facebook Connect
 - Google+
 - Twitter
 - Feedsburner
- Tracking
 - Scorecardresearch
- Web Analytics
 - Yahoo! Web Analytics
 - Google Analytics
- ...

A screenshot of the De Standaard website from 2011. The browser window shows the URL "http://www.standaard.be/". The website layout includes a top navigation bar with categories like "NIEUWS", "OPINIES", "ECONOMIE.BIZ", etc. A red box highlights a banner advertisement for "DE PIZZA-JONGEN VS DE TOURING WEGENWACHTER" with a "GO" button. Another red box highlights a large article titled "'Dit is een zeer gevaarlijke situatie'" by Yves Leterme, featuring a photo of him. A third red box highlights a sidebar advertisement for the "De nieuwe Audi Q3" with a form to request a newsletter. A fourth red box highlights a social media widget for Facebook and Twitter, showing 34k likes and 821 tweets. A fifth red box highlights a small article snippet about a shooting at Brussels Airport. The bottom of the page features logos for "KU LEUVEN" and "iMinds".



“88.45% of the Alexa top 10,000 web sites included at least one remote JavaScript library”

CCS 2012

Malicious third-party scripts can ...



A screenshot of the De Standaard website in a web browser. The browser's address bar shows "DS http://www.standaard.be/". The website has a navigation bar with categories like "NIEUWS", "OPINIES", "ECONOMIE.BIZ", etc. A large blue banner at the top features a cartoon illustration of a pizza delivery person and a car, with text "Jij bent DE PIZZA-JONGEN VS DE TOURING WEGENWACHTER GO". Below this, a news article titled "'Dit is een zeer gevaarlijke situatie'" by Yves Leterme is displayed. A red arrow points from the article's title to a red-bordered box on the right side of the page. This box contains a cartoon illustration of a person wearing a green beanie and sunglasses, with the text "De nieuwe" and "alles te weten". Another red arrow points from the article's title to a red-bordered box at the bottom right of the page. This box contains a cartoon illustration of a person wearing a green beanie and sunglasses, with the text "De nieuwe" and "alles te weten". The website also features a "MEEST RECENT" section with a list of recent news items, a "CHRONOLOGISCH OVERZICHT" link, and a "VOOR ABONNEES" section. The bottom of the page shows social media sharing options for Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn.

And it happens in practice...



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qTip is a tooltip plugin for the jQuery framework. It's cross-browser, customizable and packed full of features!

So what are you waiting for? Join the qTip community!

craigthompson

Stylish
Customizable
Cross-browser
Degradable
Small filesize

Home Features Demos Download Documentation Forum

If you downloaded the qTip2 library between 8th December 2011 and 10th of January 2012, please make sure to re-download the library as the site was compromised between these dates due to malicious code injected via a Wordpress bug. Apologies for any inconvenience caused by this but as usual vulnerabilities like this can only be pro-actively remedied as they occur.

Download latest: 1.0.0-rc3

Which package would you like?

- ☒ **Production** - YUICompressed source code - 38KB
- ☐ **Development** - Uncompressed source code - 83KB
- ☐ **Debugger** - qTip debug plugin for easier development - 5KB
- ☒ **jQuery 1.3.2** - Tested and recommended for qTip - 56KB



Download!

94KB

32 days...



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Nick Nikiforaki *et. al.* **You are what you include: Large-scale evaluation of remote JavaScript inclusions.** In *Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security*. 2012.

LARGE-SCALE ANALYSIS OF SCRIPT INCLUSIONS



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
- Crawled over 3,300,000 pages belonging to the Alexa top 10,000
- Discovered:
 - 8,439,799 remote inclusions
 - 301,968 unique JS files
 - 20,225 uniquely-addressed remote hosts

How many remote hosts?



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Popular JavaScript libraries and APIs



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Offered service	JavaScript file	% Top Alexa
• Web analytics	www.google-analytics.com/ga.js	68.37%
• Dynamic Ads	pagead2.googlesyndication.com/pagead/show_ads.js	23.87%
• Web analytics	www.google-analytics.com/urchin.js	17.32%
Social Networking	connect.facebook.net/en_us/all.js	16.82%
Social Networking	platform.twitter.com/widgets.js	13.87%
Social Networking & Web analytics	s7.addthis.com/js/250/addthis_widget.js	12.68%
Web analytics & Tracking	edge.quantserve.com/quant.js	11.98%
Market Research	b.scorecardresearch.com/beacon.js	10.45%
• Google Helper Functions	www.google.com/jsapi	10.14%
• Web analytics	ssl.google-analytics.com/ga.js	10.12%

JS Action	# of Top scripts
Reading Cookies	41
<code>document.write()</code>	36
Writing Cookies	30
<code>eval()</code>	28
XHR	14
Accessing LocalStorage	3
Accessing SessionStorage	0
Geolocation	0



- 8.5 million records of remote inclusions
- Are there new attack vectors to exploit the script-inclusion pattern?
- 4 new attack vectors
 - Cross-user & Cross-network Scripting
 - Stale domain-based inclusions
 - Stale IP-based inclusions
 - Typo-squatting Cross-Site Scripting





- What happens when you trust a remote site and the domain of that site expires?
 - Anyone can register it, and start serving malicious JS
 - Equal in power to stored XSS
- 56 domains found, used in 47 sites



- Registered some of the stale domains:
 - blogtools.us -> goldprice.org (4,779th in Alexa)
 - hbotapadmin.us -> hbo.com

	Blogtools.us	Hbotapadmin.com
Visits	80,466	4,615
Including domains	24	4
Including pages	84	41



- Typo-squatting
 - registering domains that are mistypes of popular domains
 - Serve ads, phishing, drive-by downloads etc. to users that mistype the domain
- Unfortunately... developers are also humans
 - `<script src=http://googlesyndication.com/...>`



	Googlesyndication.com
Unique visitors	163,188
Including domains	1185
Including pages	21,830

Intended domain	Actual domain
googlesyndication.com	googlesyndicatio <u>o</u> .com
purdue.edu	pur <u>u</u> de.edu
worldofwarcraft.com	worldofwa <u>i</u> rcraft.com
lesechos.fr	les <u>s</u> echos.fr
onegrp.com	onegrp. <u>n</u> l



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OVERVIEW OF MITIGATION TECHNIQUES



- Limit third-party code to safe subset of JavaScript
 - Facebook JS, ADSafe, ADSafety, ...

No compatibility with existing scripts

- Browser-based sandboxing solutions
 - ConScript, WebJail, Contego, ...

Browser modifications imply short-term deployment issues

- Server-side transformations of scripts to be included
 - Google Caja, Jacaranda, BrowserShield, ...

No direct script delivery to browser
Changes architecture of the web



- JavaScript security architecture on top of mainstream browsers
 - Sandboxing/isolation of untrusted JavaScript code
 - Policy-controlled mediation to the actual DOM
- HTML5 sandbox/CSP-enabled security architecture
- TreeHouse: web workers sandbox architecture
- JSand: SES-enabled sandbox architecture



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Based on the talk of Mike West at Devox 2012

Securing the Client-Side: Building safe web applications with HTML5

<https://mikewest.org/2013/02/securing-the-client-side-devox-2012>

HTML5 SANDBOX/CSP-ENABLED SECURITY ARCHITECTURE



- Issued as HTTP response header
 - Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'
- Specifies which resources are allowed to be loaded as part of your page
- Extremely promising as an additional layer of defense against script injection

Example of sandboxing unsafe JavaScript



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
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Main site

Secured with CSP

Delegates insecure executions
to the sandboxed iframe

Sandboxed iframe
Runs in unique origin
Allowed to run JS



Sandboxed JS
execution
environment

“Used in office document
reader on Chrome OS”



Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self'

```
<html><head>
  <script src="main.js"></script>
</head>
<body>
  <a href="#" id="sandboxFrame"/>Click here</a>
  <iframe id="sandboxFrame" sandbox="allow-scripts"
src="sandbox.html">
  </iframe>
  <div ="#content"></div>
</body></html>
```




```
<html><head>
  <script>
    window.EventListener('message', function(event) {
      var command = event.data.command;
      var context = event.data.context;
      var result = callUnsafeFunction(command, context);
      event.source.postMessage({
        html: result}, event.origin);
    });
  </script>
</head></html>
```



```
document.querySelector('#click').addEventListener('click',  
function(){  
    var iframe = document.querySelector('#sandboxFrame');  
    var message = { command = 'render'; context = {thing: 'world'}};  
    iframe.contentWindow.postMessage(message, '*');  
});  
  
window.addEventListener('message', function(event){  
    //Would be dangerous without the CSP policy!  
    var content = document.querySelector('#content');  
    content.innerHTML = event.data.html;  
});
```



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Pieter Agten *et. al.* JSand: Complete Client-Side Sandboxing of Third-Party JavaScript without Browser Modifications. In proceedings of the Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC 2012).

JSAND: SERVER-DRIVEN SANDBOXING OF JAVASCRIPT




JSand: Server-driven sandboxing of JavaScript



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


Browser



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- Secure ECMAScript library (SES)
 - Developed by Google CAJA Team
 - Provides object-capability functionality within JavaScript
- JS Proxy API
 - Provides transparent proxy capabilities in wrapping native functionality
- Membrane pattern
 - Guarantees that no object capabilities (i.e. References) leak through the sandbox perimeter

Sandboxing/
isolation

Policy-controlled
DOM mediation



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```
<html>
  <head>
    <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
    <title>JSP Page</title>
    <jsand:initialize/>
    <jsand:sandbox policy="my embedded script">
      <jsand:code>alert("inline code on the page");</jsand:code>
    </jsand:sandbox>
  </head>
  <body>
    <h1>Hello World!</h1>
  </body>
</html>
```



```
<jsand:sandbox policy="googlemapsNoGeolocation">  
  <jsand:code>  
    canvasID = "map_canvas2";  
    failcity = "New York";  
    failpos = new google.maps.LatLng(40.69, -73.95);  
  </jsand:code>  
  <jsand:script src="googlemaps-geolocation.js"/>  
</jsand:sandbox>
```




- Google Analytics ✓
 - Needs 1 client-side JS AST transformation
- Google Maps ✓
 - Needs support for dynamic script loading
 - Needs 3 client-side JS AST transformation
- JQuery ✓

Demo available at <http://demo-jsand.websand.eu/>

DEMO



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CONCLUSION



- Most common way of integrating 3rd party JavaScript
 - More than 88% of websites integrate 3rd party scripts
 - Google is the absolute #1 script provider
- Malicious or compromised script providers obtain full control over websites on which they are integrated
 - E.g. qTip2, googlesyndycatio.com, blogtoos.us, ...



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- None of them can be integrated seamlessly
 - Require browser modifications
 - Require server-side processing
 - Require re-architecting the application
 - Have restrictions on JS the language features
- Showed some insights in 2 promising directions
 - iFrame/CSP based sandboxing
 - Server-driven sandboxing with JSand

Acknowledgements



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