

Secure Parameter Filter (SPF)

(AKA Protecting Vulnerable Applications with IIS7)

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Our Observations

- The same old code-level problems
 - Input Validation, Parameter Manipulation, Authorization Bypass, Privilege Escalation, Reliance on Browser Security, etc, etc, etc...
- Can we EVER prevent these?
 - Developer Training? There are always “mistakes”
 - Negative Security Model? Almost always can bypass
 - Positive Security Model? Very difficult to implement



What should we do?

- Root Cause Analysis:
 - **Problem:** The application allowed the user to do something they shouldn't have been able to do
 - **Solution:** Only allow the user do what the application expects them to be able to do
- How???
- Look at what the application presents to the user
- If an option is not presented, don't let them use it
- If we don't ask the user for it, don't accept it!



Secure Parameter Filter (SPF)

- What is SPF?
 - Embedded application “Security Filter”
 - Analyses incoming requests and outgoing responses
 - Every URL and input value requires a security token
 - Generated on-the-fly as pages are rendered
 - Exceptions can be defined for certain pages/inputs
 - Deployed at the application level
 - No involvement from server administrator required



Secure Parameter Filter (SPF)

- Designed to protect against:
 - **Input Tampering & Injection**
Query String, Cookies, Form Inputs
 - **URI Tampering**
Forced Browsing
 - **Forgery, Hijacking / Cross-Site Attacks**
Session-Based Tokenization



How it Works

- Output Filter
 - Analyzes HTTP output to determine what is presented
 - Only URLs and inputs presented to the user are permitted on subsequent requests
 - Append Cryptographic Token on each URL
 - Link HREF, Form ACTION, Script & Frame SRC
 - Insert unique GUID on each form and record form input profile (name, type, disabled/read-only)
 - Encrypt eligible embedded Form input values
 - ASP.NET Machine Key




How it Works

- Input Filter
 - Analyzes HTTP request to ensure it is for only authorized URLs and inputs
 - By default, only pre-determined “entry points” are permitted without a proper request token
 - Inspect free-form text inputs against specified regular expressions (optional)



How it Works





Applied Cryptography in SPF

- Encrypted Inputs
 - 16 Random Bytes Pre-Pended to Each Value
 - Produces Unique Cipher Text (similar to IV)
 - Uses ASP.NET Machine Key to Encrypt
 - Appends Time Stamp & SHA1 HMAC
 - Cipher Text
 - Time Stamp
 - Source IP Address
 - Source Guid (SPF Cookie)



Applied Cryptography in SPF

- Tokenized Elements
 - Appends Time Stamp & SHA1 HMAC
 - Plain-Text (URL, Query String)
 - Time Stamp
 - Source IP Address
 - Source Guid (SPF Cookie)
 - HMAC Key derived from ASP.NET Machine Key



Configuration Requirements

- Default Protection Settings (Required)
 - Protection Scope (URI, QueryString, Forms, Cookies)
 - Main Application Entry Point (URL)
- Exceptions to Default Settings (Optional)
 - Global Exceptions (Form Inputs, Cookies)
 - URI Exceptions (URI, Query String, Form Inputs)



Configuration Options

- Automatic Run-time Configuration Updates
 - Ineligible inputs are automatically granted exceptions
 - INPUT TYPE=TEXT, TEXAREA, etc
- “Black List” Regular Expression Filter
 - Used to optionally block malicious input strings
- Two Modes of Operation
 - Passive: Silent logging of all failed requests
 - Active: Failed requests are rejected




Supported Content Types

- HTML Analyzer
 - Uses HTML Agility Pack
- JavaScript Analyzer
 - Custom functions with arguments that include URLs and request parameters
 - `__doPostBack(eventTarget, eventArgument)`
 - Native properties that contain URLs
 - `location.href`, `window.location`, etc



SPF Reverse Proxy Test Cases

- IIS7 Reverse Proxy allows SPF to protect any web application
 - Used to perform testing against several applications
 - Can be leveraged to determine compatibility with SPF





Live Demonstration

DEMO



Questions

- Justin Clarke - justin @ gdssecurity . com
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- GDS Blog:
 - <http://www.gdssecurity.com/l/b>