

# Effective approaches to web application security

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# Who am I?

- Security Engineering Manager @ Etsy
  - Lead AppSec/NetSec/SecEng teams
- Formerly @ iSEC Partners
- Books/presentations primarily focused on application and mobile security

# What is Etsy?

Online marketplace for creative independent businesses

# Scale at Etsy

1.5B pageviews/mo

40M uniques/mo

#51 by US traffic\*


# About this talk

Real world approaches to web application  
security challenges

# About this talk

Specifically, techniques that are **simple** and **effective**

Continuous deployment?



<- What it  
(hopefully)  
isn't



Three words: iterate, iterate, iterate



Etsy pushes to production **30 times a day** on  
average




(dogs push too)



But doesn't the rapid  
rate of change mean  
things are less  
secure?!





Actually, the opposite is  
true

Being able to deploy quick is our **#1** security  
feature

# Compared to

*We'll rush that security fix. It will go out in the next release in about 6 weeks.*

- **Former** vendor at Etsy



# What it boils down to (spoiler alert)

- Make things safe by default
- Detect risky functionality / Focus your efforts
- Automate the easy stuff
- Know when the house is burning down

Safe by default

How have the traditional defenses for XSS worked out?



# Safe by default

- Problems?
  - Often done on a per-input basis
    - Easy to miss an input or output
  - May use defenses in wrong context
    - Input validation pattern may block full HTML injection, but not injecting inside JS
  - May put defenses on the client side in JS
  - Etc ...

These problems miss the point

# Safe by default

- The real problem is that it's hard to find where protections have been missed
- How can we change our approach to make it simpler?

# Safe by default

Input validation

Output encoding

# Safe by default

**Input** validation

Output **encoding**



# Safe by default

Encode dangerous HTML characters to HTML entities at the **very start** of your framework

To repeat... **Before** input reaches main application code

# Safe by default

On the surface this doesn't seem like much of a  
change

# Safe by default

Except, we've just made lots of XSS problems  
**grep-able**

***Oh yeah!***



# Safe by default

Now we look for a small number of patterns:

- HTML entity decoding functions or explicit string replacements
- Data in formats that won't be sanitized
  - Ex: Base64 encoded, double URL encoded, etc
- Code that opts out of platform protections

# Safe by default

Fundamentally shifts us:

**From:** “Where is my app missing  
protections?”

(hard)

**To:** “Where is it made deliberately unsafe?”

(easy)

# Safe by default

Obviously not a panacea

- DOM based XSS
- Javascript: URLs
- Can be a pain during internationalization efforts

Focus your efforts



# Focus your efforts

- Continuous deployment means code ships fast
- Things will go out the door before security team knows about them
- How can we detect high risk functionality?

# Detect risky functionality

- Know when sensitive portions of the codebase have been modified
- Build automatic change alerting on the codebase
  - Identify sensitive portions of the codebase
  - Create automatic alerting on modifications

# Detect risky functionality

- Doesn't have to be complex to be effective
- Approach:
  - sha1sum sensitive platform level files
  - Unit tests alert if hash of the file changes
  - Notifies security team on changes, drives code review

# Detect risky functionality

- At the platform level, watching for changes to site-wide sensitive functionality
  - CSRF defenses
  - Session management
  - Encryption wrappers
  - Login/Authentication
  - Etc

# Detect risky functionality

- At the feature level, watching for changes to specific sensitive methods
- Identifying these methods is part of initial code review/pen test of new features

# Detect risky functionality

- Watch for dangerous functions
- Usual candidates:
  - File system operations
  - Process execution/control
  - Encryption / Hashing
  - Etc

# Detect risky functionality

- Unit tests watch codebase for dangerous functions
  - Split into separate high risk/low risk lists
- Alerts are emailed to the appsec team, drive code reviews

# Detect risky functionality

- Monitor application traffic
- Purpose is twofold:
  - Detecting risky functionality that was missed by earlier processes
  - Groundwork for attack detection and verification



# Detect risky functionality

- Regex incoming requests at the framework
  - Sounds like performance nightmare, shockingly isn't
- Look for HTML/JS in request
  - This creates a huge number of false positives
    - That's by design, we refine the search later

# Detect risky functionality


- We deliberately want to cast a wide net to see HTML entering the application
- From there, build a baseline of HTML
  - Entering the application in aggregate
  - Received by specific endpoints

# Detect risky functionality

What to watch for:

- Did a new endpoint suddenly show up?
  - A new risky feature might've just shipped
- Did the amount of traffic containing HTML just significantly go up?
  - Worth investigating

# Detect risky functionality



Aggregate increased, time to investigate

Automate the easy stuff

# Automate the easy stuff

- Automate finding simple issues to free up resources for more complex tasks
- Use attacker traffic to automatically drive testing
- We call it *Attack Driven Testing*

# Automate the easy stuff

- Some cases where this is useful:
  - Application faults
  - Reflected XSS
  - SQLi

# Automate the easy stuff

- Application faults (HTTP 5xx errors)
- As an attacker, these are one of the first signs of weakness in an app
  - As a defender, pay attention to them!



# Automate the easy stuff

- Just watching for 5xx errors results in a lot of ephemeral issues that don't reproduce
- Instead:
  - Grab last X hours worth of 5xx errors from access logs
  - Replay the original request
  - Alert on any requests which still return a 5xx

# Automate the easy stuff

- Cron this script to run every few hours
- If a request still triggers an application fault hours later, it's worth investigating

# Automate the easy stuff

- Similar methodology for verifying reflected XSS
- For reflected XSS we:
  - Identify requests containing basic XSS payloads
  - Replay the request
  - Alert if the XSS payload executed

# Automate the easy stuff

- Basic payloads commonly used in testing for XSS:
  - `alert()`
  - `document.write()`
  - `unescape()`
  - `String.fromCharCode()`
  - etc

# Automate the easy stuff

We created a tool to use NodeJS as a headless browser for verification

# Automate the easy stuff



1. Fetch URL containing potential XSS




Test webserver

# Automate the easy stuff



2. Page contents returned to a temp buffer, not interpreted yet



Test webserver

# Automate the easy stuff



3. Inject our instrumented JS into page contents



Our JS

+



Page contents




Test webserver



# Automate the easy stuff

4. Combination of instrumented JS + page contents interpreted



Test webserver

# Automate the easy stuff



5. If instrumented JS is executed, alert  
appsec team for review



Test webserver

# Automate the easy stuff

- Sample instrumented JS:

```
(function() {  
  var proxiedAlert = window.alert;  
  window.alert = function() {  
    location="XSSDETECTED";  
  };  
}) ();
```

# Automate the easy stuff

- Open sourced NodeJS tool
  - <https://github.com/zanelackey/projects>
- Combine this approach with driving a browser via Watir/Selenium
  - Make sure to use all major browsers

Know when the house is  
burning down

Know when the house is burning down

**Graph early, graph often**

# Know when the house is burning down


Which of these is a quicker way to spot a problem?

# Know when the house is burning down

```
se.css" "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.7; rv:10.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/10.0" - - - - - 16951
- - - - [20/Feb/2012:22:32:10 +0000] "GET /images/sprites/buttons-master.png HTTP/1.1" 304 - "http://[REDACTED]assets/dist/88166671/css/modules/buttons-new.css" "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.7; rv:10.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/10.0" - - - - - 12156
- - - - [20/Feb/2012:22:32:10 +0000] "GET /images/spinners/spinner16.gif HTTP/1.1" 304 - "http://[REDACTED]assets/dist/88166671/css/base.css" "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.7; rv:10.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/10.0" - - - - - 18810
- - - - [20/Feb/2012:22:32:10 +0000] "GET /assets/dist/88166671/js/convos/threads.js HTTP/1.1" 200 61743 "http://[REDACTED]/conversations?ref=si_con" "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.7; rv:10.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/10.0" - - - - - 834687
- - - - [20/Feb/2012:22:32:10 +0000] "GET /assets/dist/88166671/js/bootstrap/common.js HTTP/1.1" 200 127238 "http://[REDACTED]conversations?ref=si_con" "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.7; rv:10.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/10.0" - - - - - 928201
- - - - [20/Feb/2012:22:32:11 +0000] "GET /assets/dist/88166671/js/overlays/external-link.js HTTP/1.1" 200 487 "http://[REDACTED]conversations?ref=si_con" "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.7; rv:10.0) Gecko/201
```




# Know when the house is burning down



# Know when the house is burning down

- Methodology:
  - Instrument application to collect data points
  - Fire them off to an aggregation backend
  - Build individual graphs
  - Combine groups of graphs into dashboards
- We've open sourced our instrumentation library
  - <https://github.com/etsy/statsd>

# Know when the house is burning down



# Know when the house is burning down



# Know when the house is burning down

Now we can visually spot attacks


Know when the house is burning down

But who's watching at 4AM?

# Know when the house is burning down

- In addition to data visualizations, we need automatic alerting
- Look at the raw data to see if it exceeds certain thresholds
- Works well for graphs like this...

# Know when the house is burning down






# Know when the house is burning down

But not like this...



# Know when the house is burning down



# Know when the house is burning down

- We need to smooth out graphs that follow usage patterns
- Use exponential smoothing formulas like Holt-Winters
- Math is hard, let's look at screenshots!

# Know when the house is burning down



# Know when the house is burning down

- Now that we've smoothed out the graphs...
- Use the same approach as before:
  - Grab the raw data
  - Look for values above/below a set threshold
  - Alert

# Know when the house is burning down

Alert on events that (*should*) never happen

# Know when the house is burning down

Successful attacks don't happen in a vacuum!  
They generate **signals**

# Know when the house is burning down

- Figure out what the signal of a weakness being identified looks like
- Alert when a signal occurs
- Fix the identified weaknesses



# Know when the house is burning down

Two examples: SQLi and code execution

# Know when the house is burning down

- The road to exploited SQLi is littered with broken queries
1. Watch the logs for SQL syntax errors
  2. Alert when they appear
  3. Fix the lack of validation allowing the error

# Know when the house is burning down

- Further along the attack process, a SQLi attack looks like... your database
- Sensitive DB table names shouldn't be showing up in requests
- Alert if they do!

# Know when the house is burning down

A funny story about code execution...

# Know when the house is burning down

- `preg_replace()` in PHP has an interesting modifier

*“e (PREG\_REPLACE\_EVAL) If this modifier is set, [preg\\_replace\(\)](#) does normal substitution of backreferences in the replacement string, evaluates it as PHP code, and uses the result for replacing the search string. “*

# Know when the house is burning down

- `preg_replace()` in PHP has an interesting modifier

“*e* (*PREG\_REPLACE\_EVAL*) If this modifier is set, `preg_replace()` does normal substitution of backreferences in the replacement string, **evaluates it as PHP code**, and uses the result for replacing the search string.”

# Know when the house is burning down

- What do the signals for this look like?

☒ Options

« prev 1 2 next »

```
[REDACTED] : [REDACTED 23:52:02 [REDACTED]] [error] [client [REDACTED]] [REDACTED] [warning]
[REDACTED ErrorHandler.php:41] [REDACTED] preg_replace(): Unknown modifier 'c' at
[REDACTED Controller.php line 204.
[REDACTED | sourcetype=[REDACTED] | source=[REDACTED]
```

# Know when the house is burning down

You can't fix what you're not alerting on



# Conclusions



Have the ability to deploy/respond quickly

- Make things safe by default
- Focus your efforts / Detect risky functionality
- Automate the easy stuff
- Know when the house is burning down

# Thanks!



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# References / Thanks

- DevOpsSec:  
<http://www.slideshare.net/nickgsuperstar/devopssec-apply-devops-principles-to-security>
- Special Thanks:
  - Nick Galbreath, Dan Kaminsky, Marcus Barczak