



Trusted Execution Environment, TrustZone and Mobile Security

OWASP Göteborg: Security Tapas, Oct-20, 2015

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
"TEE allows Applications to execute, process, protect and store sensitive data in an isolated, trusted environment."

Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)


Open to malware and
rooting / jailbreaking



Isolation of sensitive
assets



- TEE provides **hardware-based isolation** from rich OS such as Android, Windows Phone and Symbian
- TEE runs on the **main device chipset**
- TEE has **privileged access** to device resources (**user interface, crypto accelerators, secure elements...**).



Functionality



http://www.globalplatform.org/documents/GlobalPlatform_TEE_White_Paper_Feb2011.pdf




Figure 2 : Rich OS, TEE and SE Positioning

TEE - Use Cases

Content Protection

- IP streaming
- DRM
- Key protection
- Content protection

Mobile Financial Services

- mBanking
- Online payments
- User authentication
- Transaction validation


Corporate/government

- Secure networking
- Secure email
- BYOD
- User authentication
- Data encryption


Example of TEE enabled devices




Architectural ways of achieving a TEE




External Secure Element



Embedded Secure Element



Processor Secure Environment

 TEE component

TrustZone®


ARM TrustZone

- ✧ TrustZone enables the development of separate environments
 - ✧ Rich Operating System - Normal domain
 - ✧ Trusted Execution - Secure domain
- ✧ Both domains have the same capabilities
 - ✧ Operate in a separate memory space
- ✧ Enables a single physical processor core to execute from both the Normal world and the Secure world
 - ✧ Normal world components cannot access secure world resources
- ✧ Cortex-A Processors




How TrustZone works

- ✧ Uses a “33rd bit”, signaling whether in secure mode
- ✧ This bit is also propagated outside the system on chip (SoC)
- ✧ Peripherals and memory are configured during startup which side to belong to (normal/secure)




ARM TrustZone: Non Secure bit

- ✧ The memory is split in Secure and Non-secure regions
- ✧ Non-secure (NS) bit
 - ✧ Determines if the program execution is in the Secure or Non-secure world
- ✧ AMBA AXI bus propagates the NS bit
- ✧ Shared memory between two worlds
- ✧ Possible to secure peripherals
 - ✧ Screen, crypto blocks
 - ✧ Protected against software attacks




ARM TrustZone: transition management

- ✧ Switch between normal and secure domain
- ✧ Monitor
 - ✧ Gatekeeper that controls migration between Normal and Secure world
- ✧ In normal world, have both user mode and privileges mode. Same for Secure world
 - ✧ Secure device drivers typically run in user mode
 - ✧ Cannot switch the NS bit in user mode
- ✧ Secure Monitor Call
 - ✧ SMC



Secure Boot - typical scenario



- ✧ **CPU** boots in "secure kernel mode" in **ROM**
- ✧ **ROM Boot loader** verifies signature of **TEE OS**
- ✧ **TEE** verifies signature of **RichOS** and starts it


Example on use case

securebitcoin.net

BitCoin - example


SecureBitCoin.net

- ✧ Secure management of Master Secret
- ✧ PIN-entry to access the Master Secret
- ✧ Use secure crypto provided by TEE
- ✧ Master Secret is kept secure at all time
- ✧ Malware cannot steal data, or modify transactions



Trusted User Interface

RichOS



TEE SDK

PIN request

OK

TEE

Trusted Application

Trusted User Interface (API)

display driver

Input driver

OK

OK


Unlock Master Secret

Keys



App Deployment

"secure BitCoin" App






Thank you

Global Platform

GlobalPlatform Positioning

GLOBALPLATFORM™

GlobalPlatform is the standard for managing applications on secure chip technology



Across several market sectors and in converging sectors



- Overall objective: promote TEE ecosystem
 - Have **interoperable TEEs** across silicon vendors and devices
 - Have **one single set of APIs** for service providers whatever the silicon vendors and devices
 - Have **standardized way to administrate the TEE**
- Technology agnostic
- Resistant to
 - any software attack (remote and local)
 - basic hardware attacks (local)
 - debug interface, firmware tampering, ...
- TEE programming environment
 - Native-based (C-based)
 - Isolation between Trusted Applications

