



Protecting Against SQLi in Real-Time

Stuart Hancock

stuart.hancock@dbnetworks.com
bob.dewolfe@dbnetworks.com





AGENDA

- SQL injection attacks
 - primary database security focus
 - SQL injection detection/prevention
 - current technologies don't work
 - SQL threat assessment technology
 - a new approach
- 



Overview


Web-based attacks: vast majority of data loss

Verizon Business report: 900+ breaches,
>900M records lost

Threat is primarily from the outside

PCI compliance is no panacea


Attacks follow money – Financial, Hospitality,
Retail



Overview

- Majority of losses to Web-based attacks
- 2004-2009:
900+ breaches,
>900M records
lost

Figure 21. Types of hacking by percent of breaches within Hacking and percent of records



Outside Threats are Primary

- 70% of attacks are external
- 21% of victims were PCI-compliant
- Attacks follow money:
 - Financial – 33%
 - Hospitality – 23%
 - Retail – 15%
 - The rest – vast majority unreported

High Profile Targets Get Attacked

- High profile targets become hacking trophies
 - ✧ Stratfor
 - ✧ NSA
 - ✧ Oklahoma DOC
 - ✧ Symantec
 - ✧ US Census Bureau
 - ✧ United Nations




SQL Injection Attacks

Database attacks result in:

- Leakage of sensitive information
- Destruction of important information
- Defacement of websites
- Distribution of malicious code

SQL Injection remains the preferred method of attack



SQL Injection Scenario


Web Threat

User Name: bob' or '1'='1' -- ...
Password: ****


1. Enter bad input into a form (or cookie, url...)

2. Application layer creates new statement
*Select SSN from personnel where
userName = 'bob' or '1'='1' -- ...*

3. Malicious SQL



Can we get valuable data?



Username injected with NO password
Entire Database Dumped


State of the Industry

Current offerings (multi-tiered model):

- Code Review/Scanning
- Pattern Recognition (WL/BL)
- SQL Statement by Statement Training

Problems:

- Good luck with writing perfect code
- Chasing the horse that left the barn
- Very long learning cycle, high false positives






CODE REVIEW

“Software will always have bugs and by extension, security vulnerabilities. A practical goal for a secure software development lifecycle (SDLC) should be to reduce, not necessarily eliminate, the number of vulnerabilities introduced and the severity of those that remain.”

- Michael Howard, Microsoft, Senior Security Program Manager
- 




Whitelist/Blacklist, Statement by Statement Learning

- Not effective – horse already left the barn
 - Not possible to predict new/unique attacks
 - Application and Web Servers are SQL generators
 - Not possible to learn all generated SQL
 - High false positive rate as a result
- 



What's needed:

Adaptive Database Firewall

- Requires full understanding – application/database tiers
 - Profiles Web-based applications
 - Deep semantic/parametric analysis, all SQL statements
 - High sensitivity but low false positive rate
 - Lexically new statements assessed for structural attacks
 - Short training period
 - Continuously refined profiles adapt to application changes
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Time to safety


Compared to non-adaptive white-list/black-list technology

- Applications are protected sooner – much sooner
- Less resources consumed to achieve protection
- Application changes less likely during learning cycle
- Protects against new/unique attacks not previously seen
- Capable of monitoring future attack vectors



Rapid Learning


Long tail arrival of
new statements



Short learning cycles

- Reduce deployment costs
- keep pace with rapid application changes


Classic SQL Unique Statement Trend



When an Attack is Detected, one should...

- Alert
 - Create alerts via email, syslog (SIEM), and SNMP
 - Audit logs identify breach - secure, signed logs
- Inform
 - Analytics provide nature and scope of attack
 - Analytics provided to provide efficient review
 - Integration with third party audit/compliance facilities
- Block if desired
 - Database session kill capability terminates attack
 - Web tier integration provides session blocking
 - Blocking presents challenges

Evolution of Database Security




Current Approaches:


- Continue as is, no DB protection
- Development phase – code analysis/improvement
 - Applicable to new code development when possible
 - Too many vulnerabilities, expensive, time-consuming
 - Extensive required testing expensive, delays releases
- Post-breach: Forensics assess scope of damage
applicable to determine liability, accountability

....or.....



Real-Time Production Phase Protection

- Genuine Protection in Real-Time
 - Short learning cycle
 - Multi-environment adaptable
 - Profiling of each application's database activity
 - Drop-in, transparent install
 - Passive monitoring
 - Multiple heterogeneous databases simultaneously
 - Web-tier attack vector correlation
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THANK YOU!

Questions?

Stuart Hancock

stuart.hancock@dbnetworks.com

301-788-3192

Bob DeWolfe

bob.dewolfe@dbnetworks.com

978-317-8197

