

## Screw You and the Script You Rode in On

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#### **Introductions**

Charles Henderson

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# Agenda

- The Problem
- Current Solutions
- Our Solution
- Examples





#### The Problem: Automated website access...

- Search engine bots
- Vulnerability scanners
- Spam-bots (pills & porn)
- DDoS attacks
- Miscellaneous crawlers





#### The Problem: Automated website access...

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#### **Common Solutions**

- Web Application Firewalls
  - Pro:
    - Do a good job of filtering out automated vulnerability scanners
  - Cons:
    - Aren't well suited for identifying non-attacks
    - DDoS attacks will almost always be missed





#### **Common Solutions**

- Request Throttling
  - Pros
    - Effective at stopping aggressive crawlers
  - Cons
    - Likely to block aggregated traffic (proxy servers or NAT)
    - Or, aggressive crawling can be passed off as aggregated traffic using forged HTTP headers





#### **Common Solutions**

#### CAPTCHA

- Pros:
  - Good protection against simple spam-bots
  - Really hard ones can't be solved by even advanced scripts
- Cons:
  - Really hard ones can't be solved by even humans
  - Easy ones can be solved by scripts
  - Everyone hates them
  - You can only use them on key components





#### **CAPTCHA Scope Limitations**

- Generally only used on key operations:
  - Account creation
  - Auction bids
  - Comment posts






#### **CAPTCHA Solving**

- OWASP AppSec DC 2012, Gursev Singh Kalra released TesserCap
- Nice automation to solve common CAPTCHA formats using Tesseract
- Accommodations to users introduce weaknesses





#### reCAPTCHA







#### **Uncommon Solutions**

 Honeypot tags (injecting hidden content that only an automated tool would request)

#### Pros:

 Theoretically, very sound. Avoiding it requires extensive client-side DOM modeling to identify which components are visible. Files like robots.txt must be avoided, etc.

#### Cons:

- Must be implemented before the problem occurs
- Many organizations are currently reluctant to implement





#### **Uncommon Solutions**

- Honeypot tags (con't)
- Cons:
  - Only blocks complete crawlers a price crawler won't request hidden links





#### **Our Motivation**

- Client's repeated problems with aggressive crawling
- First time was easy to spot
- Second time was a little harder...
- Third time was a huge pain





#### Our Solution:

- Voigt-Kampff
- Offline log analysis
- Entirely passive
- Designed with the goal to grow into a real-time traffic analysis engine





## Voigt-Kampff

- Java-based
- High-performance
  - Designed for multi-core/CPU, high-RAM computers
  - Separate threads for file reading, parsing, analysis
  - Uses java.nio.channels.FileChannel for file reading
  - Regular expressions rarely used, only after initial simpler pattern matching
  - Uses H2 database easy switching between in-memory and on-disk storage
  - Custom string cache engine (truncated MD5)





## Voigt-Kampff

- High-performance (con't)
  - All behavioral pattern analysis done against "long" data type
  - Javolution collections
  - Log file parsing with modified OpenCSV





- Confidence score-based
- Per IP-address analysis
- Attempts to categorize as:
  - Search engine
  - Scripting tool
  - Spider
  - Security scanner
  - Unknown automated

- Link checker
- Validator
- Web library
- Human





- Static analysis
  - Performed against every log entry
  - Typically simpler tests
  - Is started while logs still being read
- Dynamic analysis
  - Pattern creation
    - Baseline of "normal" behavior (only works if most behavior is human)
  - Pattern comparison
    - Checks for deviations from normal baselines.





- Simplest detection with known user agent strings
  - LWP: libwww-perl/5.821
  - Curl: curl/7.9.8 (i686-pc-linux-gnu) libcurl 7.9.8(OpenSSL 0.9.6b) (ipv6 enabled)
  - Google images: Googlebot-Image/1.0
  - Java: Java/1.6.0\_26
  - Nikto: Mozilla/4.75 (Nikto/2.1.2)
- Implemented as static test





- Multiple categories of known user agents
  - Link checkers
  - Security scanners
  - Validators
  - Web libraries
  - Search engines





- Other simple tests, all implemented as static tests
  - Requests for robots.txt
  - Requests for sitemap.xml
  - Unknown / unique user agents





- Anomalous response code rates...
- Baseline:
  - -200 80%
  - -304 10%
  - -302 8%
  - -404-2%
- Anomaly:
  - -200 50%
  - -404 40%
  - -500 10%



- Anomalous file not founds (depends on real 404 codes)...
  - 3032 -- /scripts/tracking.js
  - 4268 -- /images/spacer.gif
  - 1 -- /admin.aspx
  - 4729 -- /css/tables.css





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- Application entry point (no referer header, or external referer header)
- Most applications will have a relatively small number of entry points
  - Main page
  - Key Google results
  - Login pages
  - Popular bookmarks





- Dependency requests: JavaScript, style sheets, images, etc.
- Automated tools may not request dependencies they don't use (especially large files)
- Passive dependency mapping isn't easy. Based on referer headers in proximity to original request.
- Requires ALL logs from a web site





- Multiple user agents per IP over small time
- Could be aggregated traffic (NAT or proxy)
- Could be automated tool trying to mask its signature
- Low confidence level





- Average request rate (requests per IP over a one minute period)
- Could be aggregated traffic (NAT or proxy)
- Low confidence level





- Request delays
- Standard deviation for delay between requests for an IP address
- If a client is very consistent in how frequently it sends requests, that is very suspicious





Navigational patterns





Navigational patterns





```
usage: voigtkampff [options] <filename>
 -v,--verbose
                              Increase verbose output. Can be used multiple
                              times.
 -r,--recursive
                              Use <logfile> as a directory and recursively search
                              for all log files
 -f,--file <filename>
                              additional log file(s) to parse, can be used multiple
                              times
 -o,--format <format string>
                              A W3C or format string defining the columns. For
                              example, -o "%h %l %u %t \"%r\" %>s %b \"%{Referer}i
                              \"\%{User-agent}i\"" or -o "date time c-ip
                              cs-username s-ip s-port cs-method cs-uri-stem
                              cs-uri-query sc-status cs(User-Agent)"
                              If this is ommited, voigtkampff will look for a file
                              header, then try to guess the format.
 -D, --skip-dependencies
                              Do NOT perform dependency request analysis. This is
                              useful if you are missing log files from a load
                              balanced website.
 -m,--all-memory
                              Keep all databases in memory for faster performance.
 -r,--report <filename>
                              Report file name. Defaults to report.html
```





```
./voigtkampff -v -v -m ex20120320.log
345 [main] INFO root -
Lines read: 0
Requests parsed: 0
Parsing queue: 0
Static tests: 0
5354 [main] INFO root -
Lines read: 399,960
Requests parsed: 199,722
Parsing queue: 200,495
Static tests: 0
6385 [Static testing thread 0] INFO root - Flushing string cache with 23184
records
10354 [main] INFO root -
Lines read: 562,267
Requests parsed: 382,584
Parsing queue: 167,704
```



Static tests: 10,799

```
991071 [Log parsing thread 1] INFO root - Exiting after 28735316 jobs on Log parsing thread 1
991071 [Log parsing thread 2] INFO root - Exiting after 28735316 jobs on Log parsing thread 2
991071 [Log parsing thread 0] INFO root - Exiting after 28735316 jobs on Log parsing thread 0
```





IP Address - 28.481.381.45

Total score - 100

Possible profiles -

The user-agent string matches a known scanner: Mozilla/4.75 (Nikto/2.1.2)

IP Address - 132.278.184.28

Total score - 78

Possible profiles - Unknown automated tool

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The IP had an unusually high number of 404 response codes from the server. 11.31% of the IP's responses were this code, while most clients averaged 1.02% The IP had an unusually high number of 500 response codes from the server. 5.2% of the IP's responses were this code, while most clients averaged 0.29%





# Voigt-Kampff Release

- Not today ☺
- As soon as Trustwave Legal approves it on our return





# Questions or Ideas?





## Survey

https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/ Research12\_Byrne\_Henderson





