



OWASP

The Open Web Application Security Project

Smart Grid IoT Security

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About Me



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Electricity, Water and Gas



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What is Smart Grid IoT?



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- Internet of things is the extension of Internet connectivity into physical devices and everyday objects
- Section of IoT devices employed in the large scale provision of Utilities as a Service
- It covers Electricity, Water and Gas production, distribution and management



- Locale friendly examples include:

ECG prepaid meters



GWCL smart meters




Gas Meter



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Some Promises of Smart Grid IoT



- Provide the capacity and incentive for customers to **manage their electricity consumption more efficiently.**
- Increase **retail price efficiency.**
- **Enhanced competition in the retail electricity market** associated with the timely and efficient rollout of **AMI.**
- Provide distributors with the capability and incentive to introduce **more efficient pricing** to retailers

The Urgency of Smart Grid Security



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- Utilities are essential for our daily activities; attacks can get frustrating or even scary.
- DDoS attack on a utility server could **compromise the communication of 89.7 %** of the total Smart Meters during the attack^[1]
- In October 2016, DDoS **disrupted the heating systems** for at least two housing blocks in Finland. ^[2]
- Code for Mirai IoT botnet responsible for World's largest DDoS Attack (against OVH in France) was released online. ^[3]
- In March 2018, a new **Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security and Emergency Response** was created and allocated **\$96 million** as a response to Russian attacks ^[4]

CLOUD LAYER

Big Data Processing
Business Logic
Data Warehousing


FOG LAYER

Local Network
Data Analysis & Reduction
Control Response
Virtualization/Standardization

EDGE LAYER

Large Volume Real-time Data Processing
At Source/On Premises Data Visualization
Industrial PCs
Embedded Systems
Gateways
Micro Data Storage

Sensors & Controllers (data origination)



Attack Surface Under Consideration



Field Deployments (Edge Layer)

- Metering devices & infrastructure
- Communication infrastructure
- Data and signals

Premise Deployments (Fog Layer)

- Servers
- Databases
- Management interfaces

Threats (Field Deployments)



Threats

- Device sabotage
- DOS
- MiTM
- Malware
- Data theft and falsification

Implications

- Financial loss
- Operations disruption
- Data fidelity
- Avenues for sophisticated crimes
- Network hijacking
- Reputation damage

Threats (Premise Deployments)



Threats

- Malware
- Privilege abuse
- Less-than-secure operations
- Miscellaneous cyber attack

Implications

- Systems hijacking
- Unauthorised data sharing
- Unauthorized data modification
- Reputation damage

Defenses



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| Attack Surface | Mechanism | Scope of effectiveness |
|-----------------------|--|---|
| Field Deployments | Physical security | Device sabotage |
| | IoT Security audits | DOS, MiTM, Malware |
| | Encryption and cryptography | Data theft/falsification, MiTM |
| Premise Deployments | Fine grain access controls, comprehensive logging/auditing | Privilege abuse, less-than-secure operations |
| | Software security (updates, firewall, antivirus, etc.) | Miscellaneous cyber attacks, less-than-secure operations, malware |
| | Cyber security policy and recovery plan | |



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- Attacks on Smart Grid are typically aimed at **disrupting Operations and Quality of Service**
- No system is or can be 100% secure
- Software and Hardware security are **equally important**
- **Regular audits** are crucial for long-term security of assets



- Less-than-secure operations **risks arise from compromises**
- Insider threat is a growing problem
- Few threats can be addressed by internal mechanisms
- Combine acceptance, mitigation, avoidance and transference measures
- Level of **security is often influenced by culture**

The Future??



- Increased computing power and bandwidth
- Hyper secure data and communications
- Increased communication **bandwidth**
- Higher communication **throughput and reliability**
- Systems integration on steroids
- Increased skills, funding, motivation and sophistication of both attackers and defenders
- **History will repeat itself!**

Questions for you




What is the state of security of your IoT deployments?

How are you planning to mitigate current threats?

How are you preparing to avoid future threats?

Any Questions?



References:



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- [2] Source Code for IoT botnet responsible for World's largest DDoS Attack released Online. From: <https://thehackernews.com/2016/10/mirai-source-code-iot-botnet.html> [accessed May 08 2019]
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- [4] Russia attacked the US power grid. What if they don't stop? From: <https://www.smart-energy.com/regional-news/north-america/russia-attacked-the-us-power-grid-what-if-they-dont-stop/> [accessed May 08 2019]
- [5] Heather Lovell (2018) The promise of smart grids, Local Environment, The International Journal of Justice and Sustainability, DOI: 10.1080/13549839.2017.1422117 [accessed May 08 2019]