



Tweaking to get away from SlowDOS

Tweaking to get away from SlowDOS
Sergey Shekyan, Senior Software Engineer
June 2nd, 2012

**OWASP Kansas City
June 21st, 2012**

Copyright 2012 © The OWASP Foundation
Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document
under the terms of the OWASP License.

The OWASP Foundation
<http://www.owasp.org>

Denial of Service Attacks

DDoS attackers target Russian election webcams
Anti-Putin protesters probe network, official admits

Stock Exchange Websites ... by DDoS Attacks

Number of denial of service attacks on the rise
DDoS increasing in number

DDoS attacks spread to vulnerable IPv6 Internet

Tech Insight: How To Respond To A Denial-Of-Service Attack
You can't prevent an overwhelming DDoS attack, but you can minimize its impact. Here's how

New Denial Of Service Attack Cripples Servers Slowly

Home > Network Security

Attack Tool Goes Mobile to Google Android

'Slow Read' proof-of-concept and tool released Thursday.

Attack Code Published for Serious ASP.NET DoS Vulnerability
By Lucian Constantiu, IDG News

... DDoS Attack Tool Now

New slow-motion DoS attack: just a few PCs, little fear of detection
By Sean Gallagher | Published about a month ago




Types of attack


There is a variety of forms aiming at a variety of services:

- ▶ Traffic consuming attacks (DNS, firewall, router, load balancer, OS, etc.)
- ▶ Application Layer attacks (web server, media server, mail server)

What is low-bandwidth attack?



Network Layer attacks



Application Layer attacks



DDoS economics

- DDoS attacks are affordable (from \$5/hour)
- DDoS attack is a great way to promote your start-up (attacks on Russian travel agencies are 5 times as frequent in high season)
- Longest attack detected by Kaspersky DDos Prevention System in the second half of 2011 targeted a travel agency website and lasted 80 days 19 hours 13 minutes 05 seconds
- Akamai reports DDoS attack incidents soar 2,000 percent in the past three years

Screenshot of a "company" offering DDoS services

AREYOUAREDO TEAM


Доброго времени суток.

Мы рады предложить услуги в сфере информационной безопасности сети Интернет. Основной нашей специализацией является организация сетевых атак на информационную инфраструктуру ваших недоброжелателей, а так же защита вашей информационной инфраструктуры от подобных атак.

Почему выбирают именно нас?

- *Профессионализм. Мы работаем только с собственным программным продуктом;*
- *Качество. Наш опыт позволяет нам эксплуатировать разные уязвимости на атакуемых серверах, что делает атаки в нашем исполнении максимально эффективными;*
- *Мощь. Наш ресурс и умения находить слабости, позволяют работать с "тяжелыми проектами";*
- *Анонимность. Вы можете быть полностью уверены, что данные о вашем заказе не попадут к третьим лицам;*
- *Манибэк. Делаем возврат денег по первому требованию;*
- *Скидки. Постоянным клиентам предоставляются договорные скидки;*

Доверяйте профессионалам!



DDoS атака

Сутки	50\$*
Неделя	300\$*
Месяц	1000\$*

Взлом сайта

Анализ сайта

500\$*

* - указана средняя цена, для каждого сайта/сервера оценивается индивидуально

Защита от DDoS

Разовая установка и настройка	150\$
Дополнительная разовая поддержка	25\$

[Заказать](#)



Marketing

Какие типы DDoS-атак вы можете осуществить?

http(post), udp, syn, icmp

Мне нужен особый вид атаки которого у вас нету, как быть?

Мы можем написать персонально для вас атакующий модуль за отдельную плату, например http flood, udp flood.

- HTTP Flood, UDP flood, SYN flood

Можно ли атаковать одновременно несколько целей одновременно?

Да, можно атаковать одновременно сколько угодно целей, все зависит исключительно от суммарного ресурса целей.

- Multiple targets

Можно ли оплатить атаку?

На данный момент мы принимаем только платежи системы Webmoney. Совершить

- Money back guarantee

Какой порядок работы и оплаты по DDoS услугам?

Мы связываемся с вами средствами быстрого обмена сообщениями (ICQ, Jabber, пр.). Вы указываете цель. Мы проводим анализ цели, и начинаем тест атаки, для демонстрации воздействия атаки, и оценки стоимости. После теста, мы называем вам цену в сутки. Если вас все устроит, вы оплачиваете нужное вам время и мы начинаем работу.

Какие у вас условия возврата денег за DDoS услуги?

В случае если атака перестает быть эффективной на заказанный сервер, и никакие



Application Layer DoS attacks

- Slow HTTP headers attack (a.k.a. Slowloris)
- Slow HTTP message body attack (a.k.a. Slow Post)
- Slow read HTTP attack (a.k.a. TCP Persist Timer exploit)

Demo time

What is common?

- All mentioned attacks aim at draining the pool of concurrent connections (usually relatively small)

HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Message syntax

Per RFC 2616

```
generic-message = start-line  
  * (message-header CRLF)  
CRLF  
  [ message-body ]  
start-line = Request-Line | Status-Line
```

HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Message example


```
GET /page.htm HTTP/1.1CRLF  
Host: www.example.com:8080CRLF  
Content-Length: 25CRLF  
CRLF  
Optional Message Body
```

Slowloris

- Low bandwidth attack that sends HTTP requests with incomplete headers. Continues to send headers at regular intervals to keep the sockets active
- First mentioned by Adrian Ilarion Ciobanu in 2007 and implemented by Robert Hansen in 2009




How slowloris works



Slow POST

- Attack that sends HTTP requests with complete headers but incomplete message body. Continues to send data at regular intervals to keep the sockets active
- Discovered by Wong Onn Chee and popularized by Tom Brennan in 2009

How Slow POST works



Slow Read

- Attack that keeps server sockets busy by maliciously throttling down the receipt of large HTTP responses
- Uses known Network Layer flaws to aim Application Layer
- First mentioned by Outpost24 in sockstress. Implemented as part of nkiller2 by Fotis Hantzis, a.k.a. ithilgore in 2009

Related TCP details

- “Window size (16 bits) – the size of the receive window, which specifies the number of bytes (beyond the sequence number in the acknowledgment field) that the sender of this segment is currently willing to receive” – Wikipedia

How Slow Read works

Client

Server

GET bigpage.html HTTP/1.1\r\n
Host: vulnerable-server.com:80\r\n\r\n

BTW, my recv window is only 32 bytes

HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n
Content-Length: 131072\r\n
Content-type: text/html\r\n\r\n message



Kernel to app: I can send only 32 bytes now

Got it, wait for now (ACK window 0)

Are you ready to receive more bytes? 06

OK, give me another 32 bytes


...



Prerequisites for successful Slow Read attack

The larger server response is - increasing the chances of prolonging the connection

- make server generate a data stream that doesn't fully fit into socket's send buffer (65536 bytes is default on most Linux systems `/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_wmem`, if server doesn't set its own value)
- Request large resource by naturally finding it and/or amplifying the response size by using HTTP pipelining. Dynamic resources are welcome.



Why is Slow Read is different? Traditional (slowloris/slowpost) DoS

- Customer stuck deciding what he wants
- Makes an order
- Pays
- Takes the order
- Next!

It is possible to identify and isolate slow client in his request state



Why Slow Read is different?

Slow Read DoS

it is quite late to do anything,
as the request was already
accepted and processed



- Makes an order for party of 50
- Pays
- **Cannot take the entire order with him, makes several trips to the car.**
- Next!



Why is Slow Read is different?

- Customer stuck deciding what he wants
 - Makes an order
 - Pays
 - Takes the order
 - Next!
- Makes an order for party of 50
 - Pays
 - Cannot take the entire order with him, makes several trips to the car
 - Next!



Why is Slow Read is different? (continued)

- Defense mechanisms expect the crushing fist of malice to appear in the request
- Instead, the entire transaction should be monitored

Am I vulnerable?

- There is a good chance that you are. Default configurations of nginx, lighttpd, IIS, Apache, Varnish cache proxy, Shoutcast streaming server - are vulnerable to at least one of the mentioned attacks

What should I do?

- Use available tools to simulate attacks. SlowHTTPTest covers all mentioned attacks and some more at <http://slowhttpstest.googlecode.com>
- Check out <http://slowhammer.me> soon to get access to your own whitehat botnet in the cloud
- Use Qualys WAF or other firewalls that are supposed to protect, but test before you pay!

Detection and Mitigation


- Drop connections with abnormally small TCP advertised window(s)
- Set an absolute connection timeout, if possible
- Limit length, number of headers to accept
- Limit max size of message body to accept
- Drop connections with HTTP methods (verbs) not supported by the URL
- Limit accepted header and message body to a minimal reasonable length
- Define the minimum data rate, and drop connections that are slower than that rate

Detection and Mitigation continued

- Qualys Web Application Scanner passively detects the slow attack vulnerabilities
- ModSecurity v2.6 introduced a directive called SecWriteStateLimit that places a time limit on the concurrent number of threads (per IP address)
- Snort is working on detecting connections with small TCP advertised window(s)
- Christian Folini introduced Flying Frog script at <https://www.netnea.com>

Example of misconfiguration

- Even if the server is configured to handle tens of thousands of concurrent connections, the OS might still create a bottleneck by limiting the server by the number of open file descriptors



Are anti-DoS solutions going to help?

- Have no idea, test yourself!

```
error: 0
closed: 0
service available: YES
Fri Mar 30 11:33:35 2012:slow HTTP test status on 10th second:
initializing: 0
pending: 0
connected: 50
error: 0
closed: 0
service available: YES
```

```
"w" Sending Reply, "κ"
"c" Closing connection,
"r" Idle cleanup of work
```

Srv	PID	Acc	M	CF
0-0	20579	4/4/4	W	0.0
1-0	20580	3/4/4	K	0.0
2-0	20581	3/3/3	K	0.0
3-0	20582	3/3/3	K	0.0
4-0	20583	3/3/3	K	0.0
5-0	20584	3/3/3	K	0.0
6-0	20585	3/3/3	K	0.0
7-0	20586	3/3/3	K	0.0
8-0	20587	3/3/3	K	0.0
9-0	20588	3/3/3	K	0.0

After the attack, a lot of processes remain busy for a long time, so I restarted Apache to clear them.

Here is the status a few seconds into the attack, using a URL that is being protected by CloudFlare.


As you can see, CloudFlare did not protect my server from this attack.

Who reacted first?

Those who really care - gamers!

Open Transport Tycoon Deluxe found that by using a slow read type attack, it is possible to prevent anyone from joining a game server with virtually no resources.

Patches for all affected version were released within a week!



Summary

- Even though the simplest distributed DoS attacks are enough to knock down most web sites today, the nature of the attack will be sure to improve, and it's better to be ready or, at least be aware of upcoming problems.

References

ModSecurity Advanced Topic of the Week: Mitigation of 'Slow Read' Denial of Service Attack

<http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2012/01/modsecurity-advanced-topic-of-the-week-mitigation-of-slow-read-denial-of-service-attack.html>

DDoS attacks in H2 2011

http://www.securelist.com/en/analysis/204792221/DDoS_attacks_in_H2_2011

The State of the Internet

<http://www.akamai.com/stateoftheinternet/>

Evaluation of slowhttptest against servers protected by CloudFlare

<http://samsclass.info/123/proj10/slow-read.html>

Blog posts on hardening web servers

<https://community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/>

Thank you!

- sshekyan@qualys.com

- [@sshekyan](#)