

Cloudy With a Chance of WAF

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Akamai Cloud Security





What is a WAF?

It depends who you ask...but most vendors will agree with the following statements:

“A (WAF) is an appliance, server plugin, or filter”

“Applies a set of rules to an HTTP conversation”

“Generally, these rules cover common attacks such as XSS and SQLi” (OWASP)

“..WAFs sit (in-line) and monitor traffic to and from web applications.”

“WAFs interrogate the behavior and logic of what is requested and returned”

“WAFs also detect (and can prevent) new unknown types of attacks. By watching for unusual or unexpected patterns in the traffic”

WAF History

1998: Sanctum's "AppShield"

1998: Gillian's "Exit Control"

2002: ModSecurity

2002: Imperva SecureSphere (2G Positive Security)

- Teros->Citrix, Kavado->Protegrity, Magnifire->F5, NetContinuum>Baraccuda,

2006: Breach Security acquires ThinkingStone (ModSecurity)

2006: OWASP ModSecurity CRS v1.0

2008: Akamai introduces world's first cloud-based distributed WAF

Today: Several cloud based WAFs such as: Incapsula, Qualys, CloudFlare...

WAF in the Cloud: benefits

- Elastic / Scalable
- Distributed (computing)
- Easy to set-up (when offered as a service)
- Offered as pay-as-you-grow service
- Stops attacks in the cloud
- Always up-to-date
- All events are stored in centralized location

WAF in Cloud Security Benefits

- Orchestrated attack campaigns
- Slow & low
- Zero day detection

Orchestrated Attack Campaigns



WordPress Remote File Inclusion
Vulnerability

WordPress Remote File Inclusion (RFI) vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code on the target server by exploiting a flaw in the WordPress core. This vulnerability is present in versions of WordPress prior to 4.7.6.

Trying to inject to the HTTP response via `wpload.php`

The content of the URL <http://www.google.com/robots.txt>

Content of `robots.txt`

```
User-agent: *  
Disallow: /  
Disallow: /wp-content/
```



WordPress Remote File Inclusion Vulnerability

```
GET /wp-content/plugins/wordtube/wordtube-button.php?wpPATH=http://www.google.com/humans.txt? HTTP/1.1  
Host: www.test.com  
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_8_4) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)
```

Trying to inject to this HTTP parameter **wpPATH**

The content of this URL <http://www.google.com/humans.txt?>


Content of hummans.txt



Some Question that Crossed Our Minds:

- Why RFI exploit from 2007?
- Why trying to exploit PHP inclusion on .NET application?
- Why including a legitimate page?



What Else Did This Hacker Do On This Site?





Sending **2212** different RFI exploits



Any Other Akamai Customers Hit by This Hacker?



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
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



Attacking **34** different Web sites, sending **24301** attacks





Lets find similar activity across the internet...


Bot Network that include **272** machines
Targeting **1696** Web applications
Sending **1358980** attacks



Any Other Akamai Customers Hit by This Hacker?

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Still Some Questions that Need to be Answered...



Why RFI Exploit from 2007?

Hacker trying to be lucky
using old exploits

Why Including a Legitimate Page?

Hacker checking exploit feasibility




Why trying to Exploit PHP Inclusion on .NET Application?

Hacker is just shooting all over the place



Attack Summary

- Distributed attack campaign.
- 200 compromised web servers
- Lasting over more than a month.



Slow & Low - Brute Force Attacks



Analyzing 8 Hours of Traffic

4301

Applications were targeted

2848

Malicious clients participated in the attacks

Most of the attacks originated from: US, China and France



289

Highest number of applications being scanned by one IP

531

Joomla and WordPress applications brute forced with 230K attempts

14%

Of the traffic originated from anonymized sources





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
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
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
Bypassing Detection Mechanism

One to One

Attacker is sending up to 15 brute force attempts in 1 hour to application


One to Many

Attacker is sending up to 15 brute force attempts in 1 hour to 207 different applications



Many to Many

- 11 Attackers
- each is targeting between 100 to 231 different applications
- All together targeting 478 applications
- Over time frame of 3 months




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
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Why This Attack is Successful?

- Attacker has time
- Attacker has resources
- Attacker know how to bypass security filters

Zero Day Detection - PHP vulnerabilities



Objective

Find attackers that send PHP attacks

3 Steps Technique

Step 1: Identify vulnerable servers
[...]

Step 2: The Data Analysis
[...]

Step 3: Attack Mitigation
[...]

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3 Steps Technique

Step 1 - Analyze Applications' Behavior

Fingerprint platform behind each app (e.g. PHP)

Step 2 - Analyze Client Behavior

Look for clients that try to access PHP URLs on ASP.NET apps

Step 3 - Big Data Analysis

Calculate clients maliciousness based on the number of apps scanned

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Let's Test Drive This Approach...

950

Malicious clients were detected over one week

~9

The average amount of applications scanned by client

236

Highest number of scanned applications by one client in one hour

We analyzed 10% of Akamai traffic over a 1-week time period

43%

Of the detected clients are web servers

4 days

The average amount of time client was maliciously active

A large, bold, blue number '950' is centered on the slide. It is flanked by two large, light gray square brackets, one on the left and one on the right, which are open towards the center.

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Further Analysis of Clients Traffic

- PHP known vulnerabilities - RFI, XSS, SQLi, Path traversal...
- Brute force attacks - looking for WordPress and Joomla login pages
- Comment spamming
- And in the future: Zero day exploits...





Q&A