

# SECRET **AS** SERVICE

*Key Management for the Open Cloud*

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# ABOUT US

ACADEMIC



DEVELOPER



SECURITY CONSULTANT



APPLICATION SECURITY



SECURITY PRODUCTS



OWASP BOARD MEMBER

OWASP LIVE CD

OWASP WTE

RACKER SINCE '11


PRODUCT SECURITY

HACKING THE RACK

*What do customers mean by security?*

# SECURITY TAXONOMY


## Most important security technologies for a hoster to provide




*Customers don't want to give us their data*

# RISKY BUSINESS

## Organization risk tolerance




## Cloud strategy regarding sensitive data



# CURRENT PLANS

## Block Encryption Blueprint

1/25/2013 1:03 PM



### PROTOCOL SUPPORT

Must support different protocols so that multiple products can integrate to the same system.

### IDENTITY

Must support standard Keystone authentication methods.

### MULTI-TENANT

Must support all tenants for a Cloud in the same system with guaranteed isolation.

### AUDITING & COMPLIANCE

Must support auditing & logging to support various compliance regimes.


### FREE & OPEN SOURCE

Must support for all environments, public and private.

*Every OpenStack project has encryption needs*

# FUTURE PLANS

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openstack™

CLOUD SOFTWARE

## CINDER, SWIFT & GLANCE

Encrypted files at rest.

## RED DWARF

Encrypted databases and tables.

## QUANTUM

SSL Certificates and VPN keys.

## NOVA

SSH keys, encrypted file systems.

## KEYSTONE

Encrypted metadata, user level keys

# DON'T FORGET THE CUSTOMERS

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Customer applications running on Cloud have a different, but overlapping, set of needs from OpenStack services.

## MULTI-CLOUD INTEROPERABILITY

Customers want to be able to store their keying material in a different physical & legal environment than their data. We must support multi-cloud use cases and key sharing.

## EASY INTEGRATION

Many legacy applications were not designed with advanced key management in mind. Customers need easy ways to retrofit existing applications, integrate new ones and connect vendor solutions.

## CENTRALLY MANAGED

Key management is easy to get wrong. Customers need an easy to manage solution with optional expert assistance in configuration and monitoring.

## IMPROVED SECURITY & COMPLIANCE

Most customers have compliance requirements to meet. We must support those needs while enabling real security improvements.





*Look familiar?*

# BADCODE

```
public class CryptHelper {
    private static final String ALOGRITHM = "PBESWithMD5AndTripleDES";

    // Salt
    static byte[] salt = { (byte) 0xc1, (byte) 0xa3, (byte) 0x28, (byte)
        0x1c, (byte) 0x7b, (byte) 0xc9, (byte) 0x1e, (byte) 0x9e };

    static PBEKeySpec pbeKeySpec = new PBEKeySpec("chamber of
        secrets".toCharArray());

    public byte[] encrypt(String cleartext) { ... }
    public String decrypt(byte[] ciphertext) { ... }
}
```

# BADDEFAULTS

branch: **master** Files Commits Branches **1** Tags

/ config / initializers / **secret\_token.rb**

3 months ago Rails & Bootstrap

0 contributors

file | 8 lines (6 sloc) | 0.496 kb

Edit Raw Blame History

```
1 # Be sure to restart your server when you modify this file.
2
3 # Your secret key for verifying the integrity of signed cookies.
4 # If you change this key, all old signed cookies will become invalid!
5 # Make sure the secret is at least 30 characters and all random,
6 # no regular words or you'll be exposed to dictionary attacks.
7 SECRET_KEY::Application.config.secret_token = '0h0u0P0R0Q0 0P0h0M0C0u0P010P0r0P0M0B0L0C010d0P0Z0h0Q0r0d0r070d0a0z0u010d0e0s0e0P0d0e0d0P0s0r0B0m0T0N010r0L0'
```

First 10 results on Google - all bad

# BADADVICE

Google aes encryption ruby

Web Images Maps Shopping More Search tools

About 379,000 results (0.26 seconds)

[Brent's Ramblings: AES encryption and decryption in Ruby](#)  
[www.brentsowers.com/.../aes-encryption-and-decryption-in-ru...](#)  
Dec 20, 2007 – **AES encryption** and decryption in **Ruby** is very simple, although I had a hard time finding documentation on how to do it. **Ruby** has a wrapper ...  
You visited this page on 2/27/13.

[Cryptography Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying, and Love AES](#)  
[rubylearning.com/.../cryptography-or-how-i-learned...](#)  
by Phillip Gawlowski - in 485 Google+ circles - More by Phillip Gawlowski  
Jul 18, 2011 – In this article we will use **AES** for de- and **encryption**, and SHA2 to hash data. ... Now let's take a look at **Ruby's encryption** API: require 'openssl' ...

HARDCODED KEYS

HARDCODED ALGORITHMS

BAD CYPHER BLOCK TYPES

OLD

NULL & HARDCODED IV'S

*Open source key management*

# INTRODUCING CLOUDKEEP

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<https://github.com/cloudkeep>

*That's right, it's castle themed*

# MEET THE KEEPS



## **BARBICAN**

*ReST API*

Barbican is the main ReST API providing secret storage, provisioning, lifecycle management auditing and reporting. It is written in Python using Falcon, Oslo and following OpenStack standards.



## **POSTERN**

*Agent*

Postern is the agent that provides access to secret material. It is currently planned to be implemented in Go, but we may use the Rackspace Cloud Monitoring agent framework (Virgo).



## **PALISADE**

*Web UI*

Palisade is a client side JavaScript MVC application that provides a web interface for Barbican. It is written in AngularJS and can be delivered from the Barbican API server or as a Chrome plugin.



## **KEEP**

*Command line client*

Keep is a python based command line client similar to python-novaclient. It is most useful for server maintenance, troubleshooting and development.

# DESIGN PRINCIPALS


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1. Provide a central key-store capable of distributing keying material to all types of deployments including ephemeral Cloud instances.
2. Support reasonable compliance regimes through reporting and auditability.
3. Application adoption costs should be minimal or non-existent.
4. Build a community and ecosystem by being open-source and extensible.
5. Improve security through sane defaults and centralized management of key policies.
6. Out of band communication mechanism to notify and protect sensitive assets.
7. Use OpenStack tools, processes, libraries and design patterns to ensure easy integration into the ecosystem.

# ATTACK OF THE PLUGINS



**HARDWARE SECURITY  
MODULES (HSM)**



**INTERNAL & EXTERNAL  
CERTIFICATE AUTHORITIES**




**CLOUD  
LOAD BALANCERS**  
**AUTOMATIC PROVISIONING  
TARGETS**



**DATA STORAGE  
BACKENDS**

*Oh god, not another agent...*

# THE AGENT



## LEGACY APPLICATION INTEGRATION

The agent presents a FUSE file system to allow applications easy integration options.

## ENFORCES POLICIES

Each secret has a set of policies that dictate its use. These policies are mostly enforced by the agent.

## KEYSTONE INTEGRATED

The agent uses keystone for identity, pairing and policy management.

## OUT OF BAND COMMUNICATION

The agent communicates with the API to represent real-time data about secret usage.



*Reusable block of configuration governing secret access*

# EXAMPLE POLICY

```
{
  "uuid": "01fb57ff-058c-4d68-...",
  "name": "Polyglot policy",
  "max_key_accesses": 1,
  "minutes_available_after_reboot": 10,
  "events": {
    "log_sinks": ["api", "syslog"],
    "file_path": "/var/log/postern.log",
    "allow_override": false,
    "allow_panic": true,
  },
  "executable": {
    "minutes_available_after_restart": 10,
    "name": "mysqld",
    "path": "/usr/bin",
    "owner": "mysql",
    "group": "mysql",
    "hash": "44aea8f32fa3f1f4..."
  },
  "filesystem": {
    "directory_name": "chamber",
    "owner": "root",
    "group": "root",
    "listable": false
  }
}
```

*The keying material*

# EXAMPLESECRET

```
{
  "uuid": "e2b633c7-fda5-...",
  "cacheable": false,
  "expiration": "2014-02-28T19:14:44.180394",
  "secret": "b7990b786ee9659b43ec5...",
  "secret_type": "application/aes-256-cbc",

  "filesystem": [
    {
      "name": "configuration_key",
      "presentation": "file",
      "permissions": "300",
      "owner": "root",
      "group": "root"
    }
  ]
}
```

**DEMO****TIME**

~**QUESTIONS?**~