





# 50 SHADES OF CRIMEWARE



## ABOUT US



**Frank Ruiz** - Threat Intelligence Analyst at **Fox IT** y miembro de la organización sin animo de lucro **mlw.re**.




**Manu Quintans** - Threat Intelligence Manager at Buguroo / Deloitte, miembro fundador de la organización sin ánimo de lucro **mlw.re** focalizada en combatir amenazas en Internet.





# Index





# WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT CYBER-CRIME?



# Conventions

**ciber-.** 1. Elemento compositivo prefijo, creado por acortamiento del adjetivo **cibernético**, que forma parte de términos relacionados con el mundo de las computadoras u ordenadores y de la **realidad virtual**.



SEÑORA! Soy un T800, he venido del futuro a robarle la tarjeta monedero....






# WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT CYBER-CRIME?

**IntelCrawler**

## Arab Winter? - Malware infects the Middle East. Large Number of Islamic Mobile Banking Customers are Compromised

According to IntelCrawler, a cyber intelligence firm from Los Angeles, a large fraud campaign was detected against major Islamic banking institutions. A sizable mobile botnet with more than 27 000 intercepted SMS-messages was detected operating between April 2013 and Feb 2014, which puts many smart phone banking customers at risk.



IntelCrawler

**ARAB WINTER**  
**27.000 SMS INTERCEPTADOS**





# WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT CYBER-CRIME?

**Trustwave SpiderLabs** | Anterior

Official Blog of Trustwave's SpiderLabs - SpiderLabs is an elite team of ethical hackers, investigators and researchers at Trustwave advancing the security capabilities of leading businesses and organizations throughout the world.

Home Archives Subscribe About SpiderLabs Careers at Trustwave

Search

03 December 2013

## Look What I Found: Moar Pony!

In our [last episode](#) of "Look What I Found" we talked about a fairly large instance of the Pony Botnet Controller. With the source code of Pony leaked and in the wild, we continue to see new instances and [forks](#) of Pony 1.9. One of the latest instances we've run into is larger than the last with stolen credentials for approximately **two million compromised accounts**.

With so much data in our hands, we thought it would be interesting to look into some statistics regarding this particular attack.

We'll start off with the final numbers, and then break it down:

- 1,580,000 website login credentials stolen
- 320,000 email account credentials stolen
- 41,000 FTP account credentials stolen
- 3,000 Remote Desktop credentials stolen
- 3,000 Secure Shell account credentials stolen

**Global Security Report**

CLICK HERE TO DOWNLOAD A COPY

[Our SpiderLabs Story](#)

**SpiderLabs Services**

- Threat Intelligence
- 24/7 Application Security
- App Code Review
- App Pen Testing
- Incident Response
- IoT Pen Testing

## MOAR PONY!


- 1.580,00 WEBSITE LOGIN CREDENTIALS
- 320,000 EMAIL ACCOUNTS
- 41,000 FTP ACCOUNT CREDENTIALS
- 3.000 RDP
- 3.000 SSH ACCESS







# WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT CYBER-CRIME?



## APT1

- Obama runs first law about cybersecurity.
- CISA (Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act) is running again
- Mandiant, presents at RSA Conference new SOC.

Securestate talk at 2005 about this group and their tools...





# WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT CYBER-CRIME?



in-depth security news and investigation



[BLOG](#) [ADVERTISING](#) [ABOUT T](#)

## Tagged: SpyZeus

Home / [Web Fraud 2.0](#) — 28 Comments

### visiting the SpyEye/ZeuS Merger

er 2010, I discovered that the authors of the SpyEye and King Trojans — once competitors in the market for botnet and management kits — were planning to kill further ent of ZeuS and fuse the two malware families into one an. Initially, I heard some skepticism from folks in the community about this. But three months later, security re starting to catch glimpses of this new hybrid Trojan in with the author(s) shipping a series of beta releases that

#### Recent Posts

- [Card Backlog Extends from Target Breach](#)
- [iOS Update Quashes Dangerous SSL Bug](#)
- [Adobe, Microsoft Push For 0-Day Threats](#)
- [Fire Sale on Cards Since Target Breach](#)
- [Time to Harden Your Hardware?](#)





# WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT CYBER-CRIME?

## Meet the Zberp Trojan

BY DANA TAMIR • MAY 22, 2014

Categories: [Advanced Threats](#)

Share 101 16

Tweet 221

Share 411

Like 101

Share 614

0 Sidenotes

### A New Trojan in Town: Meet Zberp

Trusteer researchers recently discovered a new Trojan that has been targeting more than 450 financial institutions around the world, mainly in the U.S., U.K. and Australia. The new Trojan, which seems to be a variant of the well-known Zeus Trojan (a.k.a. Zbot), also demonstrates behaviors associated with the Carberp Trojan family. Therefore, we named it the **Zberp** Trojan. ●●

According to an analysis conducted by Trusteer researchers **Martin G. Korman** and **Tal Darsan**, the Trojan seems to have been assembled from the leaked source code of two well-known Trojans: Zeus and Carberp. The Zeus source code was exposed to the public in 2011, and it is already used by some criminal groups that customize its behavior and develop new features. The Carberp source code was [offered for sale last](#)



Dana Tamir

Director of  
Enterprise  
Security at

Trusteer, an IBM Company

Follow @DanaTamir

Dana Tamir is Director of Enterprise Security at Trusteer, and IBM Company. In her role she leads activities related to enterprise advanced threat protection solutions. With over a...

SEE ALL POSTS





It's time back to  
“reality”





# It's time back to "reality"

Conviértete en un profesional

Enviar a un amigo  
Imprimir  
En tu móvil  
Pásalo

SEGURIDAD | Fena de la tecnología Cyber

## El 'cibercrimen', una delincuencia organizada que genera miles de millones

159

seguridad.com

Cybercrime

Daniels Net

gr. tzt.

## El cibercrimen se transforma en crimen organizado

*El dinero ya no es el único objetivo, sino también el dominio de Internet*

La profesionalización del fraude en Internet no sólo ha atraído a las bandas organizadas a la red de redes, sino que ha dado paso a una ataques con fines políticos que ya han sufrido algunas regiones del globo, señala el primer informe de Ciberdelitos realizado por S21. Obtener dinero de forma fraudulenta no ya es el único objetivo, sino también el dominio de Internet. Y aunque algunos proveedores de Internet ya han sido clausurados por el FBI, los casos de phishing y de trojanos siguen su ascenso imparable. Por Juan R. Coca.

Tweet 0 Like gusta 22 +1 0 Share Pin it

Incremento del fraude

Incremento del fraude
3127

## McAfee informa sobre una nueva generación de ciberdelitos

**El estudio revela cómo adolescentes con amplio dominio de Internet y escasos catorce años se sienten atraídos por el crimen cibernético debido a la celebridad de los criminales de alta tecnología y la promesa de beneficios monetarios sin los riesgos típicos de los delitos tradicionales.**

Diario TI 27/12/06 12:57:00 McAfee anunció los descubrimientos de una nueva investigación que revela cómo el crimen organizado está dando a luz una nueva generación de criminales cibernéticos que utilizan tácticas similares a las empleadas por la KGB durante la guerra fría.

El Informe de Criminología Virtual 2006 de McAfee es el segundo informe anual de McAfee sobre crimen organizado y uso de Internet. El estudio, basado en información recopilada de los principales departamentos de investigación de delitos de alta tecnología en Europa y el FBI, sugiere que las pandillas criminales están reclutando a los




El FBI sugiere que las pandillas criminales están reclutando a los departamentos de investigación de delitos de alta tecnología en Europa es un paso en la investigación de los beneficios monetarios de los delitos de alta tecnología. El informe anual de McAfee sobre crimen organizado y uso de Internet. El informe de Criminología Virtual 2006 de McAfee es el segundo






It's time back to "reality"





It's time back to "reality"









# Understand Cyber-Crime activities





# Understand Cyber-Crime activities



LAYER #1





# Understand Cyber-Crime activities

LAYER #1






# Understand Cyber-Crime activities

LAYER #1







[illegible]



# Understand Cyber-Crime activities

LAYER #2










# Understand Cyber-Crime activities

LAYER #2








# Understand Cyber-Crime activities

LAYER #3






# Understand Cyber-Crime activities

LAYER #3

[User ID](#) [FAQ](#) [Members List](#) [Calendar](#) [New Posts](#) [Search](#) [Quick links](#) [Escrow](#) [Prices](#) [Log Out](#)



Welcome, [Guest](#)  
You last visited Today at  
[Private Messages](#): Unread 0, Total 0.

[mazafaka](#) > [Основной раздел](#) > [Программирование в сфере кардинга Zeus.](#)

"хороший партнер, своевременные выплаты, никакого обмана :)"  
- Dee\_Kline

Best курс U-kash, LR, WHZ обмен в вывод  
ОБНАЛ, ВЫВОД, ВВОД WH, LR, ЯД, WIRE  
ВАШ СКУП СЕРВИС

АВТОМАТИЧЕСКИЙ СЕРВИС ГАРАНТА  
НЕТ ПОРУЧИТЕЛЕЙ? ВНЕСИ ДЕПОЗИТ!  
BLACK HOLE EXPLOITS KIT

[Аматор cтaтeй для FF](#)  
WHZ, LR, BITCOIN, WIRE, ALFA, PRIVAT

All times are GMT -5. The time now is 10:43.


[Ответить](#)

Page 1 of 5 1 2 3 4 5 >

Thread Tools Search this Thread Rate Thread Display Modes

13th October 2010, 15:16

[harderman](#)  
Member



Join Date: Jul 2010  
Location:  
Posts: 44

(2) [Zeus.](#)

Доброго времени суток!

С сегодняшнего дня и в будущем обслуживать продукт Zeus/Зевс версий 2.0 буду я. Мне переданы исходные коды на безвозмездной основе для того, что бы клиенты купившие софт не остались без технической поддержки продукта. Славик более продукт не поддерживает, исходные коды у себя удалил, не продает и никакого отношения к нему не имеет. Так же никакого бизнеса в интернете не ведет, его контакты через несколько дней будут не действительны. Он просил меня передать, что ему было приятно со всеми работать, у кого остались какие не решенные вопросы, просьба в ближайшие дни с ним связаться. Все клиенты купившие софт у Славика, будут обслуживаться у меня на тех же условиях что и были ранее. По всем вопросам просьба обращаться непосредственно ко мне.  
Всем спасибо за внимание!  
Для связи со мной используйте жабер: [\[redacted\]](#)

Robots have seen things you people wouldn't believe. ... And they have a plan.






# Understand Cyber-Crime activities


LAYER #3



**SERVERS, VPS, VIRTUALS, DOMAINS**

 **В СОБСТВЕННОМ ДАТА-ЦЕНТРЕ**  
В ЛИВАНСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКЕ

[Правила форума](#) - [Фонд форума](#) - [Статус "Vendor"](#) - [Статус "Seller"](#) - [Jabber @korovka.pro](#) - [Раздача инвайтов](#)

 Korovka.CC > Другое

 Халява









Добро пожаловать,  
Ваш последний визит:   
Личные сообщения: 


[Мой кабинет](#) [Новые сообщения](#) [Поиск](#) [Навигация](#) [Выход](#)

[»»](#) [NEW THEMES](#)

Страница 1 из 14 [1](#) [2](#) [3](#) [4](#) [5](#) [11](#) [»](#) [Последняя](#) [»](#)

**Темы раздела : Халява** [Опции раздела](#) [Искать в этом разделе](#)



	Тема / Автор	Рейтинг	Последнее сообщение	Ответов	Просмотров
	Халявные CC / FREE CC (1 2 3 4 5 ... Последняя страница) lolita		01.12.2013 15:57 от kracks	618	17,436
	Раздача раурал (1 2 3 4 5 ... Последняя страница) Lomik		28.11.2013 17:45 от malavita	58	2,101
	[Инвайты] Спрос / предложение инвайтов (1 2 3 4 5 ... Последняя страница) Mr.ArS		26.10.2013 09:01 от stigozol	97	2,793
	Поделитесь дедиком) (1 2 3 4 5 ... Последняя страница) Seller		28.09.2013 22:29 от rus616	191	6,100





# Understand Cyber-Crime activities


LAYER #4





# WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT CYBER-CRIME?

## FINAL SCENARIO






# Previously on...



Previously

## Previously on...

- First year, without new Banking Trojans. (Except's KINS aka Kasper)
- SymLink Arrested (January)
- Paunch Arrested (BlackHole Exploit Kit) (OCTOBER)
- FBI shut down SilkRoad and they arrest Ross William Ulbricht. (OCTOBER)
- Target Breach. :- ) – (NOVEMBER/DECEMBER)
- FBI With Spanish Police Cooperation take's down Liberty Reserver and arrest CEO.– (MAY 2013)
- ZeusP2P (Game Over) and CryptoLocker Take down. - (MAY/JUN 2014)





Previously

# Has been a special year in the volition of the industry of cyber-Crime

- The feeling of impunity begins to disappear.
- Groups midlevel begin to close and professionalize their assets.
- Ironically, the vetted gang's start to show some gaps.







Previously

# These Changes are due to

- Detentions.
- Proliferation of bloggers / twitters 'investigating' cybercrime scene. (*Pr0n stars*)
- Insider Researchers.
- Leaks (Pasties, services...)





## Conclusions

*The “industry” of  
Cyber-Crime,  
now are more than  
closed  
than ever.*





# New trends




## OUR SERVICES

# New Trends at Cyber-Crime Industry

01



02



03



01

POS

POS Malware - POINT OF SALES SYSTEM

02

TOR BASED

NEW MOBILE MALWARE (EG: TOR BASED)

03


CRYPTOCURRENCIES

Bitcoin, Litecoin, DogeCoin just Crypto Malware Miners!





## OUR SERVICES



# POS POINT OF SALE, *BUT WHY?*

The lack of a Banking Trojan for sale and the large increase in demand for cards has moved many players in this business.

Citadel users move there business to this new system.

Grows offer POS malware sales.





## OUR SERVICES

# POS POINT OF SALE, *What we found on markets?*



Soraya

Para los amigos, la "poyeya".

01

Alina Malware

02

Dexter Malware

03

BlackPos

04

Soraya

**The Beauty,  
the Bad,  
the Ugly  
and  
Guest start**





# OUR SERVICES

POS POINT OF SALE,  
*Software as Service? of course!*

## JackPos

Welcome, admin [Logout](#)

**Home page**  
View all general information you need

**Dumps**  
Check all dumps.

**Bots**  
Manage all bots.


**Settings**  
Change account's settings.

### Statistics

New bots (last 24 h)	1	Total bots	14
Alive bots (last 24 h)	9	Productive bots	7
Productive bots (last 24 h)	4	Online bots	0
New dumps (last 24 h)	36	Online productive bots	0
		Total dumps	246

Show 25 entries

GUID	IP	Last Active	Country
F4-CE-46-27-0E-16	200.171.59.33	1d 5h ago	Brazil
00-0A-CD-21-41-C0	107.217.221.162	17d 3h ago	United States
00-1B-21-0F-80-FE	96.35.154.101	11h 17m ago	United States
00-22-19-04-1F-10	184.155.114.4	2d 5h ago	United States
A4-1F-72-4C-FB-84	66.205.217.123	4d 23h ago	United States
00-1C-C0-DD-54-E0	24.48.118.125	9d 24h ago	Canada
90-2B-34-66-8F-55	207.192.232.15	4d 23h ago	United States
68-94-23-77-8A-36	96.229.187.67	14d 18h ago	United States
78-2B-CB-AB-5E-AB	67.197.5.51	2m 15s ago	United States
00-0C-29-E9-27-F7	195.101.250.40	7d 20h ago	France
08-00-27-F6-49-29	216.232.78.104	2d 16h ago	Canada
00-FF-C3-AF-9B-CF	200.171.59.33	22m 47s ago	Brazil
00-0E-0C-65-32-0E	212.145.66.101	24h 45m ago	Spain
00-50-DE-FB-D6-46	66.187.149.88	23h 55m ago	United States





## OUR SERVICES

# Mobile Malware



**Uses new resources like TOR.  
Increase of injections with support for mobile malware.**

**Mobile malware for sale:**

- iBanking (as Service).
- Perkele







# OUR SERVICES

## IBanking Malware

My projects

Phone list

SMS list

All SMS list

All Call list

Sounds

Contact list

Url report

My projects Phone list SMS list All SMS list All Call list Sounds Contact list Url report

Project: 500 | Phone: none | Feb 27, 2014 06:24:26 | User: Android


Refresh

Telephone number	ICCID	Model	OS	IMEI	Last command send	Last command	Control number	Phone status	Commands
42320943984	8309462340209020000	Unknown sdk	Android 4.4	847847987298271	26-02-2014 14:30:48	contact list (pending )	+883320040295	SMS OFF   Call OFF   Rcs OFF   Aircr OFF	Select command : <input type="button" value="Send"/>

My projects Phone list SMS list All SMS list All Call list Sounds Contact list Url report

Project: 500 | Phone: none | Feb 27, 2014 06:25:58 | User: Android

Project ID	Phone count
000	0
500	1
800	0
111	2





# OUR SERVICES

# Perkele Malware

Phone number | Event | Session | Langdata | Setting

Item per page: 100

CLEARALL =>

ALL

Item per page: 20 CLEAR


phone number	os	Bank	time
491632	(Y)	A postbank.de	2013-06-30 12:14:36
49173	(Y)	A postbank.de	2013-06-23 05:19:35
16827		A postbank.de	2013-06-15 14:48:50
1			

id	phone number	os	lang	bank	login	LOG	ip	time	check
59	4916	(Y)	A	DE	postbank.de	LINK	80.136.	2013-06-30 12:10:25	<input type="checkbox"/>
58	491	(N)	A	DE	postbank.de	LINK	46.115.	2013-06-30 09:29:03	<input type="checkbox"/>
57		(N)		DE	postbank.de	LINK	93.206.	2013-06-29 06:32:46	<input type="checkbox"/>
56		(N)		DE	postbank.de	LINK	92.224.	2013-06-27 18:34:25	<input type="checkbox"/>
55		(N)		DE	postbank.de	LINK	95.11.	2013-06-27 17:10:40	<input type="checkbox"/>
54		(N)		DE	postbank.de	LINK	217.22.	2013-06-25 06:23:56	<input type="checkbox"/>
53	49		A	DE	postbank.de	LINK	2.207.	2013-06-23 05:13:37	<input type="checkbox"/>
52		(N)		DE	postbank.de	LINK	93.21	2013-06-19 14:07:33	<input type="checkbox"/>
51		(N)		DE	postbank.de	LINK	46.1.	2013-06-19 08:54:39	<input type="checkbox"/>
50		(N)		DE	postbank.de	LINK	85.18	2013-06-19 08:08:17	<input type="checkbox"/>
49		(N)		DE	postbank.de	LINK	93.23.	2013-06-18 20:09:48	<input type="checkbox"/>
48		(N)		DE	postbank.de	LINK	78.49.	2013-06-18 17:18:18	<input type="checkbox"/>
47		(N)		DE	postbank.de	LINK	78.53.	2013-06-18 07:01:26	<input type="checkbox"/>
46		(N)		DE	postbank.de	LINK	93.216	2013-06-18 05:26:06	<input type="checkbox"/>
45	49	(N)	A	DE	comdirect.de	LINK	84.136	2013-06-17 16:27:53	<input type="checkbox"/>
44		(N)		DE	comdirect.de	LINK	93.132	2013-06-17 16:08:54	<input type="checkbox"/>
43		(N)		DE	postbank.de	LINK	80.136	2013-06-17 14:37:15	<input type="checkbox"/>
42		(N)		DE	postbank.de	LINK	213.	2013-06-17 09:35:14	<input type="checkbox"/>
41		(N)		DE	comdirect.de	LINK	87.173.	2013-06-17 08:51:38	<input type="checkbox"/>
40		(N)		DE	comdirect.de	LINK	87.172	2013-06-17 08:51:14	<input type="checkbox"/>
39	4	(N)	A	DE	postbank.de	LINK	78.5.	2013-06-17 08:41:41	<input type="checkbox"/>
38		(N)		DE	postbank.de	LINK		2013-06-17 05:32:36	<input type="checkbox"/>





# CryptoCurrencies





# CryptoCurrencies

[Statistic](#)

[Networks](#)

[Reports](#)

[Commands](#)

[Settings](#)

[VNC](#)


[Users](#)

[Logout](#)

## Statistic

### Clients

total:	147679
Activity last Week:	119982 (81%)
Activity last 24 h:	71749 (48%)
Activity last 30 m:	20307 (13%)
<hr/>	
Hash rate total:	344124.15
Average Hash rate:	2.33
Hash rate 24 hrs:	176008.80
Hash rate 30 min:	51362.38





# CryptoCurrencies

## Countries

India	15975 (10%)
Spain	9677 (6%)
Thailand	9167 (6%)
Brazil	9093 (6%)
United States	8811 (5%)
Mexico	6700 (4%)
Vietnam	5906 (3%)
Argentina	5014 (3%)
Romania	5006 (3%)
Egypt	4601 (3%)
Italy	4227 (2%)
Turkey	3503 (2%)
Peru	3428 (2%)
Colombia	3267 (2%)





## OUR SERVICES

# CryptoCurrencies

### TOTAL HASH RATE

#### Expected Rewards

<b>24 hours</b>	124.24818819 LTC	1279.26 EUR
<b>7 days</b>	869.73731731 LTC	8954.82 EUR
<b>30 days</b>	3727.44564560 LTC	38377.78 EUR

### 24H HASH RATE

#### Expected Rewards

<b>24 hours</b>	63.54593438 LTC	654.52 EUR
<b>7 days</b>	444.82154063 LTC	4581.66 EUR
<b>30 days</b>	1906.37803125 LTC	19635.69 EUR





**Examples!**







## Examples

# TimeLine

### Brian Krebs

**18/Dec/2013: Sources:** Target Investigating Data Breach

**20/Dec/2013:** Cards Stolen in Target Breach Flood Underground Markets

**22/Dec/2013:** Non-US Cards Used At Target Fetch Premium

**24/Dec/2013:** Who's Selling Credit Cards from Target?

**10/Jan/2014:** Target: Names, Emails, Phone Numbers on Up To 70 Million Customers Stolen

**15/Jan/2014:** A First Look at the Target Intrusion, Malware

**16/Jan/2014:** A Closer Look at the Target Malware, Part II

**29/Jan/2014:** New Clues in the Target Breach

**04/Feb/2014:** These Guys Battled BlackPOS at a Retailer


**05/Feb/2014:** Target Hackers Broke in Via HVAC Company

**12/Feb/2014:** Email Attack on Vendor Set Up Breach at Target

**19/Feb/2014:** Fire Sale on Cards Stolen in Target Breach

**25/Feb/2014:** Card Backlog Extends Pain from Target Breach

# Example







# Examples

## Example

**About the breach**

What happened?

Has the issue been resolved?

Does that information include social security numbers?

Do you think you will find anything else?

How could Target let all this credit and debit card information get accessed?

How can I be assured you are taking the steps to protect my information in the future?

**Guest information**

When did Target learn that certain guest information was taken?

Is this occurrence of theft a new incident?

How many guests were affected by the additional stolen information?


What guest information was taken?

How do I know if I was affected by this latest development? Should I call Target?

Why was Target collecting and keeping this type of information?

Do I believe that my credit or debit card information was impacted, since that automatically means additional information was stolen as well?


What does it mean if my information was stolen? What are the risks?





# Examples

Example



TARGET





# INTELLIGENCE



Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE







INTELL

... and remember


IN-TE-LLI-GEN-CE

# INTELLIGENCE

- Emerging threat research
- Strategic partnerships to share intelligence
- Tailored threat focus areas
- Live, dynamic intelligence feeds with advanced
- Actively tracking of cybercrime element
- Daily emerging threat reviews
- Awareness of the changing technology and business environment
- Metrics and trending data for multiple key threat indicators
- Recommendations on improved and refined processes

- Botnet monitoring and analysis
- Malware reverse engineering
- Social media monitor
- Reputation scans
- Deep web monitoring
- Social engineering threats
- Spoofed websites
- All Source Intelligence
- 

- Emerging tech review
- Loss management
- Vendor management
- Executive identity monitoring






# INFRASTRUCTURES





## OUR SERVICES


# Simple Botnet





## OUR SERVICES


# Simple Botnet With Proxy





## OUR SERVICES


# Botnet With Double Proxy





# OUR SERVICES


## FAST FLUX + C&C





## OUR SERVICES


# FAST FLUX + PROXY+ C&C





# OUR SERVICES

## BulletProof Hosters








## OUR SERVICES


# OWN INFRASTRUCTURES





## OUR SERVICES


# TOR INFRASTRUCTURES





## OUR SERVICES

# P2P INFRASTRUCTURE





# DEMO TIME



DEMO Concept

**BUILD POS ENVIROMENT**

**SWIPE OUR CREDIT CARD**

**BREATHE DEEPLY**


**INFECT OUR POS**

**CALM DOWN**

**PWN THE BOTNET AND  
GET OUR MONEY BACK!**

**OH MY GOD!!!**

**IT'S BEAUTIFUL!**





## DEMO RESULTS

Me robo mi tarjeta...



Yo quemé su botnet...





**Deloitte.**



**THANKS!**



# WARNING!

**SAVE 20%** when you order online and enter Promo Code **AVN99**  
*FREE standard shipping when you order online.*

# COMING!

## Android Malware and Analysis

### Authors

Ken Dunham, Shane Hartman, Manu Quintans, Tim Strazzere,  
and Jose Andre Morales

There has long been a need for a book that covers the tools and tactics for identifying and analyzing Android threats. Ken Dunham, renowned global malware expert, and leading international experts' team up to document the best tools and tactics for analyzing Android malware. Many tools exist in the open source market today but do not work as advertised and frequently include failed installations and extensive



October 2014, 224 pp.

ISBN: 978-1-4822-5219-4

\$59.95 / £38.99

### Selected Contents

Introduction to Android Operating System and Threats. Malware Threats, Hoaxes, & Taxonomy. Open Source Tools. Static Analysis. Android Evolution. Android Malware Tactics & Trends. Behavioral Analysis.

Ken Dunham • Shane Hartman • Jose Andre Morales  
Manu Quintans • Tim Strazzere



**SAVE 20%** when you order online and enter Promo Code **AVN99**  
*FREE standard shipping when you order online.*

Catalog no. K23862  
October 2014, 224 pp.  
ISBN: 978-1-4822-5219-4  
\$59.95 / £38.99



**THANKS!!!**



**Q/A**