



Search and Destroy the Unknown

FROM MALWARE ANALYSIS TO INDICATIONS OF COMPROMISE

Who am I?

- ▶ Michael Boman, Malware Researcher
- ▶ Malware Research Institute
- ▶ Provide the community with knowledge and tools

Detecting the Unknown

- ▶ FBI: There are only two types of companies: those that have been hacked, and those that will be.
- ▶ Always assume that you have been compromised and look for signs to confirm the assumption

Where to look

- ▶ There is gold in those logfiles!
 - ▶ Firewall
 - ▶ IDS / IPS
 - ▶ Proxy
 - ▶ DNS
 - ▶ System logfiles
 - ▶ Netflow data

Firewall

- ▶ New sessions are enough, no need to log every packet
- ▶ Ingress (incoming) AND Egress (outgoing)
- ▶ Denied AND Permitted

IDS / IPS

- ▶ Detecting attacks are "nice", detecting compromises are "cool"
- ▶ You need **actionable** information from your IDS / IPS system
- ▶ Custom rules are the path to salvation

Proxy

- ▶ Detecting known bad sites
- ▶ Trace infections to source
- ▶ Detecting outliers

DNS

- ▶ Log queries
- ▶ Establish DNS query & response baseline
- ▶ Analyze NXDOMAIN responses
- ▶ Analyze successful DNS lookups
- ▶ Identify domain name abnormalities

| Windows 7 regular expressions | SOURCE | EventID Number |
|---|-------------|----------------|
| .*APPCRASH.* | Application | 1001 |
| .*he protected system file.* | Application | 64004 |
| .*EMET_DLL Module logged the following event:.* | Application | 2 |
| .* <i>your virus/spyware</i> .* | Application | Depends |
| .*A new process has been created\..* | Security | 4688 |
| .*A service was installed in the system\..* | Security | 4697 |
| .*A scheduled task was created\..* | Security | 4698 |
| .*Logon Type:[\W]*(3 10).* | Security | 4624, 4625 |
| .*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run.* | Security | 4657 |
| .*service terminated unexpectedly\..* | System | 7034 |
| .*service was successfully sent a.* | System | 7035 |
| .*service entered the.* | System | 7036 |
| .*service was changed from.* | System | 7040 |

Netflow data

- ▶ WHO is talking to WHOM
- ▶ When doing incident response, being able to narrow down the scope is key

Aquire the sample

- ▶ Exctraction from network traffic
- ▶ File on disk
- ▶ Memory dump

Extracting from Network Traffic

- ▶ Wireshark
 - ▶ GUI
- ▶ Network Miner
 - ▶ GUI
- ▶ Foremost
 - ▶ `foremost -v -i /path/to/pcap`
- ▶ Dshell
 - ▶ `DShell> decode -d rip-http --rip-output_dir=output/ /path/to/pcap`

Extracting from Memory

- ▶ Creating the memory dump

```
PsExec.exe \\HOSTNAME_OR_IP -u DOMAIN\privileged_account -p passwd -  
c mdd_1.3.exe - -o C:\MEMORY.DMP
```

- ▶ Extracting the executable / DLL from the memory dump

```
volatility dlldump -f MEMORY.DMP -D dumps/
```

```
volatility procmemdump -f MEMORY.DMP -D dumps/
```

Analyze the sample

- ▶ Confirm the malicious nature of the suspected sample
- ▶ Identify behavior that can be used to identified infected machines

Confirming the sample

- ▶ Static analysis
- ▶ Dynamic analysis

Cuckoo Sandbox

- ▶ Uses DLL-injection techniques to intercept and log specific API calls
- ▶ Uses TCPDump to capture network traffic


Minibis

- ▶ Uses Microsoft ProcMon inside the instrumented environment
- ▶ Uses TCPDump to capture network traffic
- ▶ ProcDOT can be used to analyze / visualize the execution process

Identify IOCs

- ▶ Identifiable patterns in the sample
- ▶ Created files
- ▶ Created / Modified registry keys
- ▶ Network traffic
- ▶ Memory patterns

Mandiant IOC Editor



Yara

```
rule silent_banker : banker
{
    meta:
        description = "This is just an example"
        thread_level = 3
        in_the_wild = true
    strings:
        $a = {6A 40 68 00 30 00 00 6A 14 8D 91}
        $b = {8D 4D B0 2B C1 83 C0 27 99 6A 4E 59 F7 F9}
        $c = "UVODFRYSIHLNWPEJXQZAKCBGMT"
    condition:
        $a and $b and $c
}
```

Snort

```
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET 443 ( \
  content: "| 6A 40 68 00 30 00 00 6A 14 8D 91 |"; \
  content: "| 8D 4D B0 2B C1 83 C0 27 99 6A 4E 59 F7 F9 |"; \
  content: " UVODFRYSIHLNWPEJXQZAKCBGMT"; \
  msg: " silent_banker : banker C2 Traffic"; \
)
```

Finds unknown C2 servers

Mandiant IOC Finder

Collecting:

```
mandiant_ioc_finder collect [-o output_dir] [[-d drive]...] [-q] [-v] [-h]
```

Reporting:

```
mandiant_ioc_finder report [ [-i input_iocs]...] [-s source_data] [-t html | doc]  
[-o output_folder (html) or file (doc)] [-q] [-v] [-h] [-w verbose | summary | off]
```

Searching Network Traffic

- ▶ Firewall
 - ▶ Detection, Block specific communication
- ▶ IDS / IPS
 - ▶ Create signatures to Detect and Prevent C2 communication, additional infections
- ▶ Proxy
 - ▶ Detection, Block specific communication
- ▶ DNS
 - ▶ Detection, Block communication to sites

Conclusion

Contact information

- ▶ Website:
blog.malwareresearch.institute
- ▶ Twitter: @mboman
- ▶ Email: michael@michaelboman.org

Tools mentioned

Snort, DaemonLogger, PassiveDNS, SANCP, Wireshark, Network Miner, Xplico, Dshell, PsExec, MDD, Volatility, Cuckoo Sandbox, Minibis, ProcDot, Mandiant OpenIOC Editor, Yara, Mandiant IOC Finder, Mandiant Redline