

Cyber Vigilantes

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Hacking: Industry Analysis

Hacking has become industrialized.

Attack techniques and vectors keep changing with an ever rapid pace.

Attack tools and platforms keep evolving.



Hack Fact #1:

Hackers Know the Value of Data Better Than the Good Guys



Data is hacker currency

Overall Rank 2009 2008		Item	Percentage 2009 2008		Range of Prices	
1	1	Credit card Information	19%	32%	\$0.85-\$30	
2	2	Bank account credentials	19%	19%	\$15-\$850	
3	3	Email accounts	7%	5%	\$1-\$20	_
4	4	Email addresses	7%	5%	\$1.70/ME	Ξ
5	9	Shell scripts	6%	3%	\$2-\$5	m
6	6	Full Identities	5%	4%	\$0.70-\$2	
7	13	Credit card dumps	5%	2%	\$4-\$150	Jo
8	7	Mallers	4%	3%	\$4-\$10	Po
9	8	Cash-out services	4%	3%	\$0-\$600	Ре
10	12	Website administration credentials	4%	3%	\$2-\$30	C

Table 5. Goods and services advertised on underground economy servers Source: Symantec Сфера: Stuff, CC, Cashing

Цитата выделенного

Offline

Yesterday, 09:47 AM

Рекѕ ▼ Он

molodec ▼

Posts: 27

Репутация: -3

Join Date: Jun 2010

Он в блэке на соседних площадках. В частнос

Prices and conditions of deal ----> 402860090

Sell CC base

Have 2 bases:

EU (1.3k valid)



Website Access up for Sale





Website Access up for Sale



http://cecom.army.mil/

The United States Army CECOM

Full SiteAdmin Control/SSH Root access

unknown \$499

http://pec.ha.osd.mil/	pharmacoeconomic Center	access, High value informations!	unknown	\$399
http://www.woodlands.edu.uy/	Wooldlands School Uruguay.	Full SiteAdmin Control!	5200	\$33
http://s-u.edu.in/	Singhania University	Full SiteAdmin Control.	unknown	\$55
http://www.nccu.edu.tw/	National Chengchi University.	Students/Exams user/pass and full admin access!	56093	\$99
http://www.terc.tp.edu.tw/	Taipei City East Special Education Resource Center	Full SiteAdmin Control.	74188	\$88
http://itcpantaleo.gov.it/	Italian Official Government Website.	Full SiteAdmin Control.	292942	\$99
http://donmilaninapoli.gov.it/	Istituto Statale Don Lorenzo Milani	Full SiteAdmin Control.	292942	\$99
http://itcgcesaro.gov.it/	Official Italian gov website.	Full SiteAdmin Control.	292942	\$99
http://itimarconi.gov.it/	Official Italian gov website.	Full SiteAdmin Control.	292942	\$99
http://primocircolovico.gov.it/	Official Italian gov website.	Full SiteAdmin Control.	292942	\$99
http://www.utah.gov/	American State of Utah Official Website.	Full SiteAdmin Control.	173146	\$99
http://www.uscb.edu/	University of South Carolina Beaufort.	Full SiteAdmin Control.	1123	\$88
http://michigan.gov/	American State of Michigan Official Website.	MySQL root access/Valuable information.	205070	\$55

Click here to check for proof of the hacked sites.

Email me or add me in MSN at ______ @gmail.com




Hack Fact #2:

Hackers—By Definition—Are Early Adopters



Example: Mobile (In)Security

Growth of Discussion of Mobile Platforms by year



Source: Imperva's Application Defense Center Research



Hack Fact #3:

The Good Guys Have More Vulnerabilities Than Time, Resourcing Can Manage



Situation Today

of websites : 357,292,065

of X

vulnerabilities: 230




821,771,600

vulnerabilities in active circulation



Vulnerabilities by Industry



Hack Fact #4:

Attack Automation is Prevailing



Automation is Prevailing

 In one hacker forum, it was boasted that one hacker had found 5012 websites vulnerable to SQLi through automation.

Things to note:

- •Due to automation, for only a few dollars, hackers can be effective in small groups i.e. Lulzsec.
- Automation also means that attacks are equal opportunity offenders. They don't discriminate between well-known and unknown sites.

5012 SQL Injectable Websites

Collected by

http://www.alliterafe.com/compressed/trainers.php?id='4 http://www.accom/trainers.php?id='30 http://www.page.com/trainers.php?id='30 http://www.addiscom/article.php?ID='338 http://www.article.php?ID='51 http://www.disch.com/article.php?id='13798 http://www.barricle.php?Id='0222 http://www.www.http://www.accom/article.php?id='59 http://www.data.com/press/article.php?id='000073 http://www.andianas.com/article.php?id='5 http://www.inchemeet/article.php?id='104 http://theorygram.net/article.php?id='1089 http://www.htmideco.net/news/article.php?id='416 http://procket/2006tens.net/article.php?id='2524 http://www.particle.php?id='11012&lang='th http://www.htm.lib.net/news/article.php?id='48 http://www.wew.wew.net/nl/article.php?id='1512&type='col




Studying Hackers

- Why this helps
 - + Focus on what hackers want, helping good guys prioritize
 - + Technical insight into hacker activity
 - + Business trends of hacker activity
 - + Future directions of hacker activity
- Eliminate uncertainties
 - + Active attack sources
 - + Explicit attack vectors
- Focus on actual threats
- Devise new defenses based on real data and reduce guess work





Cyber Vigilantes





Approach #1:

Monitoring Communications




Method: Hacker Forums


Tap into the neighborhood pub

- Analysis activity
 - + Quantitative analysis of topics
 - + Qualitative analysis of information being disclosed
 - + Follow up on specific interesting issues




Hacker Forum Analysis #1: General Topics Jan-June 2011







Hacker Forum Analysis #2: Tech Discussions *Jan-June 2011*





Approach #2:

Knowing Hacker Business Models



Example: Rustock

Rustock Takedown Cut Spam By 33%

Bagel and other botnets seem to be picking up the slack, according to Symantec.

By Mathew J. Schwartz InformationWeek

March 29, 2011 14:13 PM

All hail the Rustock botnet takedown. Between March 15 and 17, during which time Rustock was taken down, global spam volumes fell by 33.6%, according to a Symantec MessageLabs Intelligence report. Compared to the week before the takedown, the number of daily spam emails decreased from 52 billion to 33 billion.

At its height, the Rustock botnet pumped out 13.82 billion emails per day, comprising 29% of the world's daily spam diet. But will the Rustock respite last?





Approach #3:

Technical Attack Analysis



Getting Into Command and Control Servers




citizens thought to be involved in moving stolen funds out of the country.

account and transfer funds to another account controlled by the criminals.

Zeus has been a major problem for computer users and financial institutions over the past few years. Once installed on the victim's PC, the malware can be used to log into a victim's bank



No Honor Among Thieves



And You Can Monitor Trendy Attacks





And You Can Monitor Trendy Attacks





Approach #4:

Traffic Analysis Via Honeypots




Automated Attacks

Botnets


Mass SQL Injection attacks

Google dorks






Finding#1: Automation is Prevailing





The Unfab Four





29 percent of the attack events originated from the 10 most active attack sources




Research Compared to Lulzsec Activity

Lulzsec was a team of hackers focused on breaking applications and databases.

Our observations have a striking similarity to the attacks employed by Lulzsec during their campaign.

Lulzsec used: SQL Injection, Crosssite Scripting and Remote File Inclusion.











Lulzsec Activity Samples

Addressing the public on Thursday, LulzSec said that a single SQL Injection flaw <u>led</u> them to more than one million clear text passwords, 3.5 million "music coupon" codes and 75,000 "music codes".

Tool #1: Remote File Include

The relevant snippet from the chat log (emphasis ours):

lol - storm would you also like the RFI/LFI bot with google bypass i was talking about while i have this plugged in?

lol - i used to load about 8,000 RFI with usp flooder crushed most server :D

- ❖ 1 infected server ≈ 3000 bot infected PC power
- ❖ 8000 infected servers ≈ 24 million bot infected PC power

In 2009, a XSS vulnerability was found on the Sun website. A LulzSec member found an old server still online and running an old version of the newspaper website being still vulnerable to the same attack! Once pwned, this server was used as a jump-host to go deeper into the infrastructure. Finally the content management system used to publish the breaking news was also pwned: A simple line of JavaScript code injected in all published news was enough to redirect all the visitors to the fake page hosted somewhere else.



Conclusions



Get Proactive



Quickly identify and block source of recent malicious activity.



Enhance attack signatures with content from recent attacks.



Identify sustainable attack platforms (anonymous proxies, TOR relays, active bots).



Identify references from compromised servers.



Introduce reputation-based controls.



Fight Automation



Adjusted blocking

- Black-list IPs
- Keep lists reflective of real-time malicious sources



CAPTCHA

- -Image
- -Other methods exist (solving a riddle, watching a video, audio, etc.)



Adaptive authentication

- Alert the user
- Repeat password or answer previously recorded question

$$\frac{d}{dt} \int_{\nu_0} \left[k + \rho \phi + \frac{a_0^2}{8\pi G} F\left(\frac{||\nabla \phi||}{a_0}\right) \right] d^3 \mathbf{x}$$

$$= \frac{1}{4\pi G} \int_{\partial \nu_0} \mu \frac{\partial \phi}{\partial t} \langle \nabla \phi, \hat{\mathbf{n}} \rangle da, \tag{8}$$

Client-side computational challenges

- Slow on the client, quick on the server



Disinformation

- Bogus links
- Hidden Links




The top five security providers—led by Symantec and McAfee—accounted for 44 percent of the \$16.5 billion worldwide security software market in 2010, according to Gartner. That's down from 60 percent in 2006.

Source: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-04/hacker-armageddon-forces-symantec-mcafee-to-search-for-fixes.html



Conclusion





"The security industry may need to reconsider some of its fundamental assumptions, including 'Are we really protecting users and companie Want & **McAfee**

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/external/readwriteweb/2011/08/23/23readwriteweb-mcafee-to-security-industry-are-we-really-p-70470.html?partner=rss&emc=rs



Important Dtails

✓ If you want slides, send: your credit card number, mother's maiden name and an email to:

rob.rachwald@imperva.com





Thank You