



# 50 SHADES OF CRIMEWARE



# ABOUT US



“

**Frank Ruiz** - Threat Intelligence Analyst at **Fox IT** y miembro de la  
organización sin animo de lucro **mlw.re**.

”

“

**Manu Quintans** - Threat Intelligence Manager at Buguroo / Deloitte, miembro  
fundador de la organización sin ánimo de lucro **mlw.re** focalizada en combatir  
amenazas en Internet.

”





# Index

What we know about Cyber-Crime ?

Reality Bites

Intelligence

Understand Cyber-Crime activities

New trends at Cyber-Crime

DEMO TIME!





# WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT CYBER-CRIME?



## Conventions

**ciber-** 1. Elemento compositivo prefijo, creado por acortamiento del adjetivo **cibernético**, que forma parte de términos relacionados con el mundo de las computadoras u ordenadores y de la **realidad virtual**.



SEÑORA! Soy un T800, he venido del futuro a robarle la tarjeta monedero....





# WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT CYBER-CRIME?

**IntelCrawler**

## Arab Winter? - Malware infects the Middle East. Large Number of Islamic Mobile Banking Customers are Compromised

According to IntelCrawler, a cyber intelligence firm from Los Angeles, a large fraud campaign was detected against major Islamic banking institutions. A stable mobile botnet with more than 27 000 intercepted SMS-messages was detected operating between April 2013 and Feb 2014, which puts many smart phone banking customers at risk.



**ARAB WINTER**  
**27.000 SMS INTERCEPTADOS**





# WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT CYBER-CRIME?

The screenshot shows a blog post on the Trustwave SpiderLabs website. The header features the Trustwave SpiderLabs logo and the word 'Anterior'. The post title is 'Look What I Found: Moar Pony!'. The text discusses the discovery of a large instance of the Pony Botnet Controller, mentioning source code leaks and new instances. It highlights statistics: 1,580,000 website login credentials, 320,000 email accounts, 41,000 FTP account credentials, 3,000 RDP, and 3,000 SSH access. The sidebar includes links to the Global Security Report and SpiderLabs services.

Official Blog of Trustwave's SpiderLabs - SpiderLabs is an elite team of ethical hackers, investigators and researchers at Trustwave advancing the security capabilities of leading businesses and organizations throughout the world.

Home Archives Subscribe About SpiderLabs Careers at Trustwave

Search

03 December 2013

## Look What I Found: Moar Pony!

In our [last episode](#) of "Look What I Found" we talked about a fairly large instance of the Pony Botnet Controller. With the source code of Pony leaked and in the wild, we continue to see new instances and [forks](#) of Pony 1.9. One of the latest instances we've run into is larger than the last with stolen credentials for approximately **two million compromised accounts**.

With so much data in our hands, we thought it would be interesting to look into some statistics regarding this particular attack.

We'll start off with the final numbers, and then break it down:

- 1,580,000 website login credentials stolen
- 320,000 email account credentials stolen
- 41,000 FTP account credentials stolen
- 3,000 Remote Desktop credentials stolen
- 3,000 Secure Shell account credentials stolen

## MOAR PONY!

- **1,580,000 WEBSITE LOGIN CREDENTIALS**
- **320,000 EMAIL ACCOUNTS**
- **41,000 FTP ACCOUNT CREDENTIALS**
- **3,000 RDP**
- **3,000 SSH ACCESS**





# WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT CYBER-CRIME?

The screenshot shows the Mandiant Intelligence Center Report for APT1. The page has a red header with a search bar and a 'Community Resources' button. The main content area has a teal header with the title 'Mandiant Intelligence Center Report' and the subtitle 'APT1: Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage Units'. Below this, there are two main sections: 'APT1: Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage Units' and 'Digital Appendix & Indicators'. Each section has a summary, a 'Download Report' button, and a 'Download Appendix' button. The 'APT1' section summary states: 'This report is focused on the most prolific cyber espionage group. Mandiant tracks: APT1. This single organization has conducted a cyber espionage campaign against a broad range of victims since at least 2006.' The 'Digital Appendix & Indicators' section summary states: 'Access more than 3,000 APT1 indicators including domain names, IP addresses, X.509 encryption certificates and MD5 hashes of malware in APT1's arsenal of digital weapons.'

## APT1

- Obama runs first law about cybersecurity.
- CISPA (Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act) is running again
- Mandiant, presents at RSA Conference new SOC.

Securestate talk at 2005 about this group and there tools...





# WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT CYBER-CRIME?

# KrebsonSecurity

-depth security news and investigation



BLOG ADVERTISING | ABOUT T

## Tagged: SpyZeus

Home / Web Fraud 2.0 — 28 Comments

## visiting the SpyEye/Zeus Merger

In 2010, I discovered that the authors of the SpyEye and Zeus Trojans — once competitors in the market for botnet and management kits — were planning to kill further development of Zeus and **fuse the two malware families into one hybrid Trojan**. Initially, I heard some skepticism from folks in the security community about this. But three months later, security researchers starting to catch glimpses of this new hybrid Trojan in the wild, with the author(s) shipping a series of beta releases that

Recent Posts

- Card Backlog Extended from Target Breach
- iOS Update Quashes Dangerous SSL Bug
- Adobe, Microsoft Patch For 0-Day Threats
- Fire Sale on Cards Spawns Target Breach
- Time to Harden Your Usernames?





# WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT CYBER-CRIME?

## Meet the Zberp Trojan

BY DANA TAMIR • MAY 22, 2014

Categories: [Advanced Threats](#)



0 Sidenotes

### A New Trojan in Town: Meet Zberp

Trusteer researchers recently discovered a new Trojan that has been targeting more than 450 financial institutions around the world, mainly in the U.S., U.K. and Australia. The new Trojan, which seems to be a variant of the well-known Zeus Trojan (a.k.a. Zbot), also demonstrates behaviors associated with the Carberp Trojan family. Therefore, we named it the **Zberp** Trojan. ■ -

According to an analysis conducted by Trusteer researchers **Martin G. Korman** and **Tal Darsan**, the Trojan seems to have been assembled from the leaked source code of two well-known Trojans: Zeus and Carberp. The Zeus source code was exposed to the public in 2011, and it is already used by some criminal groups that customize its behavior and develop new features. The Carberp source code was [offered for sale last](#)



Dana Tamir

Director of Enterprise Security at Trusteer, an IBM Company

[Follow @DanaTamir](#)

Dana Tamir is Director of Enterprise Security at Trusteer, and IBM Company. In her role she leads activities related to enterprise advanced threat protection solutions. With over a...

[SEE ALL POSTS](#)





It's time back to  
“reality”



## It's time back to “reality”

# Conviértete en un profesional

Envíar a un amigo  
 Visitar  
 Imprimir  
 En tu móvil  
 Pasear

**SEGURIDAD | Perla de la tecnología Credit**

## El 'cibercrimen', una delincuencia organizada que genera miles de millones

**El cibercrimen se transforma en crimen organizado**

*El dinero ya no es el único objetivo, sino también el dominio de Internet*

La profesionalización del fraude en Internet no sólo ha atraído a las bandas organizadas a la red de redes, sino que ha dado paso a una ataques con fines políticos que ya han sufrido algunas regiones del globo, señala el primer informe de Cibercrimen realizado por SII. Obtener dinero de forma fraudulenta no ya es el único objetivo, sino también el dominio de Internet. Y aunque algunos proveedores de Internet ya han sido clasificados por el FBI, los casos de phishing y de tráfico de datos siguen su avance impparable. Por Juan R. Coca.

**McAfee informa sobre una nueva generación de cibercrimen organizado**

El estudio revela cómo adolescentes con amplio dominio de Internet y escasos catorce años se sienten atraídos por el crimen cibernético debido a la celebridad de los criminales de alta tecnología y la promesa de beneficios monetarios sin los riesgos típicos de los delitos tradicionales.

Diario TI 27/12/06 12:57:00 McAfee anunció los descubrimientos de una nueva investigación que revela cómo el crimen organizado está dando a luz una nueva generación de criminales cibernéticos que utilizan tácticas similares a las empleadas por la KGB durante la guerra fría.

El Informe de Criminología Virtual 2006 de McAfee es el segundo informe anual de McAfee sobre crimen organizado y uso de Internet. El estudio, basado en información recopilada de los principales departamentos de investigación de delitos de alta tecnología en Europa y el FBI, sugiere que las pandillas criminales están reclutando a los





It's time back to "reality"





It's time back to "reality"






# Understand Cyber-Crime activities



# Understand Cyber-Crime activities

LAYER #1





# Understand Cyber-Crime activities

# LAYER #1





# Understand Cyber-Crime activities

LAYER #1

**Hack Forums**

Welcome to Hack Forums! [Post a Thread](#) [Post a Poll](#) [Search](#) [Members](#) [Forum](#) [Help](#) [Follow](#) [Contact](#)

Posts: 1 2 3 4 5 Next >


[\[Tutorial\] How to setup Blackshades Stealth \(Part 1\)](#)

10/10/2012 10:23 PM (this post was last modified 10/10/2012 10:40 PM by [Cobra](#))

[Closed Account](#)

**Official Tutorial**

My share with you how to add it to your products  
Sign up on <http://blackshades.net> and then go to [UserCP](#) > [Add New Product](#) > [Add Stealth](#)  
When you done with that you need to sign up for a DVS. If you won't already have one:  
Go to <http://blackshades.net> > [Sign Up](#) > [Find a Host](#) > [Select a host name](#) and take the information he is up > [Create Host](#)  
Then you need to download TAK you can do that here: <http://blackshades.net/tak/conditionality.php>  
Then sign to DVS > [Select Hosts](#) > [Select your host](#) > [Process now](#)  
When you done with that go back to back to [http://blackshades.net](#) > [Add Products](#) > [Download Blackshades Stealth](#)  
When you done with the following steps setup Stealth > [Settings](#) > [Edit your profile](#) > [Active](#) > [Save](#)  
[\(Click to View\)](#)  
When you done with that go back to [http://blackshades.net](#) > [My Products](#) > [Build Stealth](#)  
Here you need to configure your Artery  
**Stealth:**  
-64-1441 - 192.168.1.100 - 192.168.1.101  
192.168.1.101 - 200.168.1.100 - 192.168.1.101  
192.168.1.101 - 200.168.1.100 - 192.168.1.101





## Understand Cyber-Crime activities

# LAYER #1



# Understand Cyber-Crime activities

LAYER #1

Advertisement: This site is IP geolocated. Inside (HTTP), DNS, made to identify geolocations.

Forum: Sybil-Ding Forum

Header: Advertisements from Twitter | Servers | VPS | Domains | SSL

Logo: Insora

Text: Average an extremely high rate (clicks not) click

INFO

Author: World news, discussion, Forum 10, Advertisements, forums, 100% Discussion of world news, anyone can post and comment, advertising

Message from the blog: Thread 10, Advertisements, 100%, freely, anyone, can, blog, discussion of the news

Article: Thread 10, Advertisements, 100%, freely, anyone, can, blog, discussion of the news

Security and Vulnerabilities

Advertisement: World news, discussion, Forum 10, Advertisements, forums, 100% Discussion of world news, anyone can post and comment, advertising

Vulnerability: Thread 10, Advertisements, 100%, freely, anyone, can, blog, discussion of the news

Security: Thread 10, Advertisements, 100%, freely, anyone, can, blog, discussion of the news

Anonymous: Thread 10, Advertisements, 100%, freely, anyone, can, blog, discussion of the news

How to ensure the ownership of their own sites on the network: Thread 10, Advertisements, 100%, freely, anyone, can, blog, discussion of the news


Footer: Home | Sybil-Ding Forum | Advertisements | Servers | VPS | Domains | SSL | SSL

Bottom right: User profile picture of a man with glasses.



# Understand Cyber-Crime activities

LAYER #2





# Understand Cyber-Crime activities

LAYER #2

VERIFIED  
FINST

PM2PMR.me 24/7 instant exchange

This resource is a closed platform. The registration fee is \$50.

Register

Software service "KaliDaff" on Router Remotely - www.kalidaff.net

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# Understand Cyber-Crime activities

## LAYER #2

The screenshot shows a forum interface with a dark theme. At the top, there is a banner for [www.dnums.com](http://www.dnums.com) with the text "Only HQ Tracks For Selling!" and a diamond icon. Below the banner, a post is visible with the subject "Ministry of Fraudulently Affairs : certains forums statutaires". The post content discusses the Ministry of Fraudulently Affairs and certain forums that are status quo. The post has 11,500 threads and 65,247 members. At the bottom of the post, there is a "Scan Legend" section with several checkboxes. The footer of the page features the American flag and the word "FULL".





# Understand Cyber-Crime activities

LAYER #3





# Understand Cyber-Crime activities

LAYER #3

MF

Welcome, [\[username\]](#)  
You last visited: Today at 10:43  
[Private Messages](#): Unread 0, Total 0.

тазетка > Основной раздел > Программирование в сфере киберпреступления

**Zeus.**

"хороший партнер, своевременные выплаты, никакого обмана ;)"  
- [Dee\\_Kline](#)

Best курс U-kash,LR,WMZ обнальбаймод  
ОБНАЛ, ВЫВОД, ВВОД WM, LR, ЯД, WIKE  
ВАШ СКУП СЕРВИС

АВТОМАТИЧЕСКИЙ СЕРВИС ГАРАНТА  
НЕТ ПОРУЧИТЕЛЕЙ? ВНЕСИ ДЕПОЗИТ!  
BLACK HOLE EXPLOITS KIT

Аналог стопке для FF  
WMZ, LR, BITCOIN, WIKE, ALFA, PRIVAT

All times are GMT -5. The time now is 10:43.

Page 1 of 5 | 1 2 3 4 5 > [Thread Tools](#) | [Search this Thread](#) | [Rate Thread](#) | [Display Modes](#)

13th October 2010, 15:16

**harderman** (2) ■ Zeus.

Member

Доброго времени суток!

С сегодняшнего дня и в будущем обслуживать продукт Zeus/Зевс версий 2.0 буду я. Мне переданы исходные коды на безвозмездной основе для того, что бы клиенты купившие софт не остались без технической поддержки продукта. Славик более продукт не поддерживает, исходные коды у себя удалил, не продает и никакого отношения к нему не имеет. Так же никакого бизнеса в интернете не ведет, его контакты через несколько дней будут не действительны.

Он просил меня передать, что ему было приятно со всеми работать, у кого остались какие не решенные вопросы, просьба в ближайшие дни с ним связаться. Все клиенты купившие софт у Славика, будут обслуживаться у меня на тех же условиях что и были ранее. По всем вопросам просьба обращаться непосредственно ко мне.

Всем спасибо за внимание!

Для связи со мной используйте жабер: [\[redacted\]](#)

Join Date: Jul 2010  
Location:  
Posts: 44

Robots have seen things you people wouldn't believe.... And they have a plan.





# Understand Cyber-Crime activities

LAYER #3

## SERVERS, VPS, VIRTUALS, DOMAINS



В СОБСТВЕННОМ ДАТА-ЦЕНТРЕ  
В ЛИВАНСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКЕ

[Правила форума](#) - [Фонд форума](#) - [Статус "Vendor"](#) - [Статус "Seller"](#) - [Jabber @korovka.pro](#) - [Раздача инвайтов](#)

Korovka.CC > Другое  
Халява

Мой кабинет Новые сообщения Поиск Навигация Выход

Страница 1 из 14 1 2 3 4 5 11 > Последняя »


Темы раздела : Халява

Тема / Автор	Рейтинг	Последнее сообщение	Ответов	Просмотров
Халявные CC / FREE CC (1 2 3 4 5 ... Последняя страница) lolita	★★★★★	01.12.2013 15:57 от kracks	618	17,436
Раздача paypal (1 2 3 4 5 ... Последняя страница) Lomik	★★★★★	28.11.2013 17:45 от malavita	58	2,101
[Инвайты] Спрос / предложение инвайтов (1 2 3 4 5 ... Последняя страница) Mr.ArS	★★★★★	26.10.2013 09:01 от stigozol	97	2,793
Поделитесь дедиком) (1 2 3 4 5 ... Последняя страница) Seller	★★★★★	28.09.2013 22:29 от rus616	191	6,100



# Understand Cyber-Crime activities


LAYER #4





# WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT CYBER-CRIME?

## FINAL SCENARIO





# Previously on...



Previously

## Previously on...

- First year, without new Banking Trojans. (Except's KINS aka Kasper)
- Symlink Arrested (January)
- Paunch Arrested (BlackHole Exploit Kit) (OCTOBER)
- FBI shut down SilkRoad and they arrest Ross Willian Ulbrich. (OCTOBER)
- Target Breach. :- ) – (NOVEMBER/DECEMBER)
- FBI With Spanish Police Cooperation take's down Liberty Reserver and arrest CEO. – (MAY 2013)
- ZeusP2P (Game Over) and CryptoLocker Take down. - (MAY/JUN 2014)





Previously

# Has been a special year in the volition of the industry of cyber-Crime

- The feeling of impunity begins to disappear.
- Groups midlevel begin to close and professionalize their assets.
- Ironically, the vetted gang's start to show some gaps.





Previously

## These Changes are due to

- Detentions.
- Proliferation of bloggers / twitters 'investigating' cybercrime scene. (*Pr0n stars*)
- Insider Researchers.
- Leaks (Pasties, services...)





## SWOT ANALYSIS

# Conclusions

*The “industry” of  
Cyber-Crime,  
now are more than  
closed  
than ever.*





# New trends



## OUR SERVICES

# New Trends at Cyber-Crime Industry




- 01** **POS**  
POS Malware - POINT OF SALES SYSTEM
- 02** **TOR BASED**  
NEW MOBILE MALWARE (EG: TOR BASED)
- 03** **CRYPTOCURRENCIES**  
Bitcoin, Litecoin, DogeCoin just Crypto Malware Miners!





## OUR SERVICES



# POS POINT OF SALE, **BUT WHY?**

**The lack of a Banking Trojan for sale and the large increase in demand for cards has moved many players in this business.**

**Citadel users move there business to this new system.**

**Grows offer POS malware sales.**





## OUR SERVICES



Soraya

Para los amigos, la "poyeya".

# POS POINT OF SALE, *What we found on markets?*

- 01 Alina Malware
- 02 Dexter Malware
- 03 BlackPos
- 04 Soraya

**The Beauty,  
the Bad,  
the Ugly  
and  
Guest start**





# OUR SERVICES

## POS POINT OF SALE, *Software as Service? of course!*

The image shows two screenshots of the JackPos software interface. The left screenshot is a 'Statistics' page with a table of bot activity over the last 24 hours. The right screenshot is a list of bot activity entries, showing GUID, IP, Last Active, and Country for each entry.

**JackPos**

Welcome, admin

Logout

**Statistics**

New bots (last 24 h)	1
Alive bots (last 24 h)	9
Productive bots (last 24 h)	4
New dumps (last 24 h)	36
Total bots	14
Productive bots	7
Online bots	0
Online productive bots	0
Total dumps	246

GUID IP Last Active Country

F4-CE-46-27-0E-16	200.171.59.33	1d 5h ago	Brazil
00-0A-C0-21-41-C0	107.217.221.162	17d 3h ago	United States
00-1B-21-0F-80-FE	96.35.154.101	11h 17m ago	United States
00-22-19-04-1F-10	184.155.114.4	2d 5h ago	United States
A4-1F-72-4C-FB-84	66.205.217.123	4d 23h ago	United States
00-1C-C0-DD-54-E0	24.48.116.125	9d 24h ago	Canada
90-2B-34-66-8F-55	207.192.232.15	4d 23h ago	United States
6B-94-23-77-8A-36	96.229.187.67	14d 18h ago	United States
7B-2B-CB-AB-5E-AB	67.197.5.51	2m 15s ago	United States
00-0C-29-E9-27-F7	195.101.250.40	7d 20h ago	France
0B-00-27-F6-49-29	216.232.78.104	2d 16h ago	Canada
00-FF-C3-AF-9B-CF	200.171.59.33	22m 47s ago	Brazil
00-0E-0C-65-32-0E	212.145.66.101	24h 45m ago	Spain
00-50-DE-FB-D6-46	66.187.149.88	23h 55m ago	United States



## OUR SERVICES

# Mobile Malware



**Uses new resources like TOR.  
Increase of injections with support for mobile  
malware.**

### **Mobile malware for sale:**

- iBanking (as Service).
- Perkele





# OUR SERVICES

## IBanking Malware


My projects Phone list SMS list All SMS list All Call list Sounds Contact list Url report

My projects Phone list SMS list All SMS list All Call list Sounds Contact list Url report Project: 500 | Phone: none | Feb 27, 2014 06:24:26 | User: Android Refresh

Telephone number	ICCID	Model	OS	IMEI	Last command send	Last command	Control number	Phone status	Commands
42320943864		133091623402908203020	Unknown sdk	Android 4.4	947947967298271	26-02-2014 14:30:48	contact list (pending)	+683320040295	Select command

My projects Phone list SMS list All SMS list All Call list Sounds Contact list Url report Project: 500 | Phone: none | Feb 27, 2014 06:25:58 | User: Android Refresh

Project ID	Phone count
000	0
500	1
800	0
111	2





# OUR SERVICES

# Perkele Malware

Phone number | Event | Session | Langdata | Setting

item per page: 100  ALL


item per page: 20

id	phone number	os	lang	bank	login	LOG	ip	time	check
59	4916	(Y)	A	DE	postbank.de	<a href="#">LINK</a>	80.136.	2013-06-30 12:10:25	<input type="checkbox"/>
58	491	(N)	A	DE	postbank.de	<a href="#">LINK</a>	46.115.	2013-06-30 09:29:03	<input type="checkbox"/>
57		(N)		DE	postbank.de	<a href="#">LINK</a>	93.206	2013-06-29 06:32:46	<input type="checkbox"/>
56		(N)		DE	postbank.de	<a href="#">LINK</a>	92.224	2013-06-27 18:34:25	<input type="checkbox"/>
55		(N)		DE	postbank.de	<a href="#">LINK</a>	95.111	2013-06-27 17:10:40	<input type="checkbox"/>
54		(N)		DE	postbank.de	<a href="#">LINK</a>	217.221	2013-06-25 06:23:56	<input type="checkbox"/>
53	49		A	DE	postbank.de	<a href="#">LINK</a>	2.207	2013-06-23 05:13:37	<input type="checkbox"/>
52		(N)		DE	postbank.de	<a href="#">LINK</a>	93.21	2013-06-19 14:07:33	<input type="checkbox"/>
51		(N)		DE	postbank.de	<a href="#">LINK</a>	46.14	2013-06-19 08:54:39	<input type="checkbox"/>
50		(N)		DE	postbank.de	<a href="#">LINK</a>	85.18	2013-06-19 08:08:17	<input type="checkbox"/>
49		(N)		DE	postbank.de	<a href="#">LINK</a>	93.231	2013-06-18 20:09:48	<input type="checkbox"/>
48		(N)		DE	postbank.de	<a href="#">LINK</a>	78.49	2013-06-18 17:18:18	<input type="checkbox"/>
47		(N)		DE	postbank.de	<a href="#">LINK</a>	78.53	2013-06-18 07:01:26	<input type="checkbox"/>
46		(N)		DE	postbank.de	<a href="#">LINK</a>	93.216	2013-06-18 05:26:06	<input type="checkbox"/>
45	495	(N)	A	DE	comdirect.de	<a href="#">LINK</a>	84.136	2013-06-17 16:27:53	<input type="checkbox"/>
44		(N)		DE	cortalconsors.de	<a href="#">LINK</a>	93.132	2013-06-17 16:08:54	<input type="checkbox"/>
43		(N)		DE	postbank.de	<a href="#">LINK</a>	80.132	2013-06-17 14:37:15	<input type="checkbox"/>
42		(N)		DE	postbank.de	<a href="#">LINK</a>	213.	2013-06-17 09:35:14	<input type="checkbox"/>
41		(N)		DE	comdirect.de	<a href="#">LINK</a>	87.173	2013-06-17 08:51:38	<input type="checkbox"/>
40		(N)		DE	comdirect.de	<a href="#">LINK</a>	87.172	2013-06-17 08:51:14	<input type="checkbox"/>
39	45	(N)	A	DE	postbank.de	<a href="#">LINK</a>	78.51	2013-06-17 08:41:41	<input type="checkbox"/>
38		(N)		DE	postbank.de	<a href="#">LINK</a>		2013-06-17 05:32:36	<input type="checkbox"/>





# CryptoCurrencies





# CryptoCurrencies

[Statistic](#) [Networks](#) [Reports](#) [Commands](#) [Settings](#) [VNC](#) [Users](#) [Logout](#)

## Statistic

### Clients

total:	147679
Activity last Week:	119982 (81%)
Activity last 24 h:	71749 (48%)
Activity last 30 m:	20307 (13%)

---

Hash rate total:	344124.15
Average Hash rate:	2.33
Hash rate 24 hrs:	176008.80
Hash rate 30 min:	51362.38





# CryptoCurrencies

## Countries

India	15975 (10%)
Spain	9677 (6%)
Thailand	9167 (6%)
Brazil	9093 (6%)
United States	8811 (5%)
Mexico	6700 (4%)
Vietnam	5906 (3%)
Argentina	5014 (3%)
Romania	5006 (3%)
Egypt	4601 (3%)
Italy	4227 (2%)
Turkey	3503 (2%)
Peru	3428 (2%)
Colombia	3267 (2%)





## OUR SERVICES

# CryptoCurrencies

## TOTAL HASH RATE

### Expected Rewards

<b>24 hours</b>	124.24818819 LTC	1279.26 EUR	<b>24 hours</b>	63.54593438 LTC	654.52 EUR
<b>7 days</b>	869.73731731 LTC	8954.82 EUR	<b>7 days</b>	444.82154063 LTC	4581.66 EUR
<b>30 days</b>	3727.44564560 LTC	38377.78 EUR	<b>30 days</b>	1906.37803125 LTC	19635.69 EUR

## 24H HASH RATE

### Expected Rewards





# Examples!






## Examples

# TimeLine

### Brian Krebs

- 18/Dec/2013: Sources:** Target Investigating Data Breach
- 20/Dec/2013:** Cards Stolen in Target Breach Flood Underground Markets
- 22/Dec/2013:** Non-US Cards Used At Target Fetch Premium
- 24/Dec/2013:** Who's Selling Credit Cards from Target?
- 10/Jan/2014:** Target: Names, Emails, Phone Numbers on Up To 70 Million Customers Stolen
- 15/Jan/2014:** A First Look at the Target Intrusion, Malware
- 16/Jan/2014:** A Closer Look at the Target Malware, Part II
- 29/Jan/2014:** New Clues in the Target Breach
- 04/Feb/2014:** These Guys Battled BlackPOS at a Retailer
- 05/Feb/2014:** Target Hackers Broke in Via HVAC Company
- 12/Feb/2014:** Email Attack on Vendor Set Up Breach at Target
- 19/Feb/2014:** Fire Sale on Cards Stolen in Target Breach
- 25/Feb/2014:** Card Backlog Extends Pain from Target Breach

# Example





# Examples

## Example

**About the breach**

**What happened?**

**Has the issue been resolved?**

**Does that information include social security numbers?**

**Do you think you will find anything else?**

**How could Target let all this credit and debit card information get accessed?**

**How can I be assured you are taking the steps to protect my information in the future?**


**Guest information**

When did Target learn that certain guest information was taken?  
Is this occurrence of theft a new incident?  
How many guests were affected by the additional stolen information?  
What guest information was taken?  
How do I know if I was affected by this latest development? Should I call Target?  
Why was Target collecting and keeping this type of information?  
If I believe that my credit or debit card information was impacted, does that automatically mean additional information was stolen as well?  
What does it mean if my information was stolen? What are the risks?





Examples



Example

**TARGET**





# INTELLIGENCE





INTELL

# INTELLIGENCE

... and remember



IN-TE-LLI-GEN-CE

- Emerging threat research
- Strategic partnerships to share intelligence
- Tailored threat focus areas
- Live, dynamic intelligence feeds with advanced
- Actively tracking of cybercrime element
- Daily emerging threat reviews
- Awareness of the changing technology and business environment
- Metrics and rendering data for multiple key threat indicators
- Recommendations on improved and refined processes

- Botnet monitoring and analysis
- Malware reverse engineering
- Social media monitor
- Reputation scans
- Deep web monitoring
- Social engineering threats
- Spoofed websites
- All Source Intelligence
- 

- Emerging tech review
- Loss management
- Vendor management
- Executive identity monitoring






# INFRASTRUCTURES



## OUR SERVICES


# Simple Botnet






## OUR SERVICES

# Simple Botnet With Proxy






## OUR SERVICES





## OUR SERVICES


# FAST FLUX + C&C






## OUR SERVICES

# FAST FLUX + PROXY+ C&C






## OUR SERVICES





# OUR SERVICES


# OWN INFRASTRUCTURES





## OUR SERVICES


# TOR INFRASTRUCTURES





## OUR SERVICES

# P2P INFRASTRUCTURE





# DEMO TIME



DEMO Concept

**BUILD POS ENVIRONMENT**  
**SWIPE OUR CREDIT CARD**

**BREATHE DEEPLY**

**INFECT OUR POS**

**CALM DOWN**

**PWN THE BOTNET AND  
GET OUR MONEY BACK!**





## DEMO RESULTS

Me robo mi tarjeta...



Yo quemé su botnet...





laSalle  
Universitat Ramon Llull

THANKS!



# WARNING!

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# COMING!

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Ken Dunham, Shane Hartman, Manu Quintans, Tim Strazzere, and Jose Andre Morales

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# THANKS!!



# Q/A