



HTTP Fuzzing: Using JBroFuzz to fuzz the web away

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Presentation Overview

- Fuzzing in general
- Fuzzing in the web world
- HTTP Fuzzing with JBrofuzz
- Other fuzzing options
- Conclusions and such



About Matt

■ Varied IT Background

- ▶ Developer, DBA, Sys Admin, Pen Tester, Application Security, CISSP, CEH, RHCE, Linux+

■ Long history with Linux & Open Source

- ▶ First Linux install ~1998
- ▶ DBA and Sys Admin was all open source
- ▶ Contributor to many projects, leader of one

■ A bit of OWASP too.



Fun pics of me - just so Brad's happy



Fun pics of me | more



I clean up really well



Nobody's safe



A fuzz by any other name...

- 1913 Websters:
“To make drunk.”
- WordNet 2.0:
“uncomplimentary terms for a policeman
“the first beard of an adolescent boy”
- For today: “a method to discover software flaws by providing unexpected inputs”



Where did fuzzing start?

- Similar to Boundary value analysis
- 1989 Professor Barton Miller
 - ▶ Early fuzzer of Unix applications
 - ▶ Pure black box approach with random strings
 - ▶ Code quality and reliability were drivers
- Next protocol specifications, network-enabled applications, browser rendering, file format fuzzing, ...



Developing your web fuzz

- Identify Target(s)
- Identify Inputs
- Create Fuzz Data
- Send/Submit Fuzz Data
- Monitor for Problems or Changes
- Verify Exploitability



Details for getting your web fuzz on

■ Identify Target(s)

- ▶ Scope of engagement determines
- ▶ Look at components of the application
 - Libraries, AJAX Frameworks, ...
- ▶ Size requires focus on soft spots/sensitive areas

■ Identify Inputs

- ▶ You've done IG-003. right?
 - OWASP Testing Guide, Information Gathering Section
- ▶ Look for those inputs “you can't change”
 - Buttons, cookies, referer, hidden fields



Details for getting your web fuzz on

■ Create Fuzz Data

- ▶ Sometimes auto-generated by the tool
- ▶ Fuzz lists
- ▶ Tailored vs Brute

■ Send/Submit Fuzz Data

- ▶ GET vs POST
- ▶ Other methods
 - SOAP, RESTful Services, WebDAV, ...
- ▶ Very painful if not automated



Details for getting your web fuzz on

■ Monitor for Problems or Changes

- ▶ HTTP Status Codes
 - HTTP 500
- ▶ Response page size
- ▶ Response timing

■ Verify Exploitability

- ▶ Error != Vulnerable
- ▶ Manually verify and refine testing
- ▶ Engagement scope determines



Fuzzing fail

- Stateful testing
 - ▶ Especially authorization testing
 - ▶ Typically blind to roles and privileges
- Logic errors or poor design
 - ▶ Too close to see higher level issues
- Incubated or multi-step vulnerabilities
 - ▶ Focus is too narrow for this much context



Fuzzing Fail continued

■ Hidden functionality

- ▶ Orphaned pages or functions
- ▶ Backdoors
 - e.g. hard coded passwords

■ Server side errors

- ▶ Memory errors
- ▶ Stalled threads (short of DOS)
- ▶ Depends on how 'crystal' your box is



Types o'Fuzz

- Mutation-based fuzzing
 - ▶ Use existing valid data
 - ▶ Mangle valid data to create test cases
- Generation-based fuzzing
 - ▶ Create test cases from nothing
 - ▶ Model existing target's data to create test cases



Fuzzing Sub-categories

■ Pre-generated test cases

- ▶ Create standard test cases and apply consistently
 - Results between tests are easily compared
 - Complete coverage = lots of test cases = work++
- ▶ No random elements
 - limited to quality of the initially created test cases

■ Random

- ▶ Quick and dirty approach
 - Lacks targeting, longer test runs, inefficient



Fuzzing Sub-categories

■ Manual Manipulation

- ▶ Tester is the random element
- ▶ Good as the testers knowledge & experience
- ▶ Works well for custom situations

■ Mutation or Brute Force Testing

- ▶ Start with good data and continually make small modifications
 - Very little setup or domain knowledge required
 - Problems similar to random



Fuzzing Sub-categories

- Automatic Protocol Generation Testing
 - ▶ Create a grammar which describes what is being tested
 - ▶ Templates describe generalized test
 - ▶ Only portions of the template are fuzzed, others are static
 - ▶ Crucial to pick the right portions to fuzz
 - ▶ Optimized to the likely vulnerable areas



Creating your own mutations

■ Using Spreadsheets for payloads

- ▶ <http://target.com/k.php?hash=abc123user>
- ▶ Select and drag feature in popular spreadsheet software makes this easy
 - abc124user
 - bcd123user
 -

Creating your own mutations

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
1	abc	123	user						
2	abc	124	user						
3	abc	125	user						
4	abc	126	user						
5	abc	127	user						
6	abc	128	user						
7	abc	129	user						
8	abc	130	user						
9	abc	131	user						
10	abc	132	user						
11	abc	133	user						
12	abc	134	user						
13	a	b	c	123	user				
14	b	c	e	123	user				
15	c	d	f	124	user				
16	a	b	c	125	user				
17	b	c	e	126	user				
18	a	b	c	127	user				
19	b	c	e	128	user				
20	c	d	f	129	user				
21	a								
22	b								
23	c								
24									
25									



Say hello to JBroFuzz

■ JBroFuzz

“Web application fuzzer for requests made over HTTP or HTTPS. Its purpose is to provide a single, portable application that offers stable web protocol fuzzing capabilities.”



JBroFuzz features

- HTTP proxy support
- Encoder/Hash window
 - ▶ Base64, MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 and URL (UTF-8)
- Very large selection of injection payloads
- Many built in user-agent strings
- Handles HTTP 100 Continue
- Search mechanism built in
- Syntax coloration



Its Demo time!



Other ways to fuzz HTTP

- OWASP WebScarab (Fuzzer tab)
 - ▶ Allows for fuzzing parameter(s) by priority
 - payloads: text files or generated
- Burp Proxy Suite (Intruder tab)
 - ▶ Allows for fuzzing the HTTP request in full
 - multiple positions and attack types
 - sniper, battering ram, pitchfork, cluster bomb
- WSFuzzer
 - ▶ Web Services Fuzzer
 - Command line, tons of options



Learn More

■ OWASP Site:


http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_JBroFuzz
or Google “OWASP JBroFuzz”

■ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fuzzing>

■ Fuzzing:

Brute Force
Vulnerability
Discovery

ISBN: 0321446119



Try it before you buy it

- All the tools mentioned today are on the OWASP Live CD
 - ▶ A subproject of OWASP Web Testing Environment
- OWASP Site:
http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Live_CD_Project
- Download & Community Site:
<http://AppSecLive.org>
- Original site: <http://mtesauro.com/livecd/>



What's next?

- Using Selenium to hold state for web application penetration testing
By Yiannis Pavlosoglou

Presented at London chapter on January 14th

PDF of slides available:

http://www.owasp.org/images/3/37/OWASP_London_14-Jan-2009_Penetration_Testing_with_Selenium-Yiannis_Pavlosoglou_v2.pdf

which is a uselessly long URL so search for “Selenium” in the search box on <http://www.owasp.org>



Questions?

THE EXPLOSION OF BOTNETS HAS MANDATED
A NEW WARNING LABEL:



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Preschool Fail

